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1. Introduction 
This is the final report of the research project ‘Diyanet, the Turkish Directorate for 
Religious Affairs in a changing environment’, conducted between September 2009 
and July 2010 in Turkey and the Netherlands. The aim of the research, which was 
commissioned by the Project Office IRP on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, was to explore the policies, agendas and activities of the Directorate after 
the coming to power of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) in Turkey in 2003. It 
was expected that the AKP aimed to change the traditional role of the Directorate 
(Diyanet) from that of guardian to a republican version of Islam to a formal 
institute actively promoting the ‘Islamisation’ of Turkish society. 
 In addition to Turkey, the Directorate operates in other European countries with 
sizeable Turkish Muslim populations, such as the Netherlands. As a result, policy 
shifts emerging from the Turkish Directorate may influence policies related to 
Islam in other parts of Europe. A comparative investigation of Turkey and the 
Netherlands offers unique insight into the different societal and legal contexts in 
which the Directorate operates. 
The central research question is as follows: 
 
To what extent and how do recent changes in the religious and political power 
relations in Turkey affect the position and politico-religious agenda of Diyanet, 
and how do they influence Diyanet’s relation with other actors in the Islamic 
religious arena?  
 
To answer this question, we have put together two research teams, one based in 
Turkey and another in the Netherlands. The research team consisted of Prof. Dr.. 
Thijl Sunier, professor of Islam in European Societies, VU University Amsterdam; 
Dr. Nico Landman, associate professor of Islamic Studies, Utrecht University; Mrs. 
Heleen van der Linden, VU University Amsterdam; Mrs. Nazlı Bilgili, Sabancı 
University Istanbul; and Mr. Alper Bilgili, Istanbul University. The team 
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commenced research in October 2009. In April 2010, preliminary drafts of the 
‘national’ reports were finalised. Based on these reports, we formulated an outline 
for the final report. 
The research findings are based on a thorough study of secondary literature on 
Islam in Turkey and in Europe, an assessment of relevant documents and 
information on websites, and not least, interviews with informants, officials and 
scientists working on Islam. During research, we actively made use of our pre-
existing network of contacts and scholars of Islam. 
Throughout the course of research, we encountered a number of challenges. The 
first had to do with the characteristics of the institution we investigated; Diyanet is 
a state bureaucracy and our informants often limited themselves to politically or 
diplomatically correct statements. In addition, we had to ensure that the research 
would not be depicted or perceived as an intervention of the Dutch state into the 
institutional functioning of another country. Fortunately, in most cases we were 
able to convince our informants of our intentions, and as a result, did not confront 
any serious refusal to cooperate. 
A more crucial challenge we faced was the sensitivity of the topic. In Turkey, 
due to historical circumstances, the debate on Islam is extremely polarised. In 
general, there are either strong supporters of more freedom for Islam- or strong 
adversaries. The latter category suspects the AKP of having a hidden agenda to 
Islamise the country and introduce Islamic law in Turkey. It was therefore not easy 
to find respondents with a more nuanced and balanced opinion. 
A final, related challenge concerned the sensitivity of the ‘Islam issue’ in the 
Netherlands. During our research we often noticed reluctance on the part of 
informants to speak openly out about the issue. Diyanet is a state institution 
operating on foreign soil. In the present debate on the integration of Muslims, 
‘influence from abroad’ is an extremely difficult issue.  
After finalising two national reports, we decided to structure the final project 
report along four main dimensions (explained below). Following a general 
historical account of Islam in Turkey (chapter 2), the first dimension concerns the 
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institutional and formal characteristics of the Directorate; it is primarily based on 
written sources, official documents and interviews with key informants.  
The second dimension concerns the activities of the Directorate. How does the 
institute profile itself through programs, actual practices and initiatives for its 
constituency? In this regard we have compared written plans with actual activities 
as they were carried out.  
An important function of an institute such as the Directorate is its role as a guide 
for Muslims. The Directorate issues fatwa’s and publishes comments on certain 
theological disputes. With respect to the position of Muslims outside Turkey, the 
role of ‘religious guide’ renders an extra dimension, as it is only with the help of 
these authoritative comments that Muslims are able to cope with the ambiguities of 
living in a non-Islamic society. The role of religious guide also gives us an 
important perspective of how the institute handles novel developments and 
frictions in society related to religion. 
The fourth and last dimension addresses the position of the Directorate as an 
important player in the global religious field. It was expected that important data 
concerning the relation between religious organisations in both Turkey and the 
Netherlands would be gathered. The positioning of the Directorate in temporal 
religious landscapes offers us important insights into possible shifts in the source of 
religious, symbolic and political power. In terms of the Netherlands, Diyanet’s 
activities and position is illustrated by a short case study of two mosque 
organisations in the city of Rotterdam. The case study not only provides an 
overview of actual practices at a local level, but also offers crucial insight into the 
relation between a centralised bureaucracy and the everyday activities and 
decision-making processes of an ordinary mosque association.  
As Islam emerges as a central issue in political and public controversies both in 
and out of Europe, we hope this report will contribute to a better understanding of 
how Islam takes shape in Turkey and in the Netherlands. 
We thank the Project Office IRP, the staff of the Dutch Embassy in Ankara and 
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs for facilitating this research. We especially 
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thank our interlocutors for their willingness to provide us with the necessary 
information. 
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2. Historical Background 
2.1. Islam in the Turkish republic 
 
“It would be wrong to claim that the Presidency of Religious Affairs is a 
continuation of the Ottoman institution of Şeyhülislâmlık (the office of the 
Şeyhülislam, the chief religious official in the Ottoman Empire) or its 
structure. (…) Nevertheless, in Ottoman society, the relations between 
religion and politics and the organization of religious affairs were regulated 
under the authority of the institution of Şeyhülislâmlık, which was granted 
a certain degree of autonomy. This was largely preserved and continued 
during the republican period with some limitations in the field of authority. 
In fact, in the Ottoman system, the head of the religious administration was 
not the Şeyhülislam, but rather the Sultan. The Şeyhülislam administered 
religious affairs on behalf of the Sultan (Bardakoğlu 2006: 9).” 
 
This above quote is from an address of former President Ali Bardakoğlu in 2003, 
the year he became the 16th Director of Religious Affairs – almost 80 years after 
the abolishment of the Ottoman institution of the Şeyhülislâmlık and its 
replacement by the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Reisliği – 
today Başkanlığı). Quoting the law 633, published on 2 July 1965, on the 
Organisation and Duties of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), 
Bardakoğlu summarises those duties as follows: “To carry out religious affairs 
pertaining to faith, worship and moral principles, to inform society on religion and 
to administer places of worship.” As to the Directorate, he states: “[It] continued 
the Ottoman experience to a certain extent, but was given a structure that complied 
with the secular structure of the state” (Bardakoğlu 2006:10). 1
                                           
1 Article 1 of the Law 633: “Duties. 1 – to administer the affairs of the Islamic faith and the 
principles of its worship and morality; to illuminate the public about religion; and to 
administer places of worship:.” ( Görev. Madde 1 – İslam Dininin inançları, ibadet ve 
ahlak esasları ile ilgili yürütmek, din konusunda toplumu aydınlatmak ve ibadet yerlerinin 
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These statements touch at the heart of the matter at stake in this report: the 
relation between the state and religion in Turkey today, and the crucial role of 
Diyanet in structuring these relations.2
In terms of the relation between religion and the Turkish state, we can 
distinguish roughly between four phases. The first phase (1923-1945) covers the 
years in which Kemalism was a powerful political force that regulated many areas 
of public life in a rather authoritarian way. The second phase (1945-1980) is 
marked by political liberalisation, the introduction of multi-party politics and the 
emergence of Islam as a crucial factor in the political process. The third phase 
 Although Bardakoğlu acknowledges the 
changes that took place in 1924, he underlines the continuity with the Ottoman past 
and suggests a rather smooth transition. In fact, this transition was far from smooth, 
as the state elite in the early republican period tried to impose a secular order and 
saw Islamic institutions as a potential threat to the social and political changes they 
wished to accomplish. Many analysts of the early republican period have called the 
reforms of the Kemalists a revolution, a radical break with the old establishment in 
which Islam had been so important. It has been argued that the secularist ideology 
which legitimated the reforms was indeed radical and comparable to the Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia (Toprak 1981). Bardakoğlu’s remarks, however, reflect a 
popular view in contemporary Turkey that is much more positive about the 
Ottoman past and tries to harmonise the values of the Turkish republic with those 
of the Ottoman Empire. In any case, the Turkish version of secularism, as well as 
the unique relation between the state and Islam – a religion to which 98 percent of 
the Turkish population adheres, is highly complex. In order to understand the 
position and functioning of Diyanet, we need to unravel these complexities and 
show how the relation between Islam and the Turkish state has been transformed 
and reinterpreted in each phase of the development of the Turkish republic. This 
chapter will provide the reader with the necessary historical background of this 
process. 
                                                                                                           
yönetmek üzere (…)). ’Diyanet işleri başkanlığı kuruluş ve görevleri hakkında kanun’ in 
Din işleri ve ilgili mevzuat (Ankara 2001), 57. 
2 From now on we will refer to the Directorate of Religious Affairs as Diyanet. 
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(1980-2003) is characterised by the emergence of a Turkish civil society and an 
urban middle class that begins to articulate its religious convictions and outlooks, 
and the increasing visibility of Islam in public life. The fourth and last phase 
(2003-today) is marked by the coming into power of the AK party (AKP). We will 
show that each of these phases, rather than delineating sharp ruptures with the 
period before, can be conceived as providing the necessary conditions for each 
following phase. 
2.1.1. Secularisation in the early Turkish republic 
Reforms in the decade following after Mustafa Kemal (later called Atatürk) 
proclaimed the Turkish republic in 1923, indeed resembled no sudden rupture with 
the past. The continuity with an Ottoman past is, however, a continuation of a 
secularisation process rather than the perpetuation of an institutionalised religious 
landscape. In an analysis of these changes, Zürcher distinguishes three fields in 
which secularisation took place. The first is the secularisation of the state, 
education and the legal system, which impacted upon the institutionalisation of 
Islam and the ulama: the class of religious scholars. Secondly, there were measures 
taken against the use and dissemination of religious symbols. Finally, a 
secularisation of social life was envisaged, which included an attack on popular 
Islam. The first change can be seen as the final stage in the secularisation of 
Islamic institutions of the state, including education and law; this process began 
with the Tanzimat reforms of the 19th century and was virtually complete during 
the regime of the Young Turks (1908-1918) (Zürcher 2006: 227-235). Mustafa 
Kemal belonged to the radical wing of the Young Turks, who envisaged a rapid 
modernisation of Turkey based on rationalism and science. Mustafa Kemal 
frequently underlined that he was not against Islam as a religion; he argued that 
Islam is essentially a rational and ‘natural’ religion (WRR 2004: 98). Nevertheless, 
this religion had to play a very limited social role and many of its political and 
social aspects had to be curtailed. In Mustafa Kemal’s view, Islamic convictions 
and practices should be an individual affair. The state had to guide and facilitate 
these practices. 
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The Kemalist attempts to ‘domesticate’ Islam can be seen in the role given to the 
newly established Directorate of Religious Affairs, Diyanet; it was made clear that 
Diyanet was confined to a separate domain of life, called religion, which no longer 
permeated and dominated other state domains, such as education and law. In this 
respect, the three tasks designated to Diyanet by the Kemalists – organising 
worship, managing religious buildings and religious instruction – were very 
reminiscent of the tasks of the French Bureau Central des Cultes, a part of the 
French republican central administration (Gözaydın 2008: 218). In 1931, the 
position of Diyanet was further weakened, as the management and personnel of the 
Turkish mosques were transferred to another institution, the Directorate General 
for Religious Foundations. It should be noted that measures taken in this first phase 
were primarily designed to reorganise the central institutions of society and to 
bring religious affairs together under the responsibility of one state bureaucracy. In 
hindsight, we can argue that these reforms were indeed far reaching, but the net 
effect was a reorganisation of the relation between religion and the Turkish state, 
rather than a separation. This has often referred to as the ‘Turkish brand of 
secularism’ (Kinzer 2001). 
2.1.2. Islam and politics in post-WWII Turkey 
In 1946, Turkey became a multi-party democracy, which immediately affected the 
relationship between the state and Islam. Competition for electoral support evolved 
into a matter of great importance. As 75 percent of the voters still lived in rural 
areas, the introduction of democracy rendered the countryside a much more 
prominent status. Both in rural areas and in the small provincial towns, a 
conservative, strongly religious worldview was still widespread among the 
population that had hardly been touched by the Kemalist cultural revolution 
(Szyliowicz 1966; Mardin 1989). Socially and economically, the countryside was 
rather isolated. In their election campaigns, the parties were faced with requests to 
support Islamic activities and to soften secularist limitations. Islam became an 
important electoral issue. One of the effects of the changing political climate was 
the Republican People’s Party Günaltay-government’s decision, in April 1950, to 
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transfer the management of mosques and Islamic personnel back to Diyanet, a 
measure that boosted the institution’s prestige (Gözaydın 2008: 220). 
In May 1950, the opposition Democratic Party, under the leadership of Adnan 
Menderes, won the elections with a large majority. In contrast to the Republican 
People’s Party, the Democratic Party had secured the backing of local (Islamic) 
networks, which in the 1950s paid off in the elections. The party showed sensitivity 
to the needs and perceptions of people other than the urban elite. Moreover, it has 
been argued that the post-WWII political reforms, together with the massive 
urbanisation of Turkey in the 1950s, had a much greater influence on the place of 
religion in Turkish society than the Kemalist revolution three decades earlier (see 
e.g. Sunier 1996). 
One of the first things Menderes did was allowing the ezan (call to prayer) to be 
performed in Arabic again. Furthermore, as religious education in schools 
expanded, more training programs for imams and preachers were encouraged. The 
sale of religious literature was permitted and the Democratic Party sought the 
support of religious movements such as the Nurcus3
Because of its concessions to Islamic groups, the Democratic Party and its 
successors have often been accused by secularists in Turkey of exploiting religious 
issues and ‘gambling with Atatürk’s legacy’. However, this is at most a half-truth. 
It is true that Menderes made concessions to the religious sentiments of the 
population, and a series of symbolic measures meant to criticise the secularist 
policies of the Republican People’s Party were initiated by the Democratic Party. 
However, there was no meddling whatsoever with the secular character of the state 
and legislation. A return to Islamic legislation - or a relaxation of state control over 
muftis and mosques - was never considered. 
 during elections. 
Menderes and his followers reacted outspokenly to the continuous accusations of 
the Republican People’s Party, which held that the Democratic Party was 
undermining secularism. Against the Kemalist view of secularism as a defence 
mechanism protecting the freedom of thought from Islamic interference, the 
                                           
3 Nurcus were followers of Said Nursî (1876-1960), a Kurdish Nakşibendi preacher, whose 
movement split up into various branches after his death. 
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Democratic Party proposed a secularism that would guarantee citizen’s freedom of 
religion. While secularism should not be anti-religious, it should be limited to 
matters of state and constitution (Zürcher 1993: 285-7; Yavuz 2003: 61-2; WRR 
2004: 105-6). 
2.1.3. The 1960s and 1970s 
After 1965, the successor to the Democratic Party, Süleyman Demirel and his 
Justice Party, managed to attract the majority of the Democratic Party’s former 
supporters. Policies pertaining to Islam of this large conservative people’s party 
remained largely similar to that of Menderes’ party. Demirel stated repeatedly that, 
although the state continued to be secular, this should not imply that the individual 
should be non-religious. Islam was appreciated as a moral code that provided 
strength to Turkish society. During the Cold War years, politicians of a more 
conservative orientation even saw Islamic standards and values, along with 
Kemalist nationalism, as an essential counterweight to the threats of socialism and 
communism. Religious movements benefited from this view and became even 
more integrated into the mainstream of Turkish politics. (Yavuz 2003: 62; WRR 
2004: 106-7) 
The 1960s also witnessed the rise of explicitly Islamic, or Islamist, political 
movements, whose political outlooks were collectively based on Islamic principles. 
The new 1961 Constitution extended political rights to Islamic groups and granted 
them more freedom of expression. Consequently, Islamic political movements 
were better able to communicate their ideas to the public. This development 
suggests that it was difficult to make a clear distinction between ‘Islamic’ and 
‘non-Islamic’ parties. Most political parties showed a growing interest in Islam, 
which can also be viewed as part of a process of democratisation in Turkey that 
started after World War II. More importantly, though, is the gradual change of 
Islam’s place in society. Whether political parties can be depicted as ‘real Islamist’ 
or as just ‘using Islamic rhetoric’ to attract voters is not very relevant in this case; it 
is clear that the social relocation of Islam caused a reconfiguration of the political 
landscape. The concept of ‘laik’, secular, as it was coined by the early Kemalists to 
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denote Turkish secularism, became a rallying point in the political process of the 
1960s and 1970s. Yavuz rightly argues that “many scholars of Turkish politics and 
society tend to view Turkey’s Islamic movement in opposition to the state rather 
than focusing on the symbiotic relationship between the two. The dominant view, 
that sees an inevitable clash of Kemalist and Islamist ideologies, ignores the more 
nuanced evolution and mutual transformation of state and society” (Yavuz 2006: 8; 
see also Mardin 1989; Çakır 1990). 
The rise of political movements with an Islamic outlook was not the result of an 
increase in piety among the population. The main cause for the electoral success of 
these parties was the socio-economic development policies of the 1960s. When the 
larger parties became strongly geared towards big businesses, or civil servants and 
organised labour, small entrepreneurs (the so-called esnaf) no longer agreed with 
their policies. By the end of the 1960s, these small entrepreneurs had managed to 
usurp control of the Union of Chambers of Commerce of Turkey from the big 
industrialists in Istanbul. Their representative became the next president: Necmettin 
Erbakan, a partially German-educated Professor of Mechanical Engineering at the 
Technical University of Istanbul, who in 1969 was elected to Parliament as an 
independent representative for the conservative town of Konya. In 1970, together 
with a few other parliamentarians, he formed the National Order Party, which was 
banned for anti-secular activities after the Turkish army seized power behind the 
scenes in March 1971. In 1973, Erbakan became the leader of a new party: the 
National Salvation Party, which gave a leading role to members of religious 
brotherhoods, in particular to members of a branch of the Nakşibendis (WRR 2004: 
107). However, Erbakan also successfully represented the voice of those small 
entrepreneurs who considered themselves victims of previous economic 
developments. Erbakan articulated a very specific moral rhetoric that had appealed 
to this ‘class caught in between’. It was a mixture of global anxiety, national pride 
and (Islamic) morality. 
Since 1973, the ideology of Erbakan’s party was referred to as ‘National Vision’ 
(Milli Görüş). Its manifesto included typically Islamist facets, such as an emphasis 
on ethics and morality in education and upbringing, as well as the fight against 
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usury and corruption. Surprisingly, though, the manifesto also strongly emphasised 
secularism. Freedom of opinion and freedom of expression were qualified as the 
foundations of democracy and human rights. However, it was a different 
interpretation of secularism than that of the Kemalists. What was meant was 
complete freedom of religion, without state control, the same understanding of 
secularism that was adopted by the Democratic Party in the 1950s. The Kemalist 
notion of secularism was rejected as the ‘dictatorship of the non-believers’. The 
other Islamist political movement that acquired influence in the 1970s and 1980s 
was the so-called ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’. In the second half of the 1970s, the 
Synthesis ideology gained popularity among supporters of the Nationalist Action 
Party, a radical (reactionary) right-wing party led by an ex-colonel, Alpaslan 
Türkeş (Erbakan 1975; WRR 2004: 107-9). 
Summarising the developments in the period between 1945 and 1980, we see a 
shift in the understanding of secularism, and in the position of Islam in society. 
Secularism is no longer understood as a civilisation to be imposed on the 
uneducated religious masses by an enlightened elite, but rather as a political system 
in which religious values may be respected, even though the political system as 
such is not based on a religious doctrine. The older understanding of Islam as an 
anti-modern force is gradually replaced by an understanding of Islam as an 
important social force in society. However, this shift is not welcomed by all; rather, 
we can observe a gradual political polarisation concerning the place of religion in 
society (Asad 2003).  
2.1.4. The 1980 coup and the Welfare Party 
The beginning of the third phase in the development of the relation between 
religion and the Turkish state was marked by a military coup in September 1980. In 
that year, a junta led by General Kenan Evren, the son of an imam, took control. In 
addition to banning religiously oriented parties, he unleashed an all-inclusive 
ideological offensive, in which Islam constituted a central role. The Islam that was 
officially approved and propagated by the military leadership had much in common 
with the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (Yavuz 2003: 71-3; WRR 2004: 109). It had 
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strong nationalist underpinnings, and it emphasised the link between state and 
nation, and national unity and social harmony; it also glorified military and 
authoritarian values. In addition, Islam was presented as an ‘enlightened’ religion, 
open to science and technology (Evren 1986: 221; WRR 2004: 109). The goal of 
this ideological offensive was to render Turkish youth immune to both socialist 
propaganda and the temptations of radical Islamic movements that were not 
controlled by the state (Yavuz 2003: 70-1; WRR 2004: 109; Birand 1987; Heper 
and Evin 1988). The rather ambitious measures taken by the military in those years 
were designed to reorganise and reshape public and political life in Turkey almost 
completely. 
It was decided that this doctrine of ‘state-Islam’ should mainly be propagated 
and inculcated through education. For instance, it formed the basis of the National 
Cultural Report (1983) of the State Planning Bureau (Poulton 1997: 184; WRR 
2004: 109), and lessons in religion and ethics were made compulsory for all 
classes; the state-controlled media (radio and television) helped spreading the 
message. Diyanet remained just as tied to the state as before, but in 1982 its 
existence and tasks were constitutionally substantiated. These tasks reflected the 
close ties between religion and nationalism that were now propagated. Diyanet had 
to “protect the Turkish national identity” (Poulton 1997: 185-7; WRR 2004: 109-
10). Materially, Diyanet profited from this new policy line: staff membership grew 
from 50,765 in 1979 to 84,172 just ten years later. The spread of ‘correct’ Islam 
was not limited to Turkey; the number of staff members working in Europe for 
Diyanet increased from 20 to 624 over the same period (Poulton 1997: 185-7; 
WRR 2004: 110). 
Parallel to this ‘official Islam’, the Milli Görüş movement of Necmettin 
Erbakan, which was active in the 1970s under different organisational names, 
reorganised in the late 1980s, as did other ‘old’, pre-1980 political leaders. Under 
the banner of The Welfare Party, they took part in political life between 1983 and 
1998. In the 1990s, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current Turkish Prime Minister, 
was a prominent member of this party. He belonged to the so-called ‘new 
generation’ of Welfare Party politicians who wished to reform Erbakan’s political 
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views according to new standards. These politicians considered Erbakan’s ideas 
outdated and not suited to the experiences and outlooks of the newly emerging 
Islamic middle-class. This middle-class was a direct result of the economic policies 
of the 1980s and 1990s, initiated by the Motherland Party under Turgut Özal, who 
later on became President of the republic. Özal adopted an economic strategy that 
did away with the Kemalist protectionist policies; conversely, he was in favour of 
an economic model that opened up Turkey’s borders to the outside world. These 
reforms led to the emergence of the so-called ‘Anatolian tigers’, a new autonomous 
force in Turkish history outside the control of the state, who aimed to redefine 
Turkey by supporting a neo-liberal economic transformation whilst promoting a 
conservative religious culture. Turkish history after 1960 reflects a conflict 
between the emerging bourgeoisie and the hegemonic civilian-military bureaucracy 
over the definition and speed of this process of modernisation – as opposed to 
Westernisation. In this regard, the structures of both class and political alliances 
went through a radical change during the Özal period; as the influence of the 
military-civilian bureaucracy waned, the power of the new Anatolian business 
class, along with Istanbul-based industrialists, increasingly waxed (Yavuz 2009: 
77). This process has created new economic opportunities, a participatory, political 
system, the ‘mediatisation’ of politics and new forms of communication networks, 
and an emphasis on the language of human rights. 
Within a decade, Turkey became a country in economic transition, on a path to 
modernisation and in the stages of producing a new class of internationally oriented 
businessmen. This resulted in a sweeping improvement in the quality of life among 
a portion of the urban population. The new wing within the Welfare Party was 
closely attached to these new policies. In their eyes, Erbakan’s policies were too 
connected to the provincial class of small manufacturers, and in many respects, too 
conservative. For a number of years, the Erbakan wing and the new wing remained 
together in the Welfare Party. The Welfare Party formed a coalition government 
with the True Path Party, the new party of former Justice Party leader Demirel in 
1996. After the ‘soft coup’ of February 1997, Prime Minister Erbakan was forced 
to resign and shortly afterwards the party was banned by the Constitutional Court 
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for violating the principle of secularism. Its successor, the Virtue Party was closed 
down for ‘anti-secularist activities’ in 2001. 
After the abolishment of the Virtue party, the Milli Görüş movement split up 
into two groups: the ’traditionalists’ and the aforementioned ’reformists’. The last 
group founded the Justice and Development Party4
Many observers in and outside Turkey interpret the popularity of the AKP 
among the Turkish population as a sign of the (re)Islamisation of Turkey. But the 
picture is much more complex than a simple ‘return to Islam’; in the successive 
elections since the early 2000s, the AKP steadily increased its electoral support 
with an extended political, economic and moral agenda. This public support arose 
not only from the AKP’s policy of liberalising strict laws on religion in the public 
realm and further restricting the influence of the army, but also from an economic 
agenda that would make Turkey ready for ‘Europe’. A thorough analysis of the 
position of the AKP falls outside the scope of this report, though one important 
aspect of the political situation in Turkey should be mentioned here. 
 in August 2001. Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, the former major of Istanbul, was chosen as its leader. Under his 
leadership, the reformists strongly criticised the political style and policies of their 
predecessors in the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party, in particular the Islamist 
and anti-Western element in those policies. By contrast, they started a dialogue 
with the more secular circles in society, and accepted economic liberalism (Azak 
2009: 74-5). The Erbakan wing reorganised itself into the Felicity Party in 2001. 
Since then, the party did not manage to pass the 10 percent threshold necessary to 
obtain seats in Parliament. 
According to Yavuz and other observers, the AKP is a product of the conflict 
between localised forms of modernity and Westernisation, highlighted by two key 
events: the 1997 coup and the 2001 economic crisis. The party came to power to 
restore the process of liberalisation, and even accelerate it, by fulfilling the 
Copenhagen Criteria for Turkey’s membership of the EU. Thus, the AKP should 
not be treated as a ‘rebellion’ against modernity or even Europeanisation, but rather 
                                           
4 We will use the abbreviation of the Turkish name of the party: Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi, AKP or AK party. 
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a break from rigid Kemalism and the events tied to the coup and economic crisis 
(Yavuz 2009: 16). An important question here is to what extent the AKP can be 
depicted as a ‘reformist Islamic movement’. Yavuz is rather clear about that; he 
calls the present situation, in which Islamic movements are crucial players in the 
political arena, “a conservative revolution” as it seeks to maintain Turkey’s 
generally conservative traditions and bring local norms and identities to the 
national level, whilst also “creating new cognitive spaces for different imaginations 
of the past and the reconstruction of the present (…) and overcoming the rigid 
nation-state ideology” (Yavuz 2006: 7). This transition does not emerge from the 
intelligentsia, but rather from “a bottom-up imagination of those who felt excluded 
and dissatisfied with the prevailing socio-political conditions of Turkey. The AKP 
has attempted to overthrow the ingrained Kemalist mode or patterns of 
‘progressive and elitist thinking’. The main goal is to level the society so that the 
gap top and bottom of society is reduced. In short, the AKP’s dream is to shape 
politics along the identity and needs of civil society”; this process is, in turn, “a 
normative revolution” in that it seeks to moralise the political institutions and 
networks. (ibid.).  
It should be added that the strong position of a moderate conservative movement 
in Turkey’s political arena has also caused a sharp increase in political polarisation. 
Since the early 2000s, there have been a variety of instances where clashes occur 
between the AKP constituencies and the older, republican and strongly secularist 
segment of the population. The AKP movement argues that a ‘real’ democratic 
Turkey should reflect the background of the population; the secularists argue that 
the AKP is slowly breaking down Turkey’s Kemalist legacy. In the next paragraph 
we will present a picture of the situation in Turkey in the past decade. This is the 
beginning of the aforementioned fourth phase in the development of the relation 
between religion and the Turkish state. 
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2.1.5. The AK party in power 
2.1.5.1. The first period of AKP government (2002-2007) 
The AKP was founded in August 2001 by ‘reformists’ within the Virtue Party and 
initiated by Abdullah Gül, the current President of the republic. Within only fifteen 
months, these so-called reformists, who were strongly supported by the new 
emerging business class, managed to turn the AKP into the biggest political 
movement in Turkey’s history. During the 2003 election, the party experienced an 
overwhelming electoral victory by garnering 30 percent of the votes. During the 
campaign, the party presented itself as the new alternative for other parties on the 
central-right side of the political spectrum. Besides the AKP, only the Republican 
People’s Party managed to pass the electoral threshold, and as a result, the AKP 
obtained two-third of the seats in Parliament. 
The AKP positioned itself at the forefront of social justice and reform. It 
developed into a movement that appealed to those sectors of Turkish society that 
were the main victims of the socio-economic crisis. They also had a strong 
foothold in many grass-root level associations and initiatives. In the first years after 
coming to power in 2003, the AKP adopted a very pragmatic and reconciling 
policy; its leaders were well aware of the strong tensions between the secularists 
and the supporters of the new AKP policies, and primarily aimed to prevent 
political polarisation. The absolute majority in Parliament offered the party a 
comfortable position to quickly introduce a number of economic, social and 
political reforms. One of the aims was to pave the way for renewed negotiations 
with the European Union in October 2005. The macro-economic reforms initiated 
by the preceding right-wing central government of the Democratic Left Party, the 
Republican People’s Party and the Nationalist Movement Party were upheld by the 
AKP government. The Turkish economy saw a steady growth, which resulted, 
among other things, in an increase in the general level of prosperity of the 
population. The decisiveness and vigour of the AKP government resulted in a rise 
in popularity, and also made Turkey a reliable partner for foreign investors. 
Although these new economic policies were initiated by the previous government, 
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the AKP benefited politically from the results. This was the main reason behind the 
new victory of the AKP during the general elections of 2007.5
2.1.5.2. The second period of AKP government (2007-present) 
 
In the years prior to the 2007 elections, the AKP gradually became more self-
assured. The party saw its support among the population increase, which made 
political leaders more confident. A very important support for reforms to liberalise 
political life came from Brussels, as the EU argued that only with the complete 
removal of political restrictions for Kurds, Alevis and other minorities could 
Turkey fully become an EU member. Meanwhile, tensions in society increased. 
The renewed victory of the AKP with even more votes (46.6 percent) than in the 
2002 elections (33 percent) made the fundamental gap between the secularist and 
AKP sections of the population even more explicit. The ‘Anatolian encroachment’, 
or the presence of a more self-conscious population with a conservative outlook in 
public spaces – which had previously been the domain of a secularist elite – caused 
anxiety among the predominantly westernised urban population. Many feared that 
the AKP had a hidden ‘Islamic’ agenda, and this feeling was strengthened by the 
pressure from certain parts of the AKP constituencies to lift the ban on the veil in 
public buildings, in particular universities. Lifting this ban required a change in the 
Constitution, for which a two-third majority in Parliament was necessary. Though 
in early 2008 the AKP-led Parliament voted in favour of lifting the ban, with 410 
out of 550 votes, the Constitutional Court, traditional defender of the Kemalist 
legacy, did not accept this decision and even accused the AKP in June 2008 of 
subverting the secular basis of the Turkish republic. The ban on the veil remained 
in place.  
Another issue concerned the election of Abdullah Gül for the Presidency. The 
army and the Republican People’s Party opposition considered Gül an 
unacceptable candidate. His election, however, could not be blocked.6
                                           
5 
 The political 
polarisation in Turkey laid bare a very fundamental and sensitive issue: a more 
http://www.turkije-instituut.nl/2e%20TERMIJN%AKP--396 
6 http://www.turkije-instituut.nl/2e%20TERMIJN%20AKP--397/  
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democratic Turkey, which is a crucial prerequisite to enter the EU, will no doubt 
lead to a more prominent and more visible role of Islam in society and in politics. 
The ‘solution’ that some hard-liner sections of the republican opposition envision, 
namely a constitutional barrier against Islam, implies a continuous state control 
over the democratic process. 
The controversies that have dominated Turkish politics for almost a decade 
reveal the very different notions of secularism invoked by political actors. 
Secularism is an enormously extended semantic field that cannot be captured in a 
single definition (Asad 2003; Casanova 1994; De Vries 2008; Göle 2010; Taylor 
2007; Van der Veer 1996). In the actual political process in Turkey, there are 
different understandings of what secularism should mean. Secularists, led by the 
Republican People’s Party, argue that the AKP aims to dismantle ‘the secular 
character’ of Turkey. Their understanding of secularism upholds a strict control of 
any form of religious assertion in the political arena and in public life more 
generally. In turn, they suggest that legislation should safeguard these control 
mechanisms. This is the version of secularism underlying early Kemalist reforms. 
A more moderate version of this understanding of secularism envisions the state as 
a guardian of the freedom to live without any religious influence on public life. 
Rather than controlling, the state should act as a neutral referee in religious affairs. 
This second version has been operational in actual politics for a long time, but in 
the political turmoil of the last decade among the Republican People’s Party 
constituency, we can witness a call for a return to the strict policies of the early 
republic. 
2.1.6. The AKP’s secularism 
What are the positions in the other ‘camp’? What kind of opinions can we observe 
among those in favour of the present AKP government and their version of 
secularism? Yavuz quotes a speech of Prime Minister Erdoğan from 2006, which 
adequately captures the “democratically negotiated secularism” the AKP proposes: 
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“Secularism, as the key guarantee of societal peace and democracy, is a 
concept with two dimensions. Secularism’s first dimension is that the state 
should not be structured according to religious laws. This requires a 
standardized, unitary and undivided legal order. Secularism’s second 
dimension is that the state should be neutral and keep an equal distance 
from all religious beliefs and should be the guarantor of individual’s 
freedom of religion and belief. It is explained in the second article of the 
Constitution defining the contents of secularism that secularism does not 
mean atheism; rather it means that each individual has a right to his own 
belief of sect; the right to freedom of religious practice and the right to 
equal treatment before the law regardless of faith. Therefore, due to these 
characteristics, secularism is the foundational and integrative principle of 
the Republic. The right decisions of Mustafa Kemal from the days of the 
National Liberation Movement and the concepts that reflect these 
decisions, which are also internalized by our nation and integrative 
concepts, must be jealously guarded. I believe that we must carefully avoid 
turning these integrative concepts [secularism] into a zone of ‘social 
discontent’. For this reason it is necessary for us to protect the meaning as 
well as the spirit of the concepts” (Erdoğan in Radikal, May 2006, taken 
from Yavuz 2009: 159). 
 
This quote could be understood as an invitation for ‘other religious communities’ 
to embrace the idea of secularism as a negotiable principle. Critics argue that this 
does not mean that the AKP considers non-Sunni religious convictions equal to 
other religions. The government’s reaction to allegations made by the 
Constitutional Court in 2008 further elucidate AKP’s position. The AKP’s defence 
counted over one hundred pages in which there was a call for a more ‘modern’ and 
democratic way of dealing with religion in the public sphere. Not surprisingly, the 
document underlines in many ways the party’s loyalty to ‘the values and 
characteristics of the Republic – those of a democratic and secular constitutional 
state’, and claims that the AKP has actively contributed to the social acceptance of 
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secularism. Therefore, the document strongly rejects all allegations of the AKP 
having a secret agenda of Islamisation. Among the trump cards the party brings out 
in its defence against the accusations, are its negotiations with the EU about the 
admission of Turkey: “We have more closely than ever approached the goal of 
modernization as set out by Atatürk - primarily through the distance that we have 
covered on the path to full membership in the EU.” 7
Although the AKP’s “response to the indictment” is primarily an attempt to 
explain why all accusations of their being anti-secular are simply unfounded, in 
some places it becomes clear that their understanding of secularism is 
fundamentally different from that of their opponents who have sued them. The 
AKP explains this as follows: 
  
 
“One of the basic reasons for the opening of this case is the difference 
between the understanding of secularism as delineated in the indictment 
and our party’s understanding of secularism. There may be different views 
regarding the characteristics of secularism. The indictment regards 
secularism as a concept with a single dimension and presents it as a 
‘civilized way of life’ and a ‘philosophy of life’ that should be adopted by 
individuals. This approach suggests that secularism is ‘the last phase in the 
philosophical and organizational evolution of societies’. Such an 
interpretation of secularism is based on a rigid ‘progressive’ understanding 
of 19th century positivism. In opposition to such an interpretation, the AK 
Party’s understanding of secularism reflects an approach which is in total 
harmony with contemporary democratic societies. The mentality of 
secularism as defended by our party never threatens the basic rights and 
freedoms of others. On the contrary, our understanding foresees the 
peaceful coexistence of all individuals within the context of their different 
beliefs and ways of life.8
 
  
                                           
7 http://eng.akparti.org.tr/iddianame_cevap_en.pdf 
8 Ibid., p. 29-30. 
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Whereas their opponents try to frame the issue as a confrontation between secular 
and anti-secular forces in Turkish society, the AKP makes a strong case that, in 
fact, it is about different understandings of secularism, not unlike the different 
understandings of the term in European countries today. 
On Sunday September 12, 2010, exactly thirty years after the military coup 
which gave the army a permanent formal influence on the political process, a 
referendum was held. The Turkish population could vote for a further restriction of 
the political and legal influence of the army, and for a direct influence of the 
Parliament on the selection of members of the Constitutional Court – the highest 
legal authority in the country. Both the army and the Court count as staunch 
defenders of the Kemalist legacy. The Republican People’s Party argued that this 
reform would pave the way for even further Islamisation of society, and greater 
influence of the ‘Islamists’. The AKP, on the other hand, argued that the new law 
would finally do away with the largest barrier to full democracy in Turkey; in the 
end, 58 percent of the population voted in favour of the reform. The EU 
immediately reacted by saying that this was a further step in the direction for full 
EU membership. Regardless of the positions in this ongoing debate, it is clear that 
the controversies surrounding the position of Islam in Turkey will dominate 
politics in years to come. The referendum has further enhanced the political 
polarisation of the country. On the other hand, it may have paved the way for 
further political reforms and democratisation that will enable the whole population 
to participate in the political decision-making process.  
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2.2. History of Islam in the Netherlands 
The first generation of Turkish immigrants mainly consisted of labourers who 
came to the Netherlands as part of an agreement between the Turkish and Dutch 
governments in 1964. The official request for labourers subsided in 1974, though 
the immigration of Turks to the Netherlands continued due to family networks and 
marriage. In the 1980s, there was an influx of political refugees (Azak 2009: 68), 
and at the moment, according to the 2009 figures 2.3 percent of the population of 
the Netherlands has a Turkish origin (378,000 people).9
As most of these immigrants had an Islamic background during initial migration, 
the Netherlands, like other countries in Europe, became an important field of 
activity for Islamic organisations from Turkey in the 1970s. It was also the time 
when the oppression of Islamic organisations in Turkey was severe. In the early 
1970s, the need among Turkish immigrants in Europe to have proper religious 
accommodations, such as rooms for prayer and Quran lessons, increased. Between 
1971 and 1975, there were many initiatives to this end in several Dutch cities. The 
need for mosques was enhanced by family kin networks. According to Landman, 
many people realised that a second generation of immigrants would quickly 
become estranged from Islam should they not be properly educated (Landman 
1992: 42). Sunier argues that the organisational activities among Muslims were 
relatively clear and straightforward during this period. However, these activities 
and related cooperation between Muslims were very local, and mostly focused on 
the provision of accommodation, most of the time consisting of temporary shelters 
like empty class rooms, community centres, and even empty garages. On the other 
hand, there was hardly any supra-local coordination of activities and initiatives 
(Sunier 1996: 39). 
  
From the mid-1970s onwards, an increasing number of initiatives were taken by 
Islamic movements and organisations from Turkey. In the 1980s, these 
organisations were engaged in tough competition for resources and support from 
the Turkish population. This competition, which already commenced in the 1970s, 
                                           
9 http://statline.cbs.nl 
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has largely shaped the Turkish Islamic landscape; not only in the Netherlands, but 
also in many countries of Europe (Sunier 1996). It should, however, be noted that 
the situation in the Netherlands was not simply a carbon copy of the power 
relations in Turkey. This is a gross misunderstanding that has often framed the 
debate on Islam in Europe (Sunier 1996: 61). The fundamentally different legal and 
social circumstances under which immigrants settled in the Netherlands and built 
up their communities constituted a clear break from the situation in Turkey. In 
Turkey, the different religious organisations that now operated among Turkish 
Muslims in the Netherlands had various legal positions and social functions. The 
Süleymancıs, the first organisation to become active in Europe, were followers of 
an Islamic teacher who had built up a network focusing on private religious 
education; Diyanet was a state bureaucracy supervising and facilitating the 
mosques; and the Milli Görüş movement was associated with a political party. The 
different social functions of these movements and organisations resulted in the 
combined ability for an individual believer in Turkey to bring his child to the 
Quran lessons of the Süleymancıs, benefit from the religious services of Diyanet 
and vote for a party affiliated with Milli Görüş. In the Netherlands, by contrast, 
these organisations became more or less equal actors under the same Dutch law. 
Since they all provided the same religious services, they almost by definition 
competed for support. We cannot understand the development of Turkish Islam in 
Europe unless we take into account these crucial conditions (Sunier 1996). 
 The Süleymancı movement became the first Islamic organisation to become 
active among Turkish Muslims in Europe. In the Netherlands, the Süleymancıs 
founded the Islamic Center Foundation (SIC), initiated in 1972 by a Dutch convert, 
Mr. A. van Bommel. In 1978, the SIC was renamed the Dutch Islamic Centre 
Foundation of the Netherlands (SICN). The movement set up its own mosques and 
Quran courses, and developed activities for its own constituencies, though mosque 
services reached a wider public. SICN considers Islamic teaching to be one of their 
most important activities. According to their mission statement, the SICN 
“encourages mutual contacts between Muslims living in the Netherlands and offers 
Islamic education and instruction opportunities to these Muslims”. SICN does not 
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use the official channels (meaning: Diyanet) to hire religious personnel; they train 
their own imams according to their own religious principles.10
Initially, the SICN followed a very solitary course, having hardly any contacts 
with other organisations and institutions. For outsiders it was difficult to get access 
to the organisation and its leaders, but this has changed considerably since the early 
1990s. Representatives of the SICN took part in a variety of advisory boards, had 
regular contact with the government and participated in public debates on Islam. 
The SICN website underlines that the organisation saw the integration of Muslims 
into Dutch society as one of their key targets. SICN became an active member of 
the national Turkish Advisory Board (IOT) and the National Association for 
Contacts Between Muslims and Government (CMO).
 
11 One of the most well-
known activities the SICN organises is the ‘Multifestijn’, a yearly multicultural 
festival, proudly presented as “Europe’s largest cultural fair in Utrecht”, which will 
be organised for the fifth time in June 2011.12
On the 31st of January 1979, one year after the start of SICN, a new organisation 
for Turkish Muslims was founded: the Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation 
(TICF). Its aim, according to the statutory charter, was to spread Islamic culture 
throughout the Netherlands, coordinate the activities of Turkish Muslims attached 
to the TICF and promote relations with Diyanet in Turkey (Landman 1992: 65). 
Although it was not officially admitted, the TICF was also founded to 
counterbalance the influence of the SICN (Landman 1992: 101-2). The TICF 
positioned itself as the moderate and liberal face of Turkish Islam; it could also 
claim to be the alternative for ‘radical’ Islamic movements. Since the TICF’s 
imams were trained in state-controlled institutes in Turkey, an agreement between 
 At the moment, the SICN has 48 
associative members, of which 41 run a mosque. There are another 43 associations 
with which the SICN closely cooperates; of these, some 40 organisations engage in 
youth and teaching activities, and SICN has an imam training centre (Landman 
2009: 17). 
                                           
10 http://www.sicn.nl/pages/over-sicn/oprichting.html  
11 http://www.sicn.nl/pages/activiteiten.html  
12 http://www.multifestijn.nl/2010/  
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the Turkish and Dutch states to send out imams would be beneficial for all parties, 
according to the TICF (Sunier 1996: 65). From 1980 onwards, Diyanet appointed 
imams in all affiliated mosques in the Netherlands. The imams themselves could 
obtain a work permit for the time they were abroad (Den Exter 1990b: 46-47; 
Sunier 1996: 65). From 1982 onwards, the practical and financial issues 
surrounding the religious accommodations were handed over to the newly founded 
Dutch Islamic Foundation (ISN) (Landman 1992: 103). From now on, the mosques 
that were initiated by TICF were brought under the ownership of the ISN. Now 
there were in fact two umbrella organisations: the ISN, which acted as the direct 
link with Diyanet in Turkey, and the TICF, which organised and coordinated 
activities for the members of the participating associations. Soon TICF/ISN 
became the largest umbrella organisation in the Netherlands. Although other 
organisations grew considerably over the course of many years, the ISN - with 
some 142 mosques – remains the most expansive Turkish Islamic organisation in 
the Netherlands.13
In the early 1980s, as a reaction to the growing influence of TICF/ISN but also 
because of the repression following the 1980 military coup, supporters of the Milli 
Görüş movement took refuge in Europe, where it became active among Muslims 
abroad. The headquarters of Milli Görüş is currently in Cologne, Germany. Since 
1997, two branches have remained operational in the Netherlands. The northern 
branch, Milli Görüş Northern Netherlands (MGNN), coordinates activities and 
mosques in the northern part of the country. The Dutch Islamic Federation (NIF) 
coordinates those in the southern part of the country (Lindo 2008: 2). NIF was the 
former national umbrella organisation, though due to political differences in 
opinion, it split up. NIF has about 35 mosques and 45 youth associations and 
women’s organisations (Landman 2009: 17). 
 The organisation and activities of the ISN and the TICF will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapters.  
Apart from these aforementioned three umbrella organisations, there are a 
number of smaller associations of Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands, among 
                                           
13 
http://www.diyanet.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=145&Itemid=97  
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which the Gülen movement and other Nurcu branches are the most active. The 
relatively large community of Alevi Muslims (between 20 and 30 percent of all 
Turkish migrants) has been organised by the Dutch Federation of Alevi and 
Bektashi Associations (HAK-DER) since 1991 (Landman 1992: 145-46). In the 
next chapters we will mainly deal with the organisations linked with Diyanet. The 
other organisations will be mentioned only occasionally. 
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3. Diyanet as an Institution 
3.1. In Turkey 
3.1.1. The formal tasks of Diyanet 
As was already mentioned in Chapter 2, the official task given to Diyanet when it 
was established in 1924 was threefold: 1. to administer the affairs of the Islamic 
faith and the principles of its worship and morality; 2. to illuminate the public 
about religion; and 3. to administer places of worship. This last task was 
transferred to another institution, the Directorate General for Religious 
Foundations, in 1931, but restored to Diyanet in 1950 – and the threefold task has 
since been reiterated in several official documents, including Act no. 633 of 2 July 
1965.14
Moreover, Diyanet is mentioned briefly in the constitutions of 1924, 1961 and 
1982. The 1982 Constitution mentions Diyanet in the 136th article; this article 
states that Diyanet is part of the General Administration (genel idare, i.e. the 
Ministry led by the Prime Minister himself) and that it functions in accordance 
with the principle of secularism, staying out of all political ideas and opinions and 
identifying national solidarity and unity as its primary aim.
 Our informants from the institution frequently quoted these standard texts. 
15
The above-mentioned administration of places of worship, i.e. mosques, has to 
be understood in the limited sense of management – not in the sense of actual 
construction. According to our informants within the institution, building and 
repairing mosques was not part of Diyanet’s budget until recently. Leaving the 
 This article thus 
defines Diyanet as an institution of the secular Turkish state, operating within the 
official limits of state ideology. 
                                           
14 Gözaydin (2008: 219) claims that technically Diyanet operates in a legal vacuum as the 
Turkish Parliament has now accepted a new Act on Religious Affairs in 1975, which 
replaces an earlier act of 1965. However, the President refused to sign it and the 
Constitutional Court supported his refusal. The legal lack of clarity resulting from this 
dispute seems not to hinder the organisation and activities of the institution.  
15 
http://www.diyanet.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=145&Itemid=97 
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historical and monumental mosques out of the picture, almost no public funding 
has been made available for building new mosques or repairing existing ones. 
However, the administration of mosques does give Diyanet a considerable amount 
of control over religious life. It is no coincidence that the ‘soft coup’ of February 
1997 was followed by legislation to broaden Diyanet’s authority and 
responsibilities over mosques and masjids (smaller mosques). A new regulation 
proclaimed that mosques and masjids could only be opened for worship with the 
permission of Diyanet, which would subsequently take on an administrative role. 
The regulation also applied to already established mosques; these existing 
mosques, built and opened for worship by others, would be transferred to Diyanet 
in three months and Diyanet would provide these mosques with the necessary 
cadres in proportion with the means available. The mosques were agreed to be 
‘public property’,16
3.1.2. Important tool for the state 
 implying that mosques in the hands of private religious 
organisations were deemed illegal. 
It is often repeated by political commentators that the Turkish state uses Diyanet 
against the democratisation of religion and its possible influence on the social-
political sphere (Gözaydın 2009: 246). The founders of the Republic, aware of the 
impossibility of ignoring the place of religion in people’s lives entirely, established 
Diyanet with the intention of protecting the secular order through provision of 
public religious services by the state and ensuring that personnel would continue to 
provide such services under state control (Gözaydın 2009: 273-278). Turhan 
Feyzioğlu claims that Diyanet has been kept within the administration of the 
Turkish Republic not only for provision of religious service but also, more 
significantly, for protecting the secular nature of the state and preventing the 
intervention of religion in state affairs and politics (Feyzioğlu 1982: 188-216). A 
similar point is made by Soysal, who suggests that tax money spent on religious 
officials is not used for including religion within state affairs; rather, taxes are 
spent to prevent the intervention of religion in state affairs (Soysal 1975: 2). As 
                                           
16 Resmi gazete (Official gazette), (1998, 31 July), legislation code 4379-80. 
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Gözaydın points out, the Turkish law on political parties also strongly suggests that 
Diyanet is considered an indispensible part of the secular system. This law not only 
prohibits the use of religion in politics; but article 89 of this law also makes it an 
offence to challenge the status of Diyanet and calls for the closure of political 
parties which advocate the abolishment of Diyanet (Gözaydın 2009: 286). In fact, 
the Constitutional Court banned a political party for this very reason (Otto and 
Dekker 2006). 
One of our interviewees, Mr. Subaşı, the advisor of Faruk Çelik, the devlet 
bakanı (Minister of State) responsible for Diyanet, also stressed that Diyanet 
should be considered a part of Turkish secularism. However, without 
understanding the meaning of secularism in Turkey, it is hard to understand 
Diyanet. For instance, according to Mr. Subaşı, during each military coup, while 
the Kemalist system was purportedly being restored, Diyanet became stronger. 
Whenever there is mention of a threat of religious reactionism, Diyanet is awarded 
more funding and responsibilities. When unwelcome interpretations of Islam begin 
to circulate, it is through the medium of Diyanet that the Turkish republic can 
formulate religious alternatives. 
In a 2005 publication, Mr. Subaşı underlines the secular use of Diyanet even 
stronger when writing about the perceived threat of “reactionary Islamic 
organisations” that could harm the Turkish aim of modernisation. In this scenario, 
he argues, all state instruments have the joint responsibility of fighting against this 
serious threat. In the secularism of the Turkish state, Subaşı claims, the aim is to 
replace the entanglements between the state and religion through the primacy of the 
state. Religion may continue to exist, but this religion should not be a barrier for 
the development of the system: it should have a function within it. One of the 
examples Subaşı provides for this attitude is the Turkish government making 
religious courses compulsory following the 12 September 1980 coup d’état. 
Although some secularists have criticised this move as ‘reactionary’, the idea 
behind the law was that religion, if left unchecked, could easily be turned into a 
dangerous weapon by malevolent people (Subaşı 2005: 158-160).  
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The fact that Diyanet was established by Atatürk himself is, according to Mr. 
Subaşı, an important legitimising factor, especially against secular critics of the 
institution. 
Although Mr. Subaşı stresses the crucial role that the central administration has 
in mind for Diyanet, he also emphasises the limits of the institute. Diyanet would 
never wish to make religion a determining factor in the public sphere; Mr. Subaşı 
states that the Turkish republic should be seen as a continuation of the Ottoman 
Empire. The republic ‘borrowed’ certain institutions from the Empire and adapted 
them where necessary. From this perspective, he sees Diyanet as a continuation of 
the Office of the Şeyhülislam, the highest religious official in the Ottoman Empire. 
Although there is, admittedly, a decline in the scope of responsibilities and duties, 
both institutions act in a similar way as supporting tools of the state. In fact, they 
are indispensable to the state. However, Mr. Subaşı quickly adds that the President 
of Diyanet should never attempt to resemble the religious authorities of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
The role of Diyanet also goes beyond a defensive strategy to prevent religious 
influence in state affairs; it is also presented as an effort to change religious 
perceptions of the people. Atatürk strongly rejected certain interpretations of Islam 
and the religious practices associated with them, like mysticism and the 
mythological and legendary narratives in some Islamic traditions. In line with the 
strong positivist tendencies of that period (the 1920s and 1930s), those 
manifestations of religion were to be abandoned, while the morality of the religion 
was to be preserved. For example, the closure of dervish lodges by Atatürk must be 
seen as an attempt to reform Islam: to turn it into a more rational and morality-
based religion. This intention to reform the Islamic faith has continued to be a part 
of the political discourse in Turkey. The last Prime Minister before prior to the 
1960 coup, Şemseddin Günaltay, who was known to be the first ‘Islamist’ Prime 
Minister even though he was a member of the Republican People’s Party (Altun 
2004: 160-163), was clear about the necessity of providing new interpretations of 
the Islamic teaching to replace more traditional interpretations. According to 
Günaltay, the problem is not Islam; it is the wrong understandings of it. This 
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problem was identified as the main cause of Islamic reactionism and a challenge to 
be overcome (Altun 2004: 168-169). 
Referring to the reformist intentions of the republic’s founding father, Özer 
Ozankaya states that Diyanet is a necessary tool to influence the people “until 
religious sentiments are devoid of vain beliefs, until religion is free from intentions 
of exploitation, until adults can form their own beliefs with their free wills and 
until religion is not a matter of repression anymore” (Ozankaya 1995: 215-216). 
All these understandings of Diyanet and the duties attributed to it show that the 
Turkish state aims to make the Turkish people accept an Islamic identity that is in 
line with the construct of the state itself (Gözaydın 2009: 278). 
A slightly different perspective on the official role of Diyanet was given by the 
mufti of Istanbul, Mr. Çağrıcı. According to Mr. Çağrıcı, Diyanet brings unity by 
speaking with authority. Diyanet, he claims, is an institution that provides religious 
unity and solidarity; that prevents radicalism; and that is respected by the masses, 
who look to Diyanet for religious guidance. The absence of a central and 
authoritative religious institution like Diyanet would create religious controversies 
and turmoil. Mr. Çağrıcı uses Pakistan as an example to prove this point; Pakistan 
was the most promising Muslim country in the 1960s and 1970s, but because the 
administration could not provide unity in the public discourse on religious affairs, 
today “everyone is talking at once”. Although one may question the adequacy of 
this comparison between Turkey and Pakistan, the point of Mr. Çağrıcı is clear: the 
presence of a unified state institution for religious affairs prevents fragmentation of 
the Muslim community in a variety of ‘cemaats’.17
                                           
17 The term ‘cemaat’ can have two different meanings in the Turkish context. A certain 
group of people praying together at the same moment in any given mosque can be referred 
to as a cemaat. In this case, it does not always refer to a fixed group of people, as in Turkey, 
except for example some elderly people, people do not pray in the same mosque all the 
time. A second meaning of cemaat refers to followers of religious groups or movements 
like the Süleymancıs or Fethullahcıs, who gather together as followers of a specific group 
or movement and whose activities are not necessarily limited to praying (Bila 1989). It is 
this second meaning of cemaat that is often used in arguments concerning the monopoly of 
Diyanet, or its co-existence with other cemaats in the Turksh social sphere. 
 Diyanet’s relation with other 
religious bodies and organisations in Turkey will be discussed later. 
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3.1.2.1. Puppet of the regime? 
The task ascribed to Diyanet by the state and secularist authors has led its critics to 
suggest that the institution cannot have any religious legitimacy, as it is simply a 
puppet of the secular regime. 
According to Ismail Kara, a Professor of Islamic Philosophy at Marmara 
University, Diyanet can hardly be called a religious institution; the President of 
Diyanet is appointed by the secular state of the Turkish republic, just as any other 
state official (Kara 2003: 64). Because of the direct appointment by the Prime 
Minister, the President of Diyanet resembles other civil servants, whose main 
purpose is to apply the policies of the governments. Kara points at a change in the 
appearance of the cadres of Diyanet following the coup of 12 September 1980 to 
illustrate how Diyanet officials indeed ‘became’ ordinary civil servants. Muftis 
without a traditional religious appearance, wearing a tie or lacking a beard or 
Islamic cap (who began to emerge after the coup) are, according to Ismail Kara, 
symbolically leaving behind the religious/spiritual identities they possess. These 
cadres of Diyanet become ordinary civil servants of the state in this way, without 
any particular religious mark of identification (Kara 2003: 110). 
Many other Muslim writers and journalists have criticised the “so-called 
representatives of Islam and Muslims” (Diyanet officials) of being appointed and 
hence being tied to political authority (Dilipak 1990: 183). Even the former 
President of Diyanet, Said Yazıcıoğlu, once mentioned in a newspaper interview 
that Turkey cannot be considered a secular state, as secularism “in scientific and 
Western terms” means the separation of state and religious affairs. Religion, 
according to Yazıcıoğlu, should have been left to the cemaats (Bila 1989). The 
counter argument came from an earlier Diyanet President, Lutfi Doğan, who 
argued that by leaving religion to cemaats, the national unity will be harmed, 
religious communities will attempt to establish theocratic states and sectarian 
conflicts will emerge (Bila 1989). 
The position of Diyanet within the state has not only been discussed in terms of 
the legitimacy of its existence, but also in relation to suggesting alternatives for its 
status. One of these alternatives was to provide autonomy to the institution while 
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still keeping it within the state administration. Although the term ‘autonomy’ does 
not have a clearly set legal connotation, an autonomous institution is expected to be 
free from the influence of political power (Gözaydın 2009: 282). One of the former 
presidents of Diyanet, Tayyar Altıkulaç, argues that Diyanet should at least be 
directly tied to the Prime Ministry and have its President elected by a council 
representing the organisation itself, hereby avoiding direct political choices 
(Gözaydın 2009: 281). 
Of course, there are voices within Diyanet that attempt to downplay or deny 
political influence on the institution. Our respondent, Mr. Çağrıcı, mufti of 
Istanbul, categorically claimed that Diyanet has never been used by politics and no 
politicians have ever dictated tasks to Diyanet. From his point of view, Diyanet has 
never attempted to determine political decisions. This view is supported by Mr. 
İzzet Er, who explains that the government is not in a position to formulate 
religious opinions, and “cannot tell Diyanet to give a certain fatwa. Even if they 
did, the Higher Council of Religious Affairs (the organ of Diyanet taking decisions 
on religious issues) would never accept it. They take their decisions according to 
the sources of Islam.” The only way the government intervenes in Diyanet’s affairs 
is through appointments. “As they have the authority of taking the final decision, 
this is their normal right”, he adds. “The governments sometimes have some 
preferences for people to be appointed in certain offices and they express their 
views in an acceptable manner.” 
Mr. Necdet Subaşı also argues that the successive Turkish governments have 
always respected the presidents of Diyanet and left them relative freedom to 
manage their own affairs. The limited role of religion in state matters was made 
clear implicitly, but policy makers refrained from direct interference in Diyanet. Of 
course, this relative internal autonomy required that the state trusted the 
competence as well as the loyalty of Diyanet’s presidents. 
3.1.3. Internal organisation 
The study of Gözaydin presents no less than 20 organisational charts of Diyanet, 
covering the period between 1924-2008. A comparison of these charts shows that, 
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from its early days, the organisation rested on two pillars, namely the centre in 
Ankara and the regional offices in the various provinces (currently 81 in number) 
and districts (numbering 957). Since 1978, a third pillar consists of the offices 
abroad, all of which are attached to Turkish Embassies or Consulates (currently in 
22 different countries). Germany, the country with the largest Turkish population 
outside Turkey, has offices of Diyanet in 13 regional Consulates. 
3.1.3.1. The centre 
Diyanet’s centre in Ankara has witnessed a growth in size and complexity. Today, 
the central organisation is structured in seven departments for the core activities 
(ana hizmet), four departments for communication and supervision (danışma ve 
denetim), and five support units (yardımcı) (see below). 
 
 
Figure 1: Central Organisation of Diyanet18
 
 
The core activities which are identified in the organisational chart are as follows: 
1. The Higher Council of Religious Affairs, which is the highest policy making 
body in Diyanet and is in charge of approving the policy decisions of the 
President of Diyanet; it is involved with publications and answers religious 
questions. It consists of a chairman and fifteen members. 
2. The Quran Editions Inspection, a body that corrects oral and written work and 
oversees printed and digital editions of the Quran. 
                                           
18 www.diyanet.gov.tr , Sep 2010 
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3. Directorate for Religious Services, which supports day-to-day worship by, for 
example, publishing prayer times for various locations in the world. 
4. Directorate for Religious Education, which is responsible for regional centres for 
religious instruction and the personnel working there. 
5. The Hajj Directorate, in charge of organising the Pilgrimage to Mecca. 
6. The Directorate for Religious Publications, which not only publishes books, 
magazines and audio cassettes but also runs book stores. 
7. Directorate for External Relations, which is responsible for Diyanet’s activities 
abroad, including the preparation of imams to be sent to Western European 
countries. This Directorate also is involved in international inter-religious 
dialogue activities. 
 
The communication, supervision-and-control and support units are internal 
divisions which can be found in any large organisation, and need no further 
explanation.  
The institution as a whole is led by the President and five Vice Presidents.19
 
 
The Higher Council of Religious Affairs 
 
As the Higher Council of Religious Affairs (HCRA) is the highest decision and 
consultation organ of Diyanet, it is logical to discuss its position and role in some 
more detail. This Council consists of sixteen members, four of whom are selected 
from a pool of university Professors specialised in Islamic Studies. Members of  
the council are formally independent of the other cadres of Diyanet, including that 
of the President, although the President is included as a member. The President of 
Diyanet does have a say in the selection of members; a selection committee 
nominates candidates from whom he can chose. However, after this selection, 
formal appointment results from a decision made by the Cabinet under the approval 
of the President of the Republic. 
                                           
19 www.diyanet.gov.tr , Sep 2010  
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Whenever he is available, the President of Diyanet chairs the meetings of the 
Council. The members’ term of office is seven years. The chair and vice-chair are 
elected by the members of the HCRA with a simple majority vote. The Council can 
meet when a majority of the sixteen members is available; decisions can be made 
by a simple majority of those present. The President of Diyanet does not have 
superior control over the Council; he acts as an ordinary member of the HCRA, 
and in terms of decision-making, his vote is counted as just one vote. The HCRA 
can make decisions even in administrative issues, and these decisions must be 
implemented by the specific departments of Diyanet. 
Another institution that should be mentioned in this context is the Higher 
Religion Consultation. The consultation takes place every five years, and any 
person who has ever been a member of the HCRA, the current members of the 
Council, the city muftis, or academics from university Faculties of Theology come 
together to meet. As an outcome of these meetings, publications are prepared and 
current religious issues are discussed, as related to us by Saim Yeprem, who 
organised the meeting in 2002 and is a former member of the HCRA. 
3.1.3.2. The regional offices 
The centralised character of the Turkish state is reflected in the structure of 
Diyanet, as all major decisions are made in Ankara. However, Diyanet has a 
extensive network of regional offices covering all the Turkish provinces and sub-
provinces (il and ilçe). The regional offices are led by a mufti. The original 
meaning of this term is a person who is entitled to issue fatwa’s, or Islamic legal 
advice. In the Turkish context, however, the mufti (of müfü) is the highest official 
in one of the Diyanet districts. The regional mufti supervises the work of preachers, 
imams, muezzins (the ones who perform the call to prayer), teachers of Quran 
courses, and other local Diyanet officials. Like other state institutions, there is a 
hierarchy between the province and the sub-province. Diyanet began opening 
Education Centres (Eğitim Merkezi) in the 1970s in the regions of Bolu, Ankara 
and Istanbul (Den Exter 1990: 15), and later in other cities. Today, there are 
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eighteen regional Education Centres; the result of these developments can be 
visualised in the organisational chart for the regions below:  
 
Figure 2: Regional organisation of Diyanet20
 
 
3.1.3.3. The offices abroad 
Diyanet’s website only briefly makes mention of its offices abroad, indicating that 
they are either associated with Embassies, in which case the Diyanet official has 
the status of a counsellor of the Embassy, or with Consulates, where the Diyanet 
official is an attaché. However, to operate effectively in foreign countries, 
associations and foundations have been created according to the legal requirements 
and opportunities of the respective nations. For the Netherlands, the internal 
structure of Diyanet institutions is described below. 
3.1.4. Statistical data 
Opponents of both the AKP and Diyanet have suggested that the current 
government reveals a hidden religious agenda by increasing the amount of 
personnel and budget of Diyanet. However, it is difficult to substantiate this claim 
based on the statistics of Diyanet itself. The table below shows the increase in the 
number of personnel throughout the years. Besides yearly fluctuations, the total 
increase in the number of personnel between 1998-2008 is 4.2 percent (see below).  
                                           
20 www.diyanet.gov.tr, Sep. 2010. 
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Table 1: Number of personnel, 1998 - 200821
Year 
 
Personnel 
1998  79 685  
1999  77 795  
2000  75 433  
2001  76 044  
2002  74 374  
2003  74 114  
2004  71 693  
2005  80 299  
2006  79 810  
2007  84 195  
2008  83 033  
 
As the vast majority of Diyanet personnel works as imam and preacher in mosques, 
these figures must be related to the number of mosques in the same period. The 
table below shows the number of mosques, with a total increase of 8.5 percent 
between 1998-2008.  
 
Table 2: Number of mosques and personnel, 1998 - 200822
Year 
 
Mosques Personnel 
1998 73 772   79 685  
1999  74 356   77 795  
2000  75 002   75 433  
2001  75 369   76 044  
2002  75 941   74 374  
2003  76 445   74 114  
2004  77 151   71 693  
2005  77 777   80 299  
2006  78 608   79 810  
2007  79 096   84 195  
2008  80 053   83 033  
                                           
21 İstatistiksel Tablolar / Personel Sayısı (Statistical Tables / Number of Personnel) 
Retrieved from Diyanet’s official website.  
http://www.Diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/tanitim/istatistiksel_tablolar/1_personel/1_1_personel_sa
yisi.xls  
22 İstatistiksel Tablolar / Cami Sayısı (Statistical Tables / Number of Mosques) Retrieved 
from Diyanet’s official website.  
http://www.Diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/tanitim/istatistiksel_tablolar/2_cami/2_1_cami_sayisi.xls 
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The first table shows that the number of personnel in 2008 is higher than in 1998; 
however, in certain years – especially between 1998 and 2004 - the number of 
personnel sharply decreases. On the other hand, the number of mosques has a 
steady trend of increasing in these years, and these new mosques necessitate an 
increase in the number of Diyanet personnel. Thus the normal trend in the number 
of personnel does not match the increase in the number of the mosques. This point 
is frequently raised by the current AKP government when the opposition and media 
criticise the increase in Diyanet personnel.23
In 2005, 30.8 percent of the mosques did not have Diyanet personnel (Çakır and 
Bozan 2005: 22). Moreover, the government emphasises the fact that the state does 
not build mosques in Turkey; it is the people themselves who fund and maintain 
mosques. The only thing the state should do is appoint imams to these mosques. 
The government, for that reason, declared that 15,000 people would be hired in 
2010
 The government argues that the 
current number of personnel is far from satisfying the needs of the mosques in 
Turkey. Many mosques in the countryside do not have any personnel appointed by 
Diyanet. As we can see, the numbers and percentages of total increase support this 
view. 
24
When the number of Diyanet personnel is analysed in more detail, it can be 
observed that the biggest portion of personnel graduated from the High School for 
Imams and Preachers. The group with a lower education level is a minority 
compared to the rest of the personnel. 
, marking the sharpest increase in the number of the personnel since 1998.  
 
                                           
23 See for instance ‘3 kadrodan biri Diyanet’e’ (One out of every three cadres is provided 
to Diyanet), (2009, November 10), Vatan. Retrieved from 
http://w9.gazetevatan.com/haberdetay.asp?detay=3_kadrodan_biri_Diyanete&tarih=09.01.
2010&Newsid=270104&Categoryid=2 
24 Diyanet’e 15 bin kadro müjdesi (Good news for Diyanet: 15,000 cadres), (2007, March 
26), Yeni Şafak. Retrieved from http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?i=37290 
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Table 3: Number of personnel by education level, 200825
  
 
Number  Percentage 
Total  83 033 100.00 
Bachelor’s degree (Religious higher education)  8 812 10.61 
Bachelor’s degree  5 770 6.95 
Associate degree  11 938 14.38 
Associate degree (Religious higher education)  20 935 25.21 
High school for Imams and Preachers  32 691 39.37 
High school and equivalent  1 124 1.35 
Junior high school and equivalent  1 195 1.44 
Primary school  568 0.68 
 
The percentage of women among Diyanet personnel is increasing; this increase 
took place especially in the mid-2000s (Gözaydın 2009: 106). However, according 
to the numbers, in 2008 only 3,710 women worked for Diyanet, hardly 4.5 
percent.26 On the other hand, Diyanet recently spoke out about their intention to 
decrease this gender gap through the use of positive discrimination in favour of 
women.27
As mentioned above, the AKP government has been criticised for increasing the 
number of Diyanet personnel. A similar criticism is raised against Diyanet’s share 
of the state budget. The opposition parties and secular media consider the increased 
funding a reflection of Islamisation within the state. In this vein, Turkish 
newspapers stated that Diyanet’s budget is larger than those of 37 other state 
 
                                           
25 İstatistiksel Tablolar / Öğrenim Durumuna Göre Personel Sayısı (Statistical Tables / 
Number of Personnel with respect to education level) Retrieved from Diyanet’s official 
website.  
http://www.Diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/tanitim/istatistiksel_tablolar/1_personel/1_2_ogrenim_d
urumlarina  
 gore_personel_sayisi.xls 
26 ‘Diyanet İşleri’nde 3 bin 710 kadın görev yapıyor.’ (3,710 women work in Diyanet), 
(2008, July 7), Sabah. Retrieved from 
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/07/07/haber,004FD00AAFAE447BA45481A5CA3BB95B.h
tml 
27 ‘Diyanet’ten kadına pozitif ayrımcılık’ (Positive discrimination towards women by 
Diyanet), (2009, November 8), Milliyet. Retrieved from 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Guncel/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetayArsiv&KategoriI
D=24&ArticleID=1159507 
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bodies, and comes in the 7th place after, among others, health care, education, the 
army, and the Justice Department.28
  
 However, a more balanced study of Diyanet’s 
budget by Gözaydin shows that Diyanet’s share in the national budget has been 
relatively constant since 1951, when it was raised from 0.2 to 0.6 percent of the 
total budget. Since then, the percentage has always hovered between 0.5 and 1.0 
percent (with two exceptions where the budget was raised to slightly above one 
percent of the national budget, in 1965-67 and 1990-91). The table below shows 
the proportion of Diyanet’s budget in relation to the total budget since 1993: 
Table 4: Diyanet’s share in the Budget29
Year 
 
percentage 
1993 0.9 
1994 1.0 
1995 0.9 
1996 0.6 
1997 0.7 
1998 0.7 
1999 0.6 
2000 0.5 
2001 0.6 
2002 0.6 
2003 0.5 
2004 0.6 
2005 0.7 
2006 0.8 
2007 0.8 
2008 0.9 
2009 0.7 
 
                                           
28 ‘Diyanet bütçesi 37 kurumu solladı.’ (Diyanet’s budget exceeds that of 37 departments), 
(2006, October 24), Hürriyet. Retrieved from 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=5309772  
29 Gözaydın 2009: 224.  
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Figures like these should of course be interpreted against the background of a more 
thorough analysis of Turkey’s public finance arena, which falls outside the scope 
of this study. However, these figures suffice to show that the somewhat alarmist 
opinions, which suggest a drastic increase in public funding of religion, are 
premature. 
Indeed, data on Turkey’s public finance show that Diyanet’s budget reached its 
peak during the rule of centre-right parties. In 1966, when the Justice Party was in 
power, Diyanet’s share was 1.89 percent of the national budget. In 1990, during the 
one-party government, the centre-right Motherland Party, Diyanet’s share was 1.23 
percent (Çakır and Bozan 2005: 105). During the reign of the AKP governments, 
the percentage has been much lower. 
When the budget of Diyanet is analysed in more detail, it can be observed that 
the majority is used for personnel expenditures. 
 
Table 5: Budget appropriation of year 200930
  
 
YTL 
Current Expenditures 2 426 678 398 
 1)Personnel Expenditures 2 206 919 000 
 2)Other Current Expenditures 219 759 398 
Investments 16 991 000 
Transfers 1 947 000 
 Total Budget 2 445 616 398 
 
                                           
30 İstatistiksel Tablolar / 2008-2009 Yılları Bütçe Ödenekleri (Statistical Tables / Budget 
Appropriation of 2008-2009) Retrieved from Diyanet’s official website.  
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/tanitim/istatistiksel_tablolar/6_butce/2009_yili_butce_od
enegi.xls  
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3.1.5. Recent developments 
3.1.5.1. New legal basis and internal organisation 
With regard to the inner organisation of Diyanet, a new step was taken by the 
Minister of State responsible for Diyanet, Faruk Çelik, with regard to the 
preparation of a Diyanet bill which was put into effect on 1 July 2010. The bill 
concerns Diyanet’s organisation and duties; emphasising the necessity of a new 
regulation on Diyanet’s duties, Çelik stated that Diyanet’s services are being 
administered through a law that came into effect in 1965 and therefore need to be 
revised.31
One of the most important changes according to the new organisation of Diyanet 
is the term of office of the President of Diyanet. While the current law does not 
provide restraints to the term of office, the new law limits it to five years, and the 
same official can be appointed only twice. The procedure for the appointment of 
the President was also changed; the President of Diyanet must be chosen by the 
Religion Supreme Council (Din Üst Kurulu). This Council consists of a group of 
120 individuals, including theologians, members of the Higher Council of 
Religious Affairs and regional muftis. The Council selects three candidates for the 
Presidency, and the Council of Ministers chooses one of these nominees, proposing 
his appointment to the President of the Republic. This new procedure is claimed to 
be an attempt to enhance the administrative autonomy of Diyanet. In short, the bill 
reduces the number of Vice Presidents from five to two and limits their term of 
office to that of the President. 
  
The Diyanet bill also regulates career opportunities for religious officials, both 
in the centre and the outer regions. The preachers and imams are able to raise their 
positions to become senior or head-preachers or -imams. An additional suggestion 
put forward in the bill is that appointments and promotions of Diyanet officials will 
be based on merits; exams will be taken for these purposes. Upper cadres of 
Diyanet will require at least ten years of experience as a university lecturer; this 
                                           
31 He refers to Act 633, which we discussed in 3.1.1. 
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requirement will strongly enhance the number of academics in Diyanet, especially 
from the Faculties of Theology. 
Another measure installed to raise the academic level of religious officials 
within Diyanet is the establishment of Diyanet Academies. The Academies will 
replace a number of in-service training facilities for imams today. One of their aims 
is to send Diyanet officials abroad; a one year program is scheduled, which 
includes intensive training in a foreign language. 
An interesting proposal in the Diyanet bill is the creation of a Diyanet radio and 
television broadcasting station. Obviously, this will enhance the possibilities of 
Diyanet to reach large audiences. This proposal, and the reactions to it, will be 
discussed further in chapter 4. 
Another remarkable detail of the bill concerns the religious identity of Diyanet 
officials. Under the former law, all employees are expected to be ‘religious’ (in 
Turkish: dindar, which also can be translated as ‘pious’). The use of this Turkish 
term, instead of the Arabic term Muslim, reflects the same ambiguity as the name 
‘Diyanet’ itself, because it can also refer to religious beliefs other than Islam. The 
phrasing of the law does not exclude pious people from other religions from 
becoming a Diyanet employee; however, the new law opens the door for non-
Muslims further by stipulating that the requirement of ‘being pious’ applies only to 
those teaching religion or providing religious services. Diyanet officials in legal 
consultancy, foreign relations, human resources management, media and public 
relations are no longer expected to be pious since the acceptance of the bill. 
Among the topics of the Diyanet bill, one of the most widely discussed issues is 
the shift in age restrictions for participation in the Quran courses provided by 
Diyanet during the summer. According to the former regulations, children cannot 
attend the courses until they finish the 5th grade of the primary school. The new 
law, however, makes it possible for younger children to attend these courses - with 
no age limit - only requiring the permission of their parents. 
The Diyanet bill also aims to put an end to a long discussion about the 
ownership of mosques in Turkey. As we explained earlier, the administration of 
mosques was one of Diyanet’s tasks since its foundation in 1924, a duty later 
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transferred to the Directorate General for Religious Foundations in 1931 and given 
back to Diyanet in 1950. However, this does not mean that Diyanet has the 
exclusive right to own and manage mosques. Currently, many mosques are 
associated with a local foundation that has collected the money to build the mosque 
from the people and later maintains responsibility for its maintenance; the 
responsibility of Diyanet is, in those cases, limited to appointing the imams and 
supervising the religious services of the mosque. The bill expands this area of 
responsibility for Diyanet and transfers the official ownership of all new mosques 
to Diyanet rather than to the foundations building them. This practice will however 
not be applied to already-existing mosques. According to our interviewee, Mr. 
Çelik, this development will clarify a legal situation which was until now not very 
clear, namely the question of formal ownership. However, it will not change the 
daily financial management of mosques significantly. Many mosques have 
associated shops and other commercial activities from which the costs of 
maintenance are paid, while the surplus is used for various religious services or 
charity works.32
While several of the topics in the bill discussed above are not new at all, they 
give a legal basis to what already happens in the Diyanet organisation, as İştar 
Gözaydın told us. Some of the developments mentioned in the following 
paragraphs also fall in this category. 
 However, this claim of Mr. Çelik seems to be an understatement 
of the impact of this measure, as it obviously reduces the autonomy of local 
mosque foundations and gives Diyanet more opportunities to control flows of 
money at the local level.  
3.1.5.2. University graduates as the new Diyanet cadres  
The increase of academics within Diyanet has been ongoing for some years. 
Okumuş links this development to the Presidency of Mr. Ali Bardakoğlu, under 
whose leadership the number of theologians within Diyanet increased. These 
                                           
32 For further information on the bill, see these websites. 
http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=5591814, 
http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=5754956,http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=5472441, 
http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=192969 
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academics generated a new “academic religiosity” (Okumuş 2008: 355) within 
Diyanet. All of our interviewees evaluate this influx of academics positively, as the 
educated newcomers are seen to be knowledgeable people who are aware of what 
is going on in the world. However, the interviewees also refer to some problems 
rising from this development. The arrival of these academics, who immediately are 
awarded positions at the top of the institution, has offended some officials who 
have worked for Diyanet longer. However, Mr. Er says that he interprets such a 
response as being natural, as it is a kind of reflex to protect the institutional 
identity. 
Mr. Saim Yeprem, Director of the Science, Culture, Arts and Publication Board 
of the Turkish Diyanet Foundation and former member of the Higher Council of 
Religious Affairs, interprets this increase in the number of academics within 
Diyanet as a natural development; as there are now 21 Faculties of Theology in 
Turkey, graduates of these faculties are becoming increasingly involved in 
academic careers. At the moment, Diyanet has more academics than ever; there 
already exists a rule stating that four out of the sixteen members of the Higher 
Council of Religious Affairs should be instructors in university. Half of the total 
sixteen members are academics, according to Mr. Bunyamin Erul, a member of the 
Council, who believes that they make up “the brain of Diyanet”. This higher 
proportion of academics within Diyanet, Mr. Yeprem believes, increases the 
quality of the institution and adds to the credibility of its scientific character. 
According to Mr. Yeprem, the general public trusts Diyanet; even if an individual 
belongs to another cemaat, Mr. Erul says, he or she trusts Diyanet. The Council, 
which is also responsible for providing answers to religious questions and issuing 
fatwa’s, generates the religious knowledge. This knowledge is transmitted to the 
masses through both muftis and imams and through publications and the media. 
3.1.5.3. Decentralising Friday sermons? 
An interesting development in Diyanet’s recent internal policies concerns the 
centrality of the Friday sermons. Particularly after the 28 February intervention in 
1997 (the so-called post-modern or ‘soft’ coup), sermons in Turkish mosques 
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began to be controlled by the central administration of Diyanet. These hutbes were 
being prepared by a hutbe commission, functioning within the Higher Council of 
Religious Affairs. Afterwards, the hutbes were sent to the imams through the 
Diyanet Gazetesi (a monthly journal). However, this very centralised procedure of 
controlling the content of Friday sermons was relaxed in 2006, when the task of 
preparing the hutbes was transferred to hutbe commissions within regional mufti 
offices. 
Today, Diyanet seems to move gradually towards an even more decentralised 
system. According to a new plan, preachers will be trained to prepare distinct 
sermons for each mosque.33 A similar proposal was accepted during the 4th 
Religious Council of Diyanet, organised in October 2009. The 9th decision of the 
Council discussed the efficiency of hutbes written and sent by the central 
administration. The Council maintains that imams should be more active in writing 
the sermons in order to increase efficiency in preaching; this process, the Council 
claims, should be gradual.34
Analysing this development, we have to bear in mind that the decentralisation of 
responsibility in this area is relative; even if the sermon is prepared by a specific 
imam, the office of the mufti to which the imam is tied has to check and approve 
the text before it is delivered in the mosque. It is also important to notice that the 
extreme central control of Friday sermons was not an old tradition within Diyanet 
and did not come from the cadres of the institution itself, but was rather imposed 
upon it by the central government.  
 The mufti of Istanbul, Mustafa Çağrıcı told us that 
Diyanet began organising meetings for imams and muezzins (callers for daily 
prayers) to educate them in the preparation of sermon texts. 
In the aftermath of the 28 February coup of 1997, the state was anxious about 
anything having to do with religion, which was seen as the major threat to a 
secular, democratic Turkish Republic. Therefore, today’s more lenient attitude 
                                           
33 Cihan Yenilmez, ‘Merkezî vaaz sistemi kaldırılıyor’ (Central preach system will be 
removed), (2009, December 24), Zaman. Retrieved from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=931327 
34 Information on the 4th Religious Council, 12-16 October 2009. Retrieved from 
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/dinsurasi/sura/default.asp  
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towards imams writing their own sermons may also be interpreted as a sign that the 
hard-line secularist policies following the coup have lost their influence. 
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3.2. In the Netherlands 
3.2.1. Diyanet abroad 
The activities carried out by Diyanet in the Netherlands and in other European 
countries are by no means an exception. In a relatively early stage, Diyanet 
explored the possibilities of reaching out to Muslims of Turkish descent in other 
parts of the world, notably in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Most 
Muslims in those regions adhere to the same Hanafi School (school of law in 
jurisprudence within Sunni Islam) as the Turks in Turkey. Diyanet’s reasons for 
becoming active in the Balkans and former Soviet Republics containing large 
Turkic speaking populations are manifold and depend on the local situation. 
However, most of these areas share a history of limited or even non-existent 
religious education. Diyanet stepped in and provided religious educational 
materials which were insufficiently available previously. Some interviewees stated 
that these regions are perhaps even more important for Diyanet than Europe or the 
USA. According to Mr. Çağrıcı, the mufti of Istanbul, over 15 million theological 
books have been sent to these regions, where students often come to Turkey for 
religious education. There they attend Quran courses or study at Vocational High 
Schools, where imams and preachers are trained, or enrol in Faculties of Theology. 
Often, these graduates later become the coordinators of religious life in their home 
countries. In addition, Diyanet provides its own imam training programs. In this 
way, Diyanet is able to influence the religious landscape in these regions, and 
implicitly prevents other countries (notably Arabic speaking) to get a foothold.  
Moreover, Diyanet sponsors mosque building projects in some African 
countries, albeit on an occasional basis, as a kind of development aid. The activities 
in Europe, however, have inevitably to do with the large Turkish immigrant 
communities there. Currently, Diyanet holds office and runs mosques in most 
Western European countries with a sizeable Turkish population. More recently, 
Diyanet extended its activities to the United States as well.  
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3.2.2. Diyanet in the Netherlands 
There were mainly two reasons for Diyanet to extend its activities to European 
countries with a large Turkish immigrant population, such as the Netherlands. In 
general, Diyanet reacted to the need for religious accommodation in the 
Netherlands. Towards the end of the 1970s, the number of Turkish Muslims 
increased considerably and, accordingly, their need for good accommodation grew. 
The second motivation could be described as a ‘competitive’ move, though some 
would say ‘protective’ act, against non-official Turkish Islamic movements. In 
those years, the Süleymancıs were in charge of most of the Turkish mosques in the 
Netherlands. As Diyanet considered this a negative development, it decided to take 
steps to change the existing situation. Moreover, it became clear that a considerable 
portion of the Turkish Muslim population was not happy with the disproportionate 
influence of the Süleymancıs at that time; they dominated the religious services, 
and although a majority of Muslims came from rural areas and were not familiar 
with the controversies between ‘parallel’ and ‘official’ Islam in Turkey, the 
recruiting activities of the Süleymancıs caused tension. This tension among 
Turkish Muslims became manifest in 1977 in the city of Rotterdam, when during 
Ramadan two imams, one from Diyanet and one with a Süleymancı background, 
were invited to deliver their services. Eventually it turned out that a large majority 
of the Muslims chose for the Diyanet imam. Within two years, both the 
Süleymancıs and the supporters of Diyanet founded their own umbrella 
organisations (Sunier 1996). The Diyanet-linked umbrella organisations were the 
Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation (TICF), founded in 1979, and the Dutch 
Islamic Foundation (ISN), founded in 1982. 
A mosque in the Netherlands requires an official registration and a legal status, 
either as a foundation or as an association. This implies that mosques are legally 
independent organisations. Under the Dutch Constitution, mosques have the same 
formal position as other religious organisations. Compared to other Turkish Islamic 
movements, the position of Diyanet in the Netherlands is unique, both due to its 
specific relation with the mother organisation in Ankara and because of the 
division of tasks and responsibilities between two organisations in the Netherlands: 
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the TICF and the ISN. The TICF operated since 1979 as the representative of the 
Turkish Muslim population and a sort of grass-roots organisation. When the ISN 
was founded in 1982, however, this was an effort to organise the same population 
in a more centralised way, formally controlled by Diyanet officials in Ankara, and 
chaired by the religious counsellor, the müşavir of the Turkish Embassy in Den 
Haag, the formal representative of Diyanet (as explained in chapter 3.1.3.3).  
The two umbrella organisations designed a rough division of labour; the ISN 
was supposed to be responsible for strictly theological issues and formal religious 
duties and services, whereas the TICF organised social and cultural activities and 
represented its members in local issues. Until recently, this division of labour and 
responsibilities between the TICF and the ISN functioned relatively well. In recent 
years, however, the ISN seems to be shifting - or rather extending - its activities 
towards the above-mentioned cemaat, the community of believers, thus gradually 
bringing the TICF under ISN’s control. We will discuss these developments further 
in the following sections.  
ISN holds office in Den Haag. According to the statutory chart its aim is to 
“create and maintain opportunities and facilities for Muslims in the Netherlands in 
order for them to be able to fulfil their religious duties, to improve the position of 
the Turkish Muslim community in the Netherlands, and provide facilities for 
intellectual and psychological development of Muslims”. These aims have not 
changed since 1982, the year of its foundation, and can easily be found in open 
sources like the ISN website or in its periodicals.35 Under the heading of faaliyetler 
(activities to reach those aims), ISN lists 27 activities36
                                           
35 Yearbook 2009 (Bülten 2009: 11); and ISN website 
 which are basically similar 
to those in a document dating from 1988. Among other things, it is clearly stated 
that ISN should not interfere in political affairs of any sort. The President (Başkan) 
of ISN since 2008, Dr. Bülent Şenay affirms and emphasises this position: “ISN 
keeps distance from party politics in the Netherlands. (…) Diyanet is not a 
religious movement. It is for 80 percent facilitating, functional, and for only 20 
http://www.diyanet.nl, Sep. 2010. 
36 
http://www.diyanet.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=100&Itemid=237 
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percent guiding, not controlling, and in a general way, not very fixed; for example 
through the fatwa’s issued by the Fatwa Kurulu (Fatwa Council).”37
At the same time, it should be noted that, as it unfolded in the 1980s, the struggle 
between different Turkish religious organisations active in the Netherlands, 
including the ISN and the TICF, contained a certain ideological positioning. Some 
authors even referred to ISN/TICF as ‘Diyanetçi’s’, denoting people adhering to 
the ‘ideology of Diyanet’ which refers to the Turkish official Islam. In the Dutch 
context, it was, simply speaking, part of the game of the different Muslim 
organisations to profile themselves against each other, and vital for their 
development. As a part of this profiling, TICF leaders positioned themselves in the 
integration debate, claiming that they were the most geared towards the integration 
of Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands (Sunier 1996: 81). On the other hand, it has 
been argued that ISN/TICF constituencies comprise a “residual category” of 
Turkish Muslims not adhering to one or another religious movement. According to 
one interviewee: “Within the Turkish community in the Netherlands you 
automatically end up with Diyanet when you do not want to be affiliated with a 
certain movement, but still want to express your affinity with Islam. So, this is 
indeed a conscious choice.”
 This statement 
indicates that ISN is careful for example not to interfere in the so-called ‘Islam 
debate’ in the Netherlands, but also that it wants to profile itself as a facilitator and 
religious guide in a general sense and not as a separate religious movement which 
is, in addition to competing with other movements, catering its own cemaat.   
38
3.2.2.1. ISN organisational structure 
  
ISN is structured hierarchically and is organisationally linked to Diyanet in Turkey. 
ISN has a General Board (Genel Kurul), a Management or Executive Team 
(Yönetim Kurulu), and a Supervisory Board (Denetleme Kurulu) to administer the 
administrative process. For an organisation chart of ISN we refer to the appendixes. 
The highest administrative institution of ISN, chaired by the President of Diyanet 
                                           
37 Interview with Dr. Bülent Senay 13th of April 2010, ISN Den Haag. 
38 Interview in Den Haag, 9th of December 2009. 
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in Turkey (or its representative), is the General Board, falling under the 
competence of the Turkish Ministry of General affairs, under the responsibility of a 
Minister of State (Devlet Bakanı), which means that Diyanet has a formal influence 
on the decisions made by the ISN. When we look at the composition of the General 
Board, currently consisting of seventeen members, it becomes clear that high 
officials of Diyanet in Turkey can decide on matters in the Netherlands. (ISN 
Bulletin 2009: 11; cf. Landman 1992: 105). However, the plenary meeting of the 
General Board only occurs once every three or four years, which limits its 
influence on day-to-day activities of the ISN considerably. The Management Team 
of the ISN that runs the organisation is selected and appointed by the General 
Board and currently consists of seven people. The President of ISN, who is the 
chairman of the Management Team, is called Din Hizmetleri Müşaviri, religious 
counsellor, or advisor, and is associated with the Turkish Embassy in Den Haag. 
He is the only official within the ISN who directly communicates with ‘Ankara’, 
and although the President only holds his position for three or four years, without 
the possibility of a second term, he has a powerful role in the institution. Besides 
providing the Turkish Embassy and Diyanet with information and advice on 
religious issues in the Netherlands, the President supervises the ISN foundation and 
the appointments and functioning of imams working in ISN mosques. The 
practicalities of the latter task are delegated to two ataşe (attachés) associated with 
the Turkish Consulates in Rotterdam and Deventer. The President and his family 
hold a diplomatik pasaport39, a diplomatic passport.40
According to several interviewees working within or close to the ISN 
organisation, there is a formal influence of Diyanet on ISN affairs in the 
Netherlands, though they all emphasised the relative autonomy that the 
 The attachés also hold a sort 
of diplomatic passport, though their exact diplomatic status has not been 
investigated by us.  
                                           
39 http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/T%C3%BCrk_pasaportu#Diplomatik_.28Siyah.29_Pasaport 
, Nov 2010 
40 Personal and e-mail communication with several interviewees, Den Haag, Dec.2009, 
Jan, April, Nov. 2010. 
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Management Team has in most daily affairs. It is a matter of to what degree the 
ISN can make its own decisions without consulting or interference from Turkey. 
This may become clearer when we take a closer look at the activities that ISN 
actually organises, both on a national and a local level. As we have indicated 
before, in the course of the years there has been a gradual extension of ISN 
activities that are only indirectly related to theological issues, and could therefore 
in some cases be labelled ‘TICF activities’, i.e. educational, cultural and social. As 
can be observed from the organisation chart, the present ISN organisation, apart 
from its traditional ‘core business’, such as the coordination of religious 
accommodation, invests in activities ranging from funeral services (funeral 
company and funeral fund41) to sports and youth activities. Recently, in 2009, the 
ISN appointed new staff, in newly created functions dealing with public relations 
and communication. Also, a special coordinator for youth activities and a press 
officer were installed in 2009 by the President of ISN, Dr. Bülent Şenay. However, 
during the conversation we had with the President, he did not consider these 
extensions of activities as a proof of a ‘turn to the cemaat’, by which we mean 
focusing more on the grass-roots organisation of ISN and its dynamics. He 
considered these kinds of activities to have always been the ‘core business’ of ISN: 
“It is just a matter of better coordination of our activities.”42
Being Turkish civil servants, the staff members of the ISN office in The Haag, 
as well as the President and imams working in the local mosques, receive a salary 
from ‘Ankara’. Staff members in local mosques are generally volunteers. Apart 
from tax money coming from Turkey and the funeral fund, the ISN earns some 
additional income from the organisation of the Pilgrimage to Mecca, the selling of 
books and some other services. Local mosques are built with donations from 
people or foundations in the Netherlands and elsewhere. ‘Ankara’ does not fund 
  
                                           
41 The funeral company and fund have coordinated and provided the necessary Islamic 
rituals in the Netherlands after the a member recently passed away; members, around 
threequarters of the Turkish population, pay a yearly fee to the fund.Source: 
http://www.profnews.nl/946430/Dr..iekwart-van-turken-in-nederland-is-lid-van-
uitvaartfonds-diyanet 
42 Interview with Dr. Bülent Şenay, 13th of April 2010. 
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any building activity. The ISN can, however, function as a bank guarantee for the 
mortgage once the ownership of the building has been handed over to the ISN. 
3.2.2.2. Appointments / human resources: the President of ISN 
The structure described above demonstrates the influence of the Turkish 
government, i.e. AKP, on ISN matters. This is especially the case with the 
appointment of the President of the ISN by the General Board. Formally speaking, 
this appointment procedure indicates the direct influence of the Turkish 
government on the ISN. Arguably this is also true for the present AKP government.  
The influence of successive governments on Diyanet and, consequently, on the 
ISN - the initial research question of our project - is an issue that has been raised 
before. In an article in the daily Dutch newspaper, Trouw in 1997 the following 
observation was made: “Since Erbakan, leader of the fundamentalist Welfare Party, 
is the Prime Minister now, many fear his influence on Diyanet. However, 
according to experts, there is no need for real worries. Erbakan will only be able to 
influence new appointments.”43
                                           
43 Trouw, 12th of April 1997: ‘Een bont gezelschap van Turkse moslims in Nederland’ (A 
many-coloured society of Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands). 
 About thirteen years later, we have been asked 
more or less the same question about the influence of the AKP on Diyanet and/or 
the ISN. Accordingly, we asked the question to several respondents: “Concerning 
the ISN, are there changes to be observed since the coming to power of the AKP 
government?” The majority of respondents came up with similar answers pointing 
in the direction of the appointment of Dr. Bülent Şenay, President of ISN since 
2008. Several interviewees described him as an internationally respected 
theologian/scholar, who speaks English very well and who has a good international 
reputation. According to the respondents, this academic outlook makes him 
different from former presidents of the ISN. A similar observation was made 
earlier in the Turkish section of this report (3.1.5.2), where we pointed out the 
increase in academics within the new Diyanet cadres. According to the President of 
the ISN himself, it is indeed an important, recent development that the present 
Diyanet leadership is “imported from academia instead of from bureaucratic 
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circles.”44 In addition to Turkey and the Netherlands, such a shift can be observed 
elsewhere in Europe. In Belgium, for instance, Diyanet has been represented by 
Professor Halife Keskin since May 2008, who is also an academic.45 According to 
Dr. Bülent Şenay, this Diyanet policy of appointing “globally aware” scholars 
instead of more nationally oriented bureaucrats is “not imposed by the government, 
but, is part of parallel processes, allowed and accommodated by the government”.46
Summarising, we could say that the formal decision-making structure between 
the Turkish government, Diyanet and ISN has not changed, though there is an 
observable shift in the policies of Diyanet and ISN with respect to their relation 
with the constituency. This brings us to the previously mentioned relation between 
the ISN and the TICF. 
 
It can be interpreted as a policy shift towards a more direct and more ‘socially 
sensible’ approach to Islam that is closer to people’s experiences. It is however 
difficult to say whether this ‘policy shift’ was purposefully initiated by high 
Diyanet officials or by the AKP; or is the result of dynamic and parallel processes, 
as a reaction to changing circumstances in a changing world? In the previous 
section, we explained this as the result of an emerging civil society in Turkey and a 
bottom-up democratisation of Islam, as opposed to the traditional, more ‘etatist’, 
top-down Kemalist version of Turkish Islam.  
3.2.2.3. ISN versus TICF 
While the ISN is the umbrella organisation of the approximately 142 mosques in 
the Netherlands, all individual mosques are also associated with the TICF. The 
TICF is the actual representative of the local Muslim communities who visit ISN 
mosques and participate in activities organised by the TICF – though are 
sometimes facilitated by ISN. Until recently, this was the actual practice. It has 
often been argued that while the TICF is the public and societal face, the ISN deals 
with finance, staffing and the facilitating of religious services. Another 
                                           
44 Interview with Dr. Bülent Şenay, 13th of April 2010, Den Haag. 
45 http://www.diyanet.be/?&Bid=235355  
46 Interview with Dr. Bülent Şenay, 13th of April 2010, Den Haag. 
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classification often heard in relation to the organisational and management 
structure is that of ISN being described as more top-down, while the TICF is said 
to be more democratic and bottom-up. In other words, a bureaucratic, centralised 
extension of the Turkish state versus a grass-roots movement emerging from within 
the Netherlands. A number of documents indicate that the ISN is mainly comprised 
of civil servants of the Turkish Embassy in Den Haag; they deal with issues such as 
the management of buildings, financial issues, the organisation of the Pilgrimage, 
etc. The TICF, on the other hand, is depicted as an organisation of Turkish Muslim 
migrants; they deal with personal issues related to their position in Dutch society 
rather than religious aspects (see e.g. Van Heelsum, Tillie, Fennema 2004: 8). 
However, we question this innate assumption, as it does not take into account the 
actual practices that take place within the two organisations.  
At least on the national level, the TICF foundation today is far less active than it 
used to be. In particular, they seem busy (re)organising their rank-and-file system; 
the TICF website has been ‘under construction’ for at least half a year, and 
currently consists of a one page Turkish text.47 On another website, however, the 
institution’s progress seems promising: “At the general meeting on 29/3/2009, 
TICF elected a new board. Since the founding of the federation, the members 
elected a completely new board (…). The elected members gathered in Utrecht, last 
Sunday, and divided the tasks and functions by mutual agreement and in a 
democratic way.”48
The TICF was founded in 1979, a few years before the ISN, which was founded 
in 1982. The relation between the two organisations has always been ambiguous 
and changes according to the circumstances. Both the TICF and the ISN are 
foundations, in the legal sense of the word. They both have the same local 
organisations as their constituent parts, and both organisations participate in the 
Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (CMO), the national Muslim advisory board 
for the government, founded in 2004. But an important difference between the 
 It does not seem a coincidence that the TICF, in this 
announcement, stresses the “democratic way” the board was elected.  
                                           
47 http://www.ticf.nl/ , Nov. 2010. 
48 http://www.lokum.nl/ , accessed in May 2010 
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TIFC and the ISN is the fact that the first has no formal relation with the Turkish 
government. The General Board of the TICF, the highest body of the organisation, 
is comprised of representatives of the affiliated local (mosque) associations. The 
Executive Committee, or Management Team, is selected from the General Board 
(Landman 1992: 106). This indeed implies that the TICF has a more democratic 
and bottom-up organisational structure than the ISN. However, according to 
several interviewees, the so-called grass-roots oriented TICF has gradually been 
brought under the control of the ISN.  
One of our interviewees, a regular visitor of a local mosque and formerly active 
in the Board of the TICF, stated that a shift has taken place over the course of the 
past several years. He referred to the mounting influence of the ISN on local 
matters due to the increasing number of mosques and the general formalisation of 
tasks and responsibilities. According to him, this resulted in the local associations 
becoming less influential. The present staff of ‘his’ mosque is much more willing 
to listen to the ISN and is less autonomous. Another interviewee referred to an 
internal discussion in which the ISN argues that the TICF - as an organisation - has 
become needless. In the past, when the Turkish migrant workers and their families 
were coping with communication problems and finding their way in Dutch society, 
the TICF was useful in building up the religious infrastructure and Muslim 
community; contrarily, with a much more emancipated and integrated population 
of Turkish descent, the ISN can handle everything that is needed on its own.49
Tensions related to the division of tasks, responsibilities and, not the least, 
influence, are certainly not new (as mentioned previously). In 1992, Landman 
observed that: “(…) an investigation of 1985 showed that there were tensions 
between the leaders of the TICF and the ISN in which the first expressed their fear 
that ISN would be able to encompass TICF easily due to their very loosely 
formulated mission statement” (Landman 1992: 107). Landman argues that the 
kind of activities these organisations perform can easily lead to a ‘confusion of 
responsibilities’, as the TICF gradually handed over many of its activities to the 
 
                                           
49 Interview in Apeldoorn, 28th of January 2010. 
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ISN during the course of the 1980s, such as the coordination of appointed imams, 
the Pilgrimage and the formal ownership of the mosques (Landman 1992: 109). In 
2001, Kadir Canatan arrived at a similar conclusion, stating that: “The influence of 
the ISN on the daily state of affairs in local mosques has increased, because they 
take care of the most crucial tasks” (Canatan 2001: 89). 
During our research, most respondents more or less acknowledged that the very 
structure of the division of tasks between ISN and TICF may coincide with the 
practicalities of facilitating mosques and religious services as opposed to 
representing the (local) ‘ISN cemaat’; however, this does not automatically mean 
that the ISN cannot make a shift towards this cemaat. Our findings indicate that the 
ISN shows a stronger concern for the (local) cemaat, and specifically focuses on 
the social, economic and cultural circumstances of its ‘members’. One of the 
respondents referred to meetings organised by the ISN to motivate people to use 
their voting rights, which was inconceivable for the organisation a decade ago.  
This shift, which does not automatically follow out of the formal responsibilities 
of ISN, is by some people considered a positive development as it is in the interest 
of the local Muslim population. Others interpret this shift as a strategic move aimed 
at neutralising the TICF and conclude that the ISN is violating its statutory chart, 
stipulating the ISN should not deal with issues other than strictly theological and 
practical ones. Unfortunately, the President of ISN, Dr. Bülent Şenay, did not wish 
to elaborate on the matter. According to him, the TICF only exists because the ISN 
exists, which implies he places the ISN, as a prerequisite, above the TICF, and not 
the other way around: “(…) ISN is taking up, willingly or unwillingly, the role of a 
Non Governmental Organisation, an NGO.” He refers to developments both in the 
Netherlands and in Turkey, illustrating that Diyanet, in all its sections and 
branches, is becoming more of a bottom-up organisation than before. This implies, 
according to Dr. Şenay, that they are “working more in line with the requirements 
of civil society, pay more attention to new target groups and, not at least, pay more 
attention to what actually takes place in society”.50
                                           
50 Interview with Dr. Bülent Şenay, 13th of April, Den Haag. 
 In the following chapter we will 
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take a closer look at how this works out in actual activities and initiatives, both in 
Turkey and in the Netherlands. 
  66 
4. Activities of Diyanet 
4.1. In Turkey 
4.1.1. Traditional activities 
As becomes clear from the formal tasks given to Diyanet, and the distribution of 
personnel over various departments in the organisation, much of the work of 
Diyanet is associated with the religious activities of Turkish mosques. The vast 
majority of Diyanet’s officials are imams and preachers, whose main task is to lead 
the daily prayers, deliver Friday sermons and arrange other religious ceremonies in 
the mosques, such as those occurring during the holy month of Ramadan, the 
Festival of Sacrifice (Kurban Bayramı) and the celebration of the Birth of the 
Prophet (Mevlit Kandili). The regional mufti offices support these mosque 
activities, as does one of the central departments of Diyanet in Ankara in charge of 
providing timetables and publishing devotional materials for the celebrations. Since 
1976, a specialised department of Diyanet has supported Turkish Muslims who 
want to go on the Pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Throughout Diyanet’s history, its second task, the ‘illumination of the public 
about religion’, has not only been carried out through sermons in the mosques but 
also through the publication of Quran editions, books on Islam and periodicals; 
these documents were distributed in mosques or specialised book stores. Since the 
early 1970s, Quran courses and other forms of extracurricular education have 
become another important activity of Diyanet’s. In 1971, Quran schools run by 
private religious associations were put under the supervision of Diyanet; in 
addition, Diyanet opened its own regional education centres and organised summer 
schools. A separate Directorate for Education was founded in 1977 for these 
educational activities. Interestingly, religious education in regular Turkish schools 
has never been the responsibility of Diyanet; rather, it falls under the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Education. 
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4.1.2. Widening the scope 
While the religious and educational activities mentioned above remain the core 
business of Diyanet, under former President Bardakoğlu some initiatives to explore 
new areas were undertaken. Two plans published in the Diyanet Strategic Plan 
2009 stood out, and provoked a public debate: the plan to launch ‘Diyanet TV’, and 
the plan of opening libraries, internet halls, classrooms, tea shops and multi-
purpose rooms in 200 pilot mosques. Here it may be noted that these kinds of 
social and educational facilities have already existed for many years in most large 
Diyanet mosque complexes in the Netherlands.   
In the same Strategic Plan, Diyanet announced that new technological tools will 
be used in mosques and by the staff providing religious services. Websites will be 
created for several mosques and the construction of the mosques modified to 
enable women and disabled people to attend more easily. The staff of these pilot 
mosques will be educated in public relations and new technologies will be used to 
ensure religious information and even Quran courses will be available through the 
internet. In this way, groups that find it difficult to attend (elderly, disabled), or are 
not sufficiently reached by traditional outreach mechanisms (groups of young 
Muslims) can be included.51
In reaction to these criticisms, most of the interviewees from Diyanet first 
downplayed the impacts of the Strategic Plan, which they refused to call ‘changes’ 
(in the sense that any ‘change’ could all too easily be interpreted as proof that 
 These planned developments in the sphere of religious 
services were criticised by secularists such as the opposition Republican People’s 
Party as a plan to turn mosques into Ottoman külliyes, complexes of buildings with 
a variety of religious and social functions. This was interpreted as a threat to the 
secular republic, as all kind of recreational, educational and social activities would 
be brought under control of a religious institution. 
                                           
51 ‘Cuma’ya mesai ayarı.’ (Adjusting the time of Friday prayer with respect to working 
hours), (2008, September 20). Retrieved from http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=4132423; 
Eda Ay, ‘Diyanet internetle atılım hedefliyor.’ (Diyanet aims advancement through 
internet)", (2009, May 6), Radikal. Retrieved from 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetay&Date=&ArticleID=934624 
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secularism is being threatened by Islamisation). The new developments are, 
according to Mr. Yeprem, nothing more than “modernising” the services of 
Diyanet, a process that is needed to catch up with changes in the rest of Europe. 
From their perspective, in today’s changing society, with new technologies and 
means of communication, Diyanet must also modify its instruments to enlighten 
religious issues to the people.  
4.1.2.1. The mosque as a social centre? 
Nevertheless, all our interviewees from the top cadres of Diyanet agreed that more 
is happening than simply upgrading the instruments of communication. Diyanet 
aims to extend the scope of religious services beyond mosques and religious 
ceremonies; in this sense, ‘religious services’ should be understood within the 
wider socio-moral axis of Islam, which covers much more than just praying, fasting 
and religious ceremonies.  
There is a very physical aspect to this argument. The activities of imams should 
not be limited to the walls of the mosque; imams are knowledgeable about religion 
and morality and should use this wisdom outside the mosques as well. Limiting 
religion and religious knowledge to the mosque is, according to the above-
mentioned interviewees, against the essence of Islam. Admitting that this limitation 
plagued Islam in Turkey for a long time, they condemn this as a wrong way of 
practising religion. By using new technologies, the message of Islam can reach the 
public more effectively than the traditional Friday sermon, Quran courses or 
religious literature. 
More importantly, the pilot projects of multifunctional Islamic centres reflect a 
changing interpretation of the duties of Diyanet and the mosques under its 
supervision. With regard to the “religious services” the mosque is providing “social 
dimensions”, in the words of Mr. Çağrıcı. He legitimises this practice by pointing 
at the Islamic tradition and the life of the Prophet Muhammad; limiting religious 
activities to the mosque, he argues, is not consistent with the Islamic tradition as 
Prophet Muhammad was careful to identify the social dimensions of religion. 
Helping the poor, assisting the hungry and homeless, having compassion and pity, 
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and being a humanitarian are all important components of Islamic religion. Islam 
today, Mr. Çağrıcı claims, is also concerned with important social problems, “such 
as drug abuse, sexual deviations, and poverty”. These were described as societal 
problems that may constitute a threat for the future. In addition to the Islamic 
tradition, comparisons with western Christianity are often called upon to legitimise 
these new social initiatives of Diyanet. Mr. Erul states that religion today is 
generally considered a phenomenon that embraces the social sphere as a whole. In 
the West, the priest is not the priest of the church but the priest of the 
neighbourhood. The developments within Diyanet mirror this more global 
phenomenon.  
Finally, the voice of the people is often invoked to legitimise the new policies; 
Mr. Erul stated that the masses themselves have made it explicit that they want 
Diyanet to extend its scope beyond just religion. The debates on religious issues on 
television, for instance, show that the masses demand discussing these issues in 
their social lives as well. 
With regard to the ‘civil societal’ role of Diyanet, İştar Gözaydın agrees that the 
scope of the activities being organised is widening; she projects that different 
societal groups are becoming increasingly attracted to mosques, and that the time 
spent in mosques is also on the rise. Furthermore, Gözaydın suggests this new civil 
societal structure will begin to resemble church organisations in the West. 
Previously, visiting mosques in Turkey was very much limited to prayer; people 
would often go to the mosque, pray and then leave immediately. This practice, she 
argues, was a result of the Republican attempt to limit the influence of religion on 
people’s life. Diyanet’s attempt to turn the mosque into a community centre 
obviously has an opposite goal: to increase the influence of religion. This should, 
in her view, not be interpreted as a move towards conservatism, as a large part of 
the Turkish public is religiously conservative anyway. Rather, it could be viewed 
as an attempt to make mosques more attractive to religiously conservative 
followers, making them more accessible to Diyanet. From this perspective, the 
attempt to create more modern, attractive and multifunctional mosques may also be 
interpreted as a strategic move in the competition between different religious 
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associations (cemaats) and Diyanet to draw in and retain adherents. This 
‘competition’ will be discussed in chapter 6. 
4.1.3. Women as target group 
With respect to Diyanet’s increasing focus on social issues, the role of women in 
social and religious life has been a major point of attention. According to Caner 
Taslaman former President Ali Bardakoğlu strongly encouraged women to 
participate in public life even though he would never explicitly criticise the 
traditional interpretations of Hanafi Sunni Islam that tend to restrict female 
participation. 
The new focus on women can be observed in three areas, which will be 
discussed below: 1. Diyanet’s contribution to public debates on the role of women 
in society; 2. Specific activities for women; and 3. Turning the mosque into a less 
male-dominated place. 
4.1.3.1. Discussing women’s rights 
Diyanet can hardly be seen as an institution standing at the forefront of the Turkish 
feminist movement. Nevertheless, on several occasions the institution and its 
President have spoken out against social problems like maltreatment of women or 
forced marriages. Part of Diyanet’s contribution to this debate is apologetical: 
though secularists may blame Islam for the poor living conditions of women in 
Turkey, this charge is unfounded as true Islam teaches otherwise. Mr. Bardakoğlu, 
for instance, claimed that forced marriages of girls at an early age are disturbing 
and violate “religious, traditional and humanistic feelings”. An interesting effort 
made to correct the negative image of Islam in this sphere is Bardakoğlu’s 
appearance on International Women’s Day. On March 8th, 2009, he visited women 
in jail and later explained to the media that the public should not judge female 
prisoners for their crimes but rather ask about the circumstances that led these 
women to commit them.52
                                           
52 ‘Bardakoğlu “cezaevinde”’ (Bardakoğlu in prison), (2009, March 13), Milli Gazete. 
Retrieved from http://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/bardakoglu-cezaevinde-117934.htm 
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According to the Vice President of Diyanet, İzzet Er, women’s rights and 
violence against women in particular have been topics of many Diyanet sermons, 
lectures and discussion panels. Moreover, he claims that, since 2006, Diyanet has 
organised 215 meetings about women’s rights, 71 about family violence, 144 about 
human rights in general, 45 about the freedom of education for young girls, and 
144 about communication within the family. He also referred to an initiative led by 
Diyanet in March 2008 to convince parents to let their daughters study; Diyanet 
even offered to provide stipends to educate 3,025 young girls.53 İştar Gözaydın 
confirms the positive attitude of Diyanet towards women’s participation in public 
life and the education needed to facilitate this. In short, Diyanet encourages women 
to participate in business life, administration and management activities; it also 
contributes female education and encourages women to take part in international 
projects in which Diyanet is actively involved as a partner. In terms of women’s 
rights, Diyanet regularly speaks out about violence and discrimination against 
women (Gözaydın 2009: 163). Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, a leading Islamic feminist, 
columnist and writer on the role of women in the Quran, who is particularly active 
in the Women Platform of the Capital has also argued that Diyanet, under Mr. 
Bardakoğlu's organisation, has led many initiatives to cooperate with women 
organisations. According to her, the new organisational structure of Diyanet allows 
for the full consideration of the requests of women organisations. She also gave the 
example of Diyanet’s reaction on International Women’s Day to the murder of 
Güldünya Tören, who was the victim of an honour killing and became a national 
symbol in Turkey.54
4.1.3.2. Family guidance 
 
Among the activities aimed at women, a significant step taken by Diyanet was to 
open family guidance and counselling bureaus. At these bureaus, women can talk 
about familial problems and be given advice by religious authorities. İzzet Er, Vice 
                                           
53 ‘Diyanet “kadın hakları” metnini yumuşatacak.’ (Diyanet will soften the text on 
‘women’s rights’), (2008, March 14). Retrieved from 
http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/438975.asp 
54 Ibidem. 
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President of Diyanet and responsible for the Presidency of Religious Services 
Department, considers this an important development as Islam as a religious faith 
concerns women equally as it addresses men. Therefore women should also be 
included in the target population of the institution. Up until now, adequate services 
have not been provided to women; to compensate for this deficiency, Diyanet has 
already opened bureaus in 53 mufti offices. However, Mr. Er stressed that these 
developments do not in any way imply that mufti offices not associated with 
Diyanet fail to address women’s issues or provide services and facilities to women 
and their families. 
4.1.3.3. Women in the mosques 
Another initiative of Diyanet concerning women is closer to its traditional domain: 
the mosque. In Turkey, there is mounting public criticism of male domination in 
mosques. As women begin to spend more and more time in public spaces, they also 
visit mosques more frequently and pray there. This has led to a tension that Diyanet 
wishes to address: but how and to what extent does Diyanet wish to do this? 
Ali Bardakoğlu made clear during interviews that he welcomes this increased 
female presence in mosques; he is even reported to have said that women are 
welcome to have informal gatherings at mosques with tea, cakes and cookies (the 
so-called güns, days of gathering).55
As in other cases, some of our respondents authorised this development by 
pointing to the Islamic tradition. Mr. Yeprem referred to women in the earlier eras 
 Most Diyanet officials encourage women to 
participate in Friday prayers, and a separate space for women is reserved in most of 
the mosques. According to Islamic doctrine, however, attending Friday prayers is a 
religious obligation for men, not for women, and Diyanet would probably never 
openly contradict this doctrine. However, the explicit encouragement of women to 
participate, and the facilities made available for them, would have been exceptional 
just a couple years ago and mark a change in Diyanet’s policies. 
                                           
55 Özcan Keser, ‘Kadınlara çağrı: Günlerinizi camide yapın.’ (Call for women: Organise 
your gathering days at mosques), (2009, December 12), Zaman. Retrieved from 
http:www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=926333&keyfield=646979616E6574 . 
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of Islam, including the days of the Prophet himself, who attended sermons in the 
mosque. In the Ottoman Empire, mosques also had separate spaces for women. 
According to Mr. Yeprem, the fact that mosques have become male domains where 
women no longer feel comfortable is simply due to population growth. A sceptical 
reader may see this historical references as an attempt to project a modern ideal 
back into history. Nevertheless, linking progressive measures to the Islamic 
tradition may be an important way of making ‘modern’ ideals more acceptable in 
an otherwise conservative religious space.  
4.1.4. Recreation and Sport 
Diyanet’s ‘move outside the mosque walls’ and attempt to reach new audiences is 
perhaps best illustrated by its activities in the fields of recreation and sport. One of 
the most interesting developments in recent years has been the establishment of 
Diyanetspor, the sports team of Diyanet, in 2007.56
Mr. Bardakoğlu approached the transfer in a more subtle manner, in a style 
fitting to his position. He stated that he would follow the racing events of Sofuoğlu 
and pray for him, and recommended sports to children and young people in Turkey 
so as to encourage healthier future generations among youth. 
 This new branch of the 
institution is purportedly active in various types of sports, such as volleyball, table 
tennis, wrestling, and motorcycling. Diyanet has also recruited some of the most 
famous and successful motorcycle racers in Turkey, such as Kenan Sofuoğlu, who 
became world champion of the Motorcycle Super Championship in 2007. In 
popular sports journalism language, the transfer of Sofuoğlu was announced to the 
public through Diyanet's official website and presented as a major event on the 
transfer market: “Diyanet has exploded the bomb with this transfer.” Here we can 
see Diyanet not only operating outside the mosque walls and beyond its traditional 
domain of religious ceremonies, but even turning to populist language. 
57
                                           
56 
 
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/sporklubu.asp  
57 ‘Kenan Sofuoğlu Diyanet Spor’a Transfer Oldu.’ (Kenan Sofuoğlu was Transferred to 
Diyanet Sports Club), News on Diyanet Youth and Sports Club. Retrieved from Diyanet’s 
Official Website http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/Diyanet-Isleri-Baskanligi-AnaMenu-
teskilat-ici-haberler-68.aspx 
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4.1.5. Diyanet in the media 
A final example illustrating that Diyanet no longer confines itself to mosque 
activities and strictly religious services is the fact that Mr. Bardakoğlu, during his 
term, was increasingly visible in the media, where he regularly commented on a 
wide variety of national and international developments. The Swiss referendum 
concerning the ban on minarets was one such occasion during which he made 
public comments both in the Diyanet journal and other media. Mr. Bardakoğlu 
argued that the referendum disappointed not only Turks but also the whole world.58 
Interestingly, the language used in Diyanet’s public opposition to the Swiss minaret 
ban drew upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a document often 
referenced by Diyanet. In turn, the ban was seen as a violation of the aims of the 
Treaty of Lisbon.59
Another public statement on international politics arose from Mr. Bardakoğlu’s 
comments on the ethnic violence against Uyghur Turks in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region of China. Here he criticised international actors for 
committing crimes to achieve strategic goals.
  
58
According to Mr. Çağrıcı the relation between the Turkish media and Diyanet 
has improved considerably in recent years. Previously, Diyanet used its own 
communication channels, with mainstream media approached only very sceptically 
or ignored altogether. Today, Diyanet follows the news and responds to major 
debates through mainstream media outlets. However, Mr. Bardakoğlu also makes 
moral statements to the media and confronts them with their own responsibility; for 
instance, he calls upon the media to become more sensitive to their way of 
informing people about violence as, according to him, the enormous amount of 
 
                                           
58 Diyanet magazine. (2009, December). Retrieved from 
59 ‘Statement to the press by the Presidency of Religious Affairs concerning the Swiss 
referendum of November 29 , 2009 on the prohibition to build new minarets.’, (2009, 
December 1). Retrieved from http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/Diyanet-Isleri-
Baskanligi-Duyuru-4461.aspx  
5 8 ‘O acıyı içimizde yaşıyoruz.’ , (2009, July 9), Milli Gazete. Retrieved from 
http://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/o-aciyi-icimizde-yasiyoruz-131924.htm 
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violence mediated to the Turkish public can create tendencies towards violent 
behaviour.60
                                           
60 ‘Bardakoğlu: Merhamet eğitimine ihtiyaç var.’ (Bardakoğlu: Education of Mercy is 
necessary), (2009, July 17), Milli Gazete. Retrieved from 
  
http://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/bardakoglu-merhamet-egitimine-ihtiyac-var-
132794.htm 
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4.2. In the Netherlands 
As we have indicated before, Turkish Muslim organisations in The Netherlands 
and elsewhere in Europe can only partially be compared to those in Turkey. In 
order to understand organisational and other developments with respect to Islam, it 
is important to consider the fundamental changes that took place after migration 
(Sunier 1996). This is especially the case with respect to the activities initiated by 
these organisations. Initially, activities were mainly oriented towards the 
preservation of links with Turkey; however, with the transformation of the Turkish 
Muslim population from migrants to post-migrants, many organisations gradually 
shifted their policies. Azak points out “the shift from a mosque-oriented Islam 
towards an Islam spreading itself in the broader public sphere” as being an 
important development in the Netherlands (Azak 2009: 79). However, it is 
important to note that Azak explicitly refers to non-ISN organisations in the 
Netherlands, implying that such a shift does not apply to (or only minimally 
concerns) the ISN: “Members of Turkish Muslim organisations like Milli Görüş, 
the Gülen movement and the Süleymancıs participate in the democratic civil 
society, and are even competing with each other in obtaining their share of 
governmental funds aimed at stimulating integration. This competition leads to 
civil activism, beyond the level of mosque organisations, and, accordingly, to an 
increased participation of Turkish migrants in public life” (Azak 2009: 79). 
In addition to ‘religious’ activities like Islamic education for children, Turkish 
Muslim organisations also organise ‘social’ activities. But having said that, we 
should stress that a division between ‘religious’ and ‘social’ activities seems to be 
quite artificial, especially given that an essential element of what we observed as 
being ‘vermaatschappelijking’ (a stronger emphasis on the social functions of 
Islam) is in fact the merging of religious and social spheres. Examples of activities 
from the aforementioned non-ISN organisations include media engagement, such 
as the weekly Zaman Hollanda; the organising of extra classes for schoolchildren 
and students, for example through the Stichting Witte Tulp (White Tulip 
Foundation, founded in 1997) and the Stichting Cosmicus (Cosmicus Foundation, 
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founded in 1995), which, as “an intercultural organisation,” aims at organising 
educational, cultural, social, and scientific activities “that stimulate and add to the 
competences and career possibilities of students and alumni”61. Interestingly, the 
aforementioned initiatives are all affiliated with the Gülen movement. The SICN, 
the foundation of the Süleymancıs, not only organises the yearly Multifestijn, “the 
festival offering the broadest range of cultural activities for the whole family”,62 
but also conferences and summer courses.63
4.2.1. Activities of ISN 
 Another activity that seems to be 
increasingly popular is the semi-public celebration of the yearly iftars (breaking of 
the fast with a shared meal during Ramadan), to which non-Muslims are often 
invited as well. 
In order to determine whether the aforementioned “shift from a mosque-oriented 
Islam towards an Islam spreading itself in the broader public sphere” applies to 
ISN as well, it is important to pay attention to the activities of ISN. Focusing on the 
objectives and ‘faaliyetler’ (activities) in the statutory chart of ISN,64
If we look at the statutory chart, it is possible to make a (albeit artificial) division 
between ‘religious’ and ‘social’ activities. Some activities seem to be aimed more 
at facilitating religion than at ‘spreading Islam to the broader public sphere’. 
Examples of those religious services are: providing religious information to 
Muslims in the Netherlands; posting religious staff abroad; developing activities 
related to the Pilgrimage in the Netherlands and Saudi Arabia; facilitating 
assistance in connection with circumcision and weddings; offering assistance with 
 a few things 
are striking. First, the objectives and activities have hardly changed since the 
1980s. Thus on paper, ISN still has the same means to reach the same objectives, 
suggesting there is no question of a ‘recent shift’. Second, ISN still holds that it 
“definitely is not engaged in political matters”. 
                                           
61 http://www.cosmicus.nl/site/index3.php?id=18&catid=26&  
62 http://www.multifestijn.nl/2010/  
63 http://www.sicn.nl/pages/activiteiten.html  
64 
http://www.diyanet.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=100&Itemid=237  
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the transport of mortal remains of deceased (Turkish) Muslims to their mother 
country; educating religious staff; Quran and language courses; accepting and 
collecting donations, in money and in kind, and dividing and spending donations, 
such as fitre (alms at the end of the fasting month Ramadan) and zakat (a fortieth 
part of the income as ‘alms’); and finally, obtaining property “at the service of the 
objectives of the foundation”.  
Another aspect of the ISN’s activities seems to be more oriented towards ‘the 
broader public sphere’ and the (intra- and inter-religious) ‘dialogue’. Examples 
include: providing social and cultural services and assistance to (Turkish) Muslims 
living in the Netherlands; organising radio and television broadcastings to inform 
people about Islam; working together with churches and other religious 
organisations in the Netherlands; stimulating and coordinating the teaching of 
Islam and scholarly research; founding and administrating schools that provide 
Islamic education; translating, printing and publishing books about Quran sciences 
and other Islamic sciences and arts; opening and maintaining libraries; organising 
conferences, seminars and contests on Islamic topics; and the organising of, and 
participation in, social, cultural, scholarly, and sports events.  
Since all these activities have changed very little on paper since the 1980s, and 
because we have observed visible changes in the actual practices of ISN, it is 
important to analyse the specific interpretations and implementation processes of 
these activities in concrete situations. In turn, it seems at least debatable whether 
(planned) activities such as the founding of schools, appointment and training of 
imams and public broadcasting fit into ISN’s claim of being “definitely not 
engaged in political matters”. But let us have a closer look at these actual practices. 
4.2.2. ISN activities in practice 
The ISN Yearbook 2009 explains how statutory objectives have been translated into 
concrete actions.65
                                           
65 “HDV anatüzükte yazılı bu kuruluş amaçları ve faaliyet alanlarına uygun olarak 
oluşturulan çeşitli birimlerinde aşağıdaki başlıklarda belirtilen hizemetler 
 The following activities are mentioned in this regard: organising 
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public worship in mosques; building, maintaining and managing mosques; 
organising conferences and seminars; developing a fund and foundation for funeral 
services; organising the yearly Pilgrimage; organising the offering of a ‘substitute 
sacrificial animal’ (by donating money); providing scholarships; distribution of 
books, calendars, publications, and translations; celebration of religious and 
(Turkish) national holidays; activities related to an inter-religious dialogue, like 
‘open houses’; services of the Gültepe Educational Centre; charity campaigns; and 
contests. The activities organised by ISN are consistent with the earlier quoted 
statement by the President of ISN, Dr. Bülent Şenay, who insists the ISN 
increasingly fulfils the role of an NGO and focuses on new ‘target groups’ such as 
women and young people. Various activities are new; for example, an exchange 
program in Turkey is available to youth in the Netherlands to provide them with 
extra knowledge of the Turkish culture; ebru courses (marbling of paper); and 
lectures of the President at universities and institutions like Clingendael. Some 
activities are especially organised for women or children, such as ‘iftar for 
children’; computer courses; and ‘Quran courses for women’. In some of ISN’s 
activities, the ‘religious component’ is indeed difficult to locate, for example, in the 
courses of ‘dıkış-nakış, kumaş boyama’ (sewing, embroidery, colouring textiles) 
and ‘kuaförlük’ (hairdressing), which are aimed at youth. However, some of these 
non-religious activities organised in larger mosques result from local initiatives 
rather than ISN policies; nevertheless, the ISN mentions these in it’s annual 
yearbook as being concrete actions in line with their objectives.  
4.2.3. Inter-religious and inter-sectarian dialogue 
The above-mentioned activities are religious, social and educational in character, 
and ISN’s monthly magazine regularly reports on these programmes in great detail; 
for example, short texts and photographs are often used to describe openings, 
jubilee celebrations, open houses, conferences, dialogues with other religions, and 
meetings with ‘fellow-Muslims’ - such as the leading ‘Uyghur Türk’, Mrs. Rabia 
                                                                                                           
gerçekleştirmektedir” (Within the various units, the following services have been realised, 
in line with the statutory objectives and activities) (HDV Bülten 2009: 12). 
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Kader, or the Jerusalem-based Uzbek Nakşibendi-sheik Abdul Aziz Bukhari. The 
ISN even participates in a celebration of the Caferi-community (a Shiite branch 
within Islam) in the Netherlands. The prominent position of the President in the 
monthly activities is remarkable; he presents himself both as a religious expert, a 
(religious) leader, leader of the dialogue, and - conversely - as a ‘man of the 
people’ who is everywhere: from conferences on topics related to religion to kick-
offs of soccer matches. 
One of the largest ISN events took place on the 4th of April 2010 in the Arena in 
Amsterdam on the celebration of the Birth of Prophet Muhammad (Mevlit Kandili). 
On this ‘Kutlu Doğum Avrupa’-day (birthday celebration in Europe) an estimated 
30,000 people were present. These public celebrations have been organised since 
1989, both in Turkey and in countries with a substantial Turkish population. 
During those manifestations, love for the Prophet as well as “vatan ve millet 
sevgisi” (love for the [mother] country and the nation) are propagated. Thus it 
seems that the ‘traditional’ Turkish relationship between religion and nationalism is 
still an important ideological part of Diyanet’s message and, accordingly, a way for 
the ISN to communicate with Turkish citizens all over the world. The celebrations 
and speeches on Kutlu Doğum Avrupa-day are based on ‘Islam according to 
Diyanet/ISN’ (Sunni, Hanafi). However, the brochure mentions seven other 
participating organisations:  
 
SICN (Dutch Islamic Centre Foundation, associated with the Süleymancıs); 
NAF (Hollanda Nizam-i Alem Federasyonu, Dutch Federation of the World 
Order); 
FECC (Federation of Educational and Cultural Centres); 
HTIKB (Dutch Union for Turkish Islamic Organisations); 
TIF (Türk Islam Federasyonu, Turkish Islamic Federation); 
TFN (Hollanda Türk Federasyonu, Turkish Federation the Netherlands); 
NIF (Dutch Islamic Federation, Milli Görüş Southern Netherlands). 
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This list of partners is interesting as it is exclusively Turkish and Sunni; as such, 
the event underlines the continuation of ethnic divisions within the Dutch Muslim 
population. Several of the organisations mentioned have in earlier studies been 
associated with right-wing and nationalist parties in Turkey (Landman 1992: 113). 
It should be emphasised that here the ISN profiles itself as an umbrella 
organisation rather than a ‘controlling’ organisation. And according to the 
President, this qualification is valid in a general sense as well: “ISN is not having 
control over other Turkish communities in the Netherlands. But, I would rather call 
it dialogue instead of cooperation. Competition is not our aim, I would rather see 
Diyanet as an ‘umbrella’.”66
Other remarkable activities in 2009 and 2010 included meetings on International 
Women’s Day (8th of March) in Rotterdam and Eindhoven; ISN’s participation in 
and sponsoring of the Multifestijn, a multicultural festival organised by the SICN 
(at this festival the President of the ISN gave a lecture on ‘uneasiness towards and 
fear of Islam within society’); a conference in Rotterdam concerning a dialogue 
with Alevi groups; and iftar celebrations (breaking of the fast during Ramadan) in 
churches. 
  
4.2.4. More emphasis on social function: why?  
The ISN not only seems to operate more actively and visibly in society than ever 
before, but also appears to surpass the TICF with regard to social activities. It is 
debatable whether the decreased ‘visibility’ of TICF is a result of a shift in the 
balance of power between the ISN and TICF. Though it can at least be observed 
that, since the appointment of the new President, the ISN has been profiling itself 
more prominently on social dimensions and propagating a ‘dialogue’ between 
Turkish Muslim organisations and denominations within Islam, as well as between 
different religions altogether. However, according to some respondents, this is a 
simple power play: “If the ISN organises an event or activity, they are prominently 
present. They have the financial capacities; they can afford prominent guest 
speakers. But, if it is ‘not their show’, if other organisations organise it, one does 
                                           
66 Interview with Dr. Bülent Şenay, Den Haag, 13th of April 2010. 
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not very often see them.”67 Another respondent commented on the relation between 
the increased number of social activities initiated by the ISN and the competition 
between different Turkish Muslim organisations (especially between the ISN and 
Milli Görüş): “Suddenly, more social activities became visible, plus educational 
and cultural activities, sports, women- and youth branches. They work in the same 
way as Milli Görüş. But this is not a recent development; it started already some 
time before the AKP came into power.”68 According to this respondent, the 
popularity of Milli Görüş played a role here; he suggests that ISN can be 
characterised as a “competing party, a kind of market player, while at the same 
time it represents the Turkish state.”69 According to the same respondent: 
“Formally speaking ISN is the same as always, but in reality, one of the tasks of 
ISN is keeping Turkish Islam in the right track, like in Turkey.”70 Remarkably, the 
President of the ISN arrived at the same conclusion: “An important role of Diyanet 
is the role of ‘anti-chaos’.”71
In short, there now seems to be a stronger emphasis on the interaction and 
cooperation between the ISN and other Turkish Islamic organisations. This 
correlates with the changes we observed in Turkey as well, though with a 
somewhat different cause. In Turkey, these changes were rooted in the emergence 
of a civil society; this involved a changing position and increased visibility of 
Islam in the public sphere. In the Netherlands, recent shifts have to do with the 
specific character of the religious landscape, where all the Muslim organisations 
have the same legal position. Therefore, the ISN has to acknowledge that it has a 
 We could characterise this perspective as a kind of 
safe antidote, like the type of Islam propagated in Turkey after the Coup of 12 
September 1980, when the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which promoted a patriotic, 
state-controlled Islam as antidote to ‘dangerous’ movements and ideologies such as 
socialism and Islamism, was the widespread ideology of the time. 
                                           
67 Interview at Muslim Information Centre Foundation, Den Haag, 20th of January 2010. 
68 Interview at Forum, Utrecht, 20th of January 2010. 
69 Ibidem. 
70 Ibidem. 
71 Interview with Dr.. Bülent Şenay, Den Haag, 13th of April 2010. 
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fundamentally different position among the Islamic population in the Netherlands 
than in Turkey. In short, in the Netherlands, Turkish Muslims can (and do) make 
choices more freely than those in Turkey. The ISN has to win the hearts and minds 
of the Muslim population, especially in this post-migration era. This implies that 
the ISN, with regard to its policies, should be aware of the fact that a growing 
proportion of Turkish Muslims are born and raised in the Netherlands. 
4.2.5. Language 
Until recently, the ISN has communicated exclusively in Turkish on its website, in 
its monthly magazine and in its office in Den Haag. Sermons in mosques affiliated 
with the ISN are also held in Turkish. On the ISN website, the importance of 
Turkish people’s own language is emphasised; for example, books aiming to 
improve Turkish language skills are regularly promoted by the ISN, such as 
Hollanda Diyanet Vakfı’dan Tükçe Dil Eğitimine destek (Support at Language 
Education by ISN). The website also announced a new project run by the Youth 
and Sports Department: ‘Avrupa’daki Türk Gençleri Kendi Kültürleriyle Bulusuyor 
Projesi’ (‘Turkish Youth in Europe Meet their Own Culture’). In this project, 
people between the ages of 18 to 25 are offered an opportunity to travel to Turkey 
in order to familiarise themselves with their own culture more intensively.72 The 
President also stresses the importance of preserving the Turkish language and 
culture. On the other hand, he mentioned during an interview that: “We aim at 
some hutbe’s [sermons] to be given in Dutch. The ISN advised to do that. And also 
the monthly magazine and the website will be translated in the near future. We will 
try to start in May 2010.”73
Thus while the ISN clearly attempts to keep their ‘own language and culture’ 
alive, it also makes pragmatic choices to become part of ‘Dutch society’ and 
responds to requirements related to ‘integration’. The integration argument was 
 This implies that in addition to (young) people of the 
Turkish community, the entire non-Turkish Dutch speaking community will have 
access to texts as well. 
                                           
72 http://www.diyanet.nl/ 
73 Interview with Dr. Bülent Şenay, Den Haag, 13th of April 2010. 
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also one of the underlying points in the policy intentions laid out by the Dutch 
authorities to educate imams in the Netherlands. It is remarkable that other Turkish 
Islamic organisations, like Milli Görüş, the Süleymancıs and the Gülen movement, 
already communicate in Dutch with their supporters. 
4.2.6. Broadcasting 
Broadcasting is an area in which ISN has been forced to forge coalitions with other 
Muslim parties. Dutch broadcasting law allocates radio and television time to 
religious programs for those religions that are sufficiently represented among the 
Dutch population. The Directorate for the Media (Commissiariaat voor de Media – 
CvdM) gives responsibility for overseeing religious programming to a 
representative organisation of the religious. Since radio and television time was 
made available for the Islamic religion in 1986, the question over organisational 
representation has led to a rivalry between various coalitions of Muslim 
organisations, a competition that tends to flare up every fifth year, when the 
broadcasting concession has to be renewed. Initially, the ISN left this area to the 
other Diyanet-linked organisation in the Netherlands, the TICF. The TICF forged a 
coalition with one Moroccan and one Surinamese Muslim organisation and 
excluded other Turkish Muslim organisations. Later, the Diyanet-linked 
organisations were themselves excluded when a rival coalition won the concession. 
The history of Islamic broadcasting in the Netherlands is complex and requires a 
separate study, but here it is sufficient to say that requirements of representation 
imposed by the above-mentioned CvdM has forced the ISN to negotiate and 
cooperate with a wide variety of Muslim partners. In this process, the ISN has 
gradually moved away, maybe for opportunistic reasons, from attempts to 
monopolise at least the Turkish part of the Muslim community. In the most recent 
application for the broadcasting licence, ISN cooperated with no less than eighteen 
other organisations, including the Alevi organisation HAK-DER and Milli Görüş 
Southern Netherlands (NIF).  
Though this application was turned down in 2009, it is not yet clear what will 
happen due to the fact that the rival coalition which won the licence (the Stichting 
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Moslim Omroep Nederland or Muslim Broadcasting in the Netherlands 
Foundation) fell apart before they could start broadcasting. At the moment, the 
Muslim Broadcasting license ‘case’ seems to be in an impasse. 
4.2.7. Imam training 
The training of imams is one of the most sensitive issues in the public debate on 
Islam. It is the single most important field where religion and integration issues 
coincide and where the role of the state in religious affairs is at stake. Since 1996, 
Dutch governments have studied various possibilities to train imams locally and 
create alternatives to recruiting imams from Muslim countries. In this regard, 
however, the Dutch government faced opposition from Muslim organisations who 
tended to see such initiatives as government interference in internal religious 
affairs (Landman 1996). Nevertheless, former Minister for Integration and 
Immigration, Mrs. Verdonk, in a letter marked December 2004, informed the 
Tweede Kamer (House of Representatives) about plans to realise imam training 
facilities in the Netherlands.74
                                           
74 
 She suggested three options: 1. A BA or MA-
program of Islamic theology at one of the existing universities, and under the 
responsibility of this university; 2. cooperation with Diyanet; and 3. projects in 
which an Islamic organisation would cooperate with an existing university, and for 
which a project subsidy would be made available. Two years later, she informed 
the Parliament, without giving details, that no cooperation between her Ministry 
and Diyanet had emerged. Diyanet had, however, initially participated in one of the 
projects emerging from the third option. The university INHolland which had 
already offered a program to train teachers of Islamic religion started a program for 
imams involving the cooperation with the national platform of Muslims in the 
Netherlands Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (CMO) (in which the ISN 
participates). This program at INHolland started in September 2006. According to 
the chairman of CMO and lecturer at INHolland, an imam should be someone from 
among the cemaat: “We have chosen the middle course. We do not think learning 
http://rijksbegroting.minfin.nl/2006/kamerstukken,2006/3/2/kst95190.html 
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the Quran by heart is realisable. No, we offer training for a profession.”75
The ISN, however, refused to participate in the INHolland plans as they found 
the level of education insufficient; there were also disagreements over the ‘imam 
profile’. The President of the ISN, in a television documentary in April 2009, made 
clear that the education of an imam should not be compared to professional 
education; imam training should start at a very young age and impart both a 
thorough knowledge of Islam as well as “body language” and a certain life attitude. 
The President expressed his doubts about the quality, the curriculum and the 
lecturers of INHolland, and added that being a Muslim is not sufficient if one 
wants to be a member of the ulema. The President concluded by stating that the 
existing situation of the ISN appointing imams from Turkey should be continued or 
the level of imam education in the Netherlands should be brought to a higher level.  
 The 
spoken language and language of education at INHolland is Dutch, “unless Arabic 
or Turkish is functional”. As a result, current policies allow for the education of 
Dutch speaking imams. 
In addition to INHolland’s imam training program, Leiden University and VU 
University Amsterdam today offer academic programs in Islamic theology. 
Students in these programs are not specifically trained for the profession of imam. 
In these cases, the involvement of Islamic organisations like Diyanet has 
sometimes been suggested but has not yet materialised.  
Rather than investing in a completely new avenue to train their Dutch imams, in 
cooperation with a Dutch university, Diyanet has in recent decades tried to improve 
the existing system of recruiting the imams in Turkey and preparing them for work 
in the Netherlands or other European countries. In Turkey, imams receive courses 
in the language and culture of the country in question. In the Netherlands, they are 
supposed to attend a tailor-made ‘inburgeringscursus’ (integration course). Imams 
were, until the 1st of July, appointed on a ‘3 plus 1’ term, or a three year term, and 
had the possibility of a one year extension. Since July 1st, the maximum term is 
                                           
75 Interview at INHolland, 10th of December 2009, Amstelveen. 
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five years, which also has implications for their residence permit.76 The 
appointment and presence of Turkish ‘state imams’ has aroused many questions, 
speculations and even fear among policy makers and media. Many people wish to 
have more insight into the appointment and dismissal process of certain imams. In 
the Netherlands, imams are formally supervised by the President of the ISN who 
delegates this task to the attachés in Deventer and Rotterdam. According to an 
interviewee, imams can be dismissed for several general reasons: corruption, 
contacts with the press or media without permission, undesired involvement in 
illegitimate religious activities (i.e. popular Islam, see Chapter 5.1.3.2), or 
radicalisation. After a first warning, they receive an official letter from one of the 
attachés, eventually followed by a ‘good conversation’, a suspension or - in the 
worst case scenario - dismissal. If an imam is not breaking rules but has a conflict 
with the Board of the mosque where he is appointed, there can be an ‘exchanging 
of imams’. The above-mentioned interviewee gave the example of an imam at a 
large mosque in an urban centre who following a conflict with the Board was 
appointed to a mosque in a small town. However, in general, more research will be 
needed to grasp an exact picture of ‘cases’.77
Conversely, Diyanet imams in Europe are also sometimes regarded as ‘tools’ in 
the integration process. For example, in Germany imams are mobilised as the ideal 
‘bridge builders’. For example, the German branch of Diyanet, DITIB, works 
together with the Goethe Institute in Frankfurt on a joint project entitled, ‘Imame 
für Integration’ (Imams for Integration).
  
78
 
 
                                           
76 Interview by telephone, 28th of November 2010. 
77 Ibidem. 
78 http://www.ditib.de/detail1.php?id=184&lang=de  
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5. Diyanet as a religious guide 
A thorough overview of the formal tasks and internal organisation of Diyanet 
(Chapter 3) as well as its various activities (Chapter 4) has made clear that the 
institution is not only engaged in the creation of material conditions for religious 
life, nor is it just involved in managing and organising these activities; its duties 
also include illuminating the public about religion. A primary activity of Diyanet’s 
highest body, the Higher Council of Religious Affairs, is to answer questions about 
the correct interpretation of Islamic practices and beliefs. Diyanet is expected to 
function as a religious guide. It is in this field, perhaps, that the paradox of a 
religious institution in a secular state becomes most striking. A famous saying of 
Atatürk is: “The truest guide (mürşit) in life is science.”; this word for guidance is 
used deliberately as it holds a religious connotation, and he suggests that today 
modern science leads the way rather than religious knowledge. Therefore, 
Diyanet’s task to guide the public in religious matters involves the subtle challenge 
of interpreting Islamic sources in a way that is compliant with the principles of the 
secular Turkish republic. In this chapter we will look more closely at the content of 
Diyanet’s interpretation of Islam. 
5.1. In Turkey 
5.1.1. Scientific publications and the Hadith Project 
Scientific journals on Islam and Islamic history of Diyanet are often published in 
cooperation with the Foundation of Religious Affairs, a foundation established by 
the top cadres of Diyanet in 1975 to support or supplement the activities of the 
Directorate. The most important publication of this Foundation is the impressive 40 
volume Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Islam Ansiklopedisi (encyclopaedia). 
A new joint project of the Directorate and the Foundation is the Hadith Project, 
which promises to be highly ambitious with 85 scholars, experts on hadiths from 
different Theology Faculties, involved (Gözaydın 2009: 153). The project aims to 
publish a six volume edition and Turkish translation of the Hadith; that is, it will 
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encompass a collection of sayings and deeds of Prophet Muhammad and his 
companions, which constitute the second source of Islamic law after the Quran. 
This project has, nationally and internationally, been widely discussed, 
especially after a BBC-contribution on 27 February 2008 that presented it as an 
attempt to reform Islam. The BBC also linked the project to the American policy of 
creating a ‘moderate Islam’ that could counterbalance Islamic fundamentalism and 
bridge the gap between the liberal West and the Muslim world. Diyanet reacted 
very agitatedly to these suggestions about the Hadith Project, and argued that it has 
nothing to do with a ‘moderate Islam’ project and does not aim at a revision, 
revolution or reform of Islam. The project should be interpreted as an attempt to 
make the Hadith understandable for people in the 21st century (Gözaydın 2009: 
153). 
To put this in perspective, it is important to know something about the character 
and literary form of the Hadith, or the collection of hadiths. The hadiths are brief 
reports in which the Prophet Muhammad, his companions or earlier prophets give 
an interpretation (in words or by an example through their own behaviour) about a 
religious or moral issue. In the tradition of Sunni Islam, these reports have been 
handed down to us in six Arabic collections, each of which is large enough to fill 
four volumes. As these collections were composed more than a hundred years after 
the death of the Prophet, they contain reports of doubtful authenticity. However, at 
least two of the collections, the Bukhari and Muslim collections, are considered 
trustworthy by Sunni orthodoxy. Against this background, any attempt to publish a 
Turkish edition that is more than a mere translation of the classical collections of 
Bukhari and Muslim is faced with the problem of determining which hadiths are 
authentic and which were fabricated. Important questions remain, such as: On what 
grounds is such a decision made? Which hadiths will be included in the Diyanet 
edition and why? 
Our respondents from the top cadres of Diyanet did their utmost best to correct 
the image created by the BBC, which suggested that the project was meant to 
eliminate those hadiths that Diyanet, for one reason or another, wanted to be 
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forgotten. Mr. Er, for instance, denies that the project has any doctrinal purpose at 
all, but simply brings together earlier insights about the authenticity of hadiths. 
Also Mr. Yeprem underlines that the Hadith Project is not about eliminating 
unwelcome hadiths, but rather aims to present the hadiths in a language that is 
understandable today. Still, he hints at the fact that some sort of a new selection is 
being made. If problems of our time cannot be solved with classical approaches, 
then the Higher Council of Religious Affairs will replace these less useful 
approaches with new ones; in saying this, he suggests that the classical Arabic 
hadith collection did not always make the right choice between authentic and false. 
He accepts that there are numerous hadiths about the Prophet that have been made 
up by people. Diyanet aims to present people “the accurate ones”. 
Mr. Erul, the project leader, primarily portrays it as a matter of presenting the 
Arabic material to a contemporary Turkish public: the young generations cannot 
understand the older texts. Hence, this project was initiated in order to make 
hadiths more comprehensible to the masses. Although many scholars are involved, 
the project does not aim to produce an academic edition but rather an edition 
targeting ordinary people. 
He explains, however, that the project is more than a translation project. It also 
includes the classification of thousands of hadiths, according to various topics. This 
implies a selection process, as many hadiths have been handed down in various 
different readings. Mr. Erul reacts by stating that more than 200,000 hadiths have 
been transmitted, thus any book edition will have to make a selection. In turn, the 
classical collections, like the Bukhari collection, made selections: Bukhari selected 
only 4,000 hadiths. Similarly, “Diyanet has chosen the most credible hadiths.” Mr. 
Erul added that the new edition should be used the next 50-100 years: “These 
volumes will be translated into English and German as well.” 
In our interviews, the question on what basis the selections of hadiths was being 
made remained unanswered because of the apologetic attitudes of the Diyanet 
officials. However, the July 2009 issue of Diyanet Magazine sheds some more light 
on the intentions behind the project; one article and two interviews with professors 
from various Faculties of Theology were included in the issue. Saim Yeprem 
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argued that a renovation will take place in terms of the “perception of religion”, 
rather than in “religion itself”, and emphasised the need to produce knowledge for 
human beings living in the 21st century without transforming the global message of 
Islam. This distinction between “religion itself”, which is eternal and unchanging, 
versus our human “perception of religion”, that can be moulded to changing 
circumstances, is an important instrument for modernist and reformist tendencies in 
Islam today. 
Said Hatipoğlu, taking this idea of bringing religion in line with contemporary 
circumstances even further, argues that if the actions of the Prophet Muhammad 
are taken out of their historical context and made into a model for all times and all 
places, this will lead to unacceptable behaviour. Rather than getting lost in the 
details of his actions and sayings, Hatipoğlu suggests that the real intentions behind 
Muhammad’s decisions and way of thinking should be emphasised. In other words, 
the Hadith Project should, in the view of Hatipoğlu, present the sayings and deeds 
of the Prophet within the context of Muhammad’s own time rather than portray 
them as eternal, absolute truths.79
Though our respondents consistently deny it, there are good reasons to believe 
that a reformist tendency is behind the Hadith Project, and that reformist academics 
are involved in it. At this moment, it is still unclear how Diyanet’s hadith collection 
will exactly look, and to what extent the selection will take into account the 
‘acceptability’ according to modern ethics of certain hadiths. What will happen, for 
instance, with the many reports on corporal punishment, including stoning in case 
of adultery? Will they be left out? Will they be included, or put into a historical 
context to make it clear that they have no validity today? One way or another, this 
new edition of the Hadith will influence religious interpretation among the Turkish 
population for the coming decades. 
 
                                           
79 Diyanet Magazine (July 2009). Retrieved from 
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/DIYANET/2009aylik/temmuz/aylik/Diyanet.html . 
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5.1.2. The religious authority of Diyanet 
Although ‘illuminating the public about religion’ is a major task of Diyanet, the 
question of whether or not it has the religious authority to do so is a widely debated 
issue. Is Diyanet in a position to declare religious rules and act as a religious 
authority? Many theologians argue that Diyanet is not the religious authority in 
Turkey; it is just an institution to organise and facilitate religious services. 
According to Ismail Kara, a professor of Islamic Philosophy, Diyanet is not 
qualified to represent Islam. Rather than a holy institution with a sacred identity, 
Diyanet is generally defined as an administrative body or part of the 
administration, with the responsibility to provide services (Gözaydın 2009: 103-
105). Referring to the absence of a Church and a clergy in Islam and to the fact that 
Islamic doctrine does not recognise a religious authority as defining ‘true Islam’ or 
judging individuals’ religiosity, Gözaydın argues that there has always been a need 
for some organisations to regulate the services and facilities of the ummah, the 
community of the believers. Although Diyanet sometimes uses a similar reasoning, 
it does express itself on and answer to issues related to religious laws. 
Fierce discussions revolve around the official status of Diyanet and whether its 
existence can be justified in both Islamic and secular terms. One of the former 
Diyanet presidents, Mr. Lutfi Doğan, attributes Diyanet’s establishment to the lack 
of a clergy in Islam.80
On the other hand, one of the current vice-presidents of Diyanet, İzzet Er does 
not limit the responsibilities of Diyanet to the organisation of services; he argues 
 According to him, this absence legitimises the state’s 
understanding of religious services as being public in nature, and the state’s 
provision of these services. Some jurists, however, argue that, due to the very same 
reason, the organisation responsible for these duties should be objective and 
unbiased and deal not with faith but only with technical necessities. The main 
reason underpinning this argument is that Diyanet is funded from the taxes of all 
Turkish citizens, even if they do not believe in Islam and are not Muslim. Hence, 
religion in this view cannot be a matter of public service (Derbil 1949: 466). 
                                           
80 Lütfi Doğan, ‘Laiklik ve Yeni Yapılanma’ (Secularism and New Structuring), Milliyet, 
(1989, March 4). Retrieved from http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/Arsiv/1989/03/04 
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instead that Diyanet is also an office of fatwa’s. However, he also adds that 
Muslims in Turkey are free to interpret these fatwa’s of Diyanet as they wish; they 
should listen to the fatwa’s and rules issued by the Higher Committee of Religious 
Affairs, though are free to follow or ignore them, according to their own situation. 
During the interview, he illustrates this point through a hadith of the Prophet which 
states, “ask your heart”. Caner Taslaman, on the other hand, argues that Diyanet 
might be useful or even necessary to coordinate religious activities, such as 
providing a time schedule for prayers, but that its role in producing religious 
knowledge is unacceptable due to the absence of clergy in Islam. 
The question whether religious guidance by an institution of a secular state is 
appropriate depends on one’s interpretation of secularism. However, Diyanet has 
made its task of ‘illuminating the people about religion’ include the issuing of 
fatwa’s. 
5.1.3. Fatwa’s and religious advice 
In our study of how Diyanet has responded to moral and religious questions in 
recent decades, we see several patterns. The character of the advice given by the 
organisation seems to depend on the social and political importance of the issue at 
hand, and also on whether there is dispute about the topic in the public opinion. 
Some examples are highly informative in grasping the nature of Diyanet’s fatwa’s. 
Diyanet seems to be rather sensitive about public morality. Practices that are 
morally disputable, like buying lottery tickets, are criticised by Diyanet and defined 
as a form of gambling, which Islamic doctrine condemns.81
                                           
81 Okan Müderrisoğlu, ‘Piyango kumar.’ (Lottery is gambling), (2005, December 25), 
Sabah. Retrieved from 
 However, in the case of 
many social and cultural practices that are not Islamic in origin but socially 
accepted in contemporary Turkey, Diyanet tends to legitimate and tolerate rather 
than protest against them. With respect to celebrating New Year’s Eve, for 
instance, many traditionalists, conservative Muslims and religious teachers would 
argue that it is a Christian tradition, and should thus not be celebrated by Muslims. 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/muderrisoglu/2005/12/25/Piyango_kumar . 
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However, the majority of the Turkish population celebrates New Year’s Eve 
anyway. Mr. Bardakoğlu, clarifies the issue by distinguishing between Christmas 
and New Year celebrations and by arguing that Christmas is a religious festival for 
Christians while New Year’s Eve is a part of global culture, meaning that it can be 
celebrated.82 Diyanet’s stance on contemporary issues such as birth control, in vitro 
fertilisation83, organ transplantation (Gözaydın 2009: 163) and sexuality taught at 
schools84 also reflects views that are commonly accepted by the majority of the 
population, even though traditionalist and conservatives argue against these 
practices. Another significant example is Diyanet’s stance on the Quran’s embrace 
of monogamy. In Diyanet’s purportedly first public statement on the issue 
(according to the journalist reporting about it), Ali Bardakoğlu observed that 
officially and socially, monogamy is the rule in Turkey, pointing to the social 
benefits of monogamy and the disadvantages of polygamy (e.g. the lack of 
protection of women’s rights, problems in children’s inheritance, and victimisation 
of women). In turn, he concluded that polygamy has many drawbacks from an 
Islamic viewpoint as well.85
                                           
82 Okan Müderrisoğlu, ‘Yılbaşı evrensel kültürün parçası.’ (New Year's Day is part of the 
global culture)", (2005, December 25), Sabah. Retrieved from 
 Unfortunately, his statement does not make clear 
whether he wishes to link this argument to the Quran verse (Sura 4:3) that allows 
polygamy, as long as the husband treats all of his maximum of four wives equally. 
Many modernist Muslims argue that this equal treatment of women is a condition 
that no man can meet, so the intention of the verse is the abolishment of the 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/muderrisoglu/2005/12/25/Yilbasi_evrensel_kulturun_par
casi 
83 ‘Vatikan’dan veto, Diyanet’ten onay’ (Veto from vatican, approval from Diyanet) (2008, 
December 14), Vatan. 
84 ‘Diyanet’ten “cinsellik eğitimi” çıkışı.’ (Sex education' opening from Diyanet), (2008, 
December 18), Vatan. Retrieved from 
http://w9.gazetevatan.com/haberdetay.asp?detay=Diyanetten_cinsellik_egitimi_cikisi_2140
21_1&tarih=09.01.2010&Newsid=214021&Categoryid=1. 
85 Fikret Bila, ‘Bardakoğlu’nun verdiği mesajlar.’ (The statements of Bardakoğlu), (2008, 
June 5), Milliyet. Retrieved from 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=YazarDetay&ArticleID=762966&AuthorI
D=61 . 
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polygamous marriage. It would be interesting to know whether Bardakoğlu follows 
this kind of reasoning. 
5.1.3.1. Sensitive issues 
Diyanet is often quick to legitimate cultural and social practices that are widely 
accepted in Turkey in terms of Islamic doctrine. But in matters that are hotly 
debated, Diyanet acts more cautiously and tends to refrain from judgements which 
utilise Islamic vocabulary (like halal or haram, allowed or forbidden); instead, a 
more general vocabulary is used (wise, unwise, usual practice in Islamic cultures, 
etc.). 
For instance, a growing number of people in Turkey have begun to argue that the 
ritual prayers (namaz) should be performed in Turkish, contrary to the orthodox 
view that formulas and Quran verses for daily prayers are uniform for all Muslims 
and must be recited in Arabic, the original language. In answer to a question on 
whether prayers in Turkish would be accepted by God, Mr. Bardakoğlu abstained 
from providing a clear-cut answer based on religious doctrine and claimed that he 
could not answer such a question, not having the license to decide which practices 
would be accepted by God. He added he could only say whether or not a religious 
practice conforms with Islamic traditions (though he did not mention whether this 
was the case).86
On some topics, Diyanet has modified its position considerably. This 
modification has usually meant a shift towards interpretations that are more in line 
with modernity and current social norms. However, this tendency towards 
accepting and even applying modernity should not be exaggerated; nor should not 
be forgotten that Diyanet’s possibilities of ‘reinterpretation’ are limited. One 
example of such a change is Diyanet’s perspective on insurance. In 1991, the 
chairman of the Higher Council of Religious Affairs, İrfan Yücel, stated that most 
Islamic scholars of the last century have considered insurance haram (forbidden) 
due to its similarity to the practice of gambling. Only the insurance issued by the 
state, Bağkur and SSK, could be considered permissible as they have no 
  
                                           
86 Ibidem. 
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commercial goal. A Council decision on the 4th of July 2005 however considers 
insurance in general to be a system of social care which cannot be compared to 
gambling. Rejecting the arguments by scholars who declared insurance to be 
illegitimate according to Islam, the Council judged that the social insurance of the 
state and private insurance companies have the same function and should not be 
evaluated separately simply just because the latter have commercials goals. As the 
Islamic regulations of social and economic life aim at building a community based 
on reciprocal help, insurance cannot be interpreted as being against this holy aim in 
Islam. In short, Diyanet moved from legitimising a state monopoly on insurance 
towards accepting the privatisation and commercialisation of this social service, 
which reflects the liberalisation of Turkish economic life. 
5.1.3.2. Against popular Islam 
An area in which Diyanet has always been clear, in which it claims to represent 
‘true Islam’, is the issue of superstitions and popular Islam. This includes the 
worshipping of saints and praying to them, asking saints for favours, or expecting 
them to have a beneficial influence on health, fertility and marriage opportunities. 
Superstition was the subject of the June 2006 Diyanet Magazine.87
                                           
87 Diyanet Magazine, (2006, June), 
 In this issue, 
‘true Islam’ is presented as the alternative for superstitions; however, according to 
Ismail Kara, in reality this is also an attempt to bring the interpretation of Islam in 
line with the modernisation process in Turkey (Kara 2003: 79). This may be true, 
as Mustafa Kemal has also regularly expressed himself against these practices, 
which he believes contradict a modern scientific world-view. However, these same 
popular practices are dually condemned by Saudi religious authorities on grounds 
that veneration of saints violates the Islamic principle that veneration belongs to 
God alone. Religious puritanism and secular modernity however seem to fit well 
within this area; perhaps this explains the confidence with which Diyanet argues 
against it. 
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/DIYANET/2006aylik/haziran/aylik/Diyanet.html 
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The subject was also discussed in the July 1995 issue,88
5.1.3.3. Nationalism and loyalty to the state 
 which displayed a cover 
page bearing the title ‘Help comes only from God, not from cloth-patches and not 
from fortune-telling’. The same message can be seen at many grave monuments 
and ‘holy places’ in Turkey visited by pilgrims; popular religious practices at or 
near such places are discouraged by metal inscriptions conveying the message that 
praying to saints is not compatible with Islamic doctrine. In a 2006 Diyanet 
publication, the issue of widespread superstitions is discussed in more detail. In this 
book, entitled, Superstitions in 21st century Turkey, 1,380 superstitions were 
identified as having “no place in Islam”. The condemned practices include: hoping 
to receive help from attending places such as mausoleums or areas where a holy 
man is believed to be buried; believing that marrying between the end of Ramadan 
and the Festival of Sacrifice brings bad luck; reciting the Quran or organising 
Islamic memorial services on the 7th, 40th or 52nd nights, or at the anniversaries 
following one’s death; carrying blue beads to avert the evil eye; carrying folded 
prayers or parts from the Quran on ones body; and visiting fortune tellers or 
witches (Gözaydın 2009: 162). 
Besides taking into consideration social sensitivities and social consensus on 
certain issues in preparing its statements and explanations, Diyanet has to take into 
account the official state view, as it is officially an administrative state institution. 
Its answers to questions regarding historical or political matters must be in 
harmony with the official state view or, at least, not contradict them. This does not 
mean that Diyanet only pays lip service to state doctrines; it also makes use of state 
doctrines to legitimate and strengthen its own religious positions. 
In the November 2009 issue of Diyanet Magazine, Selim Özarslan suggests that 
Atatürk defined Prophet Muhammad as the model human being and the Quran as 
the supreme book. According to Özarslan, Atatürk, who was aware of the 
importance of religion for the nation, believed in the necessity of religion to be 
                                           
88 Diyanet Magazine, (1995, July). 
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taught.89
Diyanet acts as a state institution and frequently mentions the importance of the 
homeland, the nation and shared historical memory of people living in Turkey. In 
the October 2009 issue of Diyanet Magazine, the importance of the Turkish 
National Assembly and national will was also emphasised
 This attitude is widely embraced by Diyanet and signifies that the 
Directorate, even during the time of the AKP government, uses Atatürk as a 
legitimising factor for its views. 
90 (On the 29th of 
October, Republican Day is celebrated). And in the August 2009 issue, the 
importance of the homeland is mentioned several times (on the 30th of August 
Victory Day is celebrated). Kiyasettin Koçoglu even states here that if the 
homeland is at stake, everything must be risked for it. The magazine memorialises 
the victory of August 30th 1922 - during the Independence War - and praises 
Atatürk, the military leader behind the victory.91
Gözaydin mentions an MA-research study on sermons that were prepared by 
Diyanet between 2003 and 2005; in the sermons, the concepts of ‘homeland’, 
‘nation’, ‘national’ and ‘Turk’ were used 263 times, while terms such as ‘human 
rights’, ‘equality’, ‘freedom’ and ‘brotherhood in Islam’ (Islam kardeşliği) were 
mentioned only 29 times. While love towards God was chosen as the subject of 
sermons five times, loving the homeland was chosen six times as the main topic 
(Gözaydın 2009: 166). This study of the sermons underlines the nationalist 
tendency in Diyanet’s written publications. 
 
This is no new phenomenon; a closer analysis of some headings in a book on 
hutbes written in the 1920s by former President of Diyanet, Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, 
shows how the Turkish Republic at that time used sermons in mosques as 
ideological tools. Some of the headlines are: ‘Defending the Homeland’, ‘Helping 
the Turkish Aeronautical Association’, ‘The Honour of military service’, ‘The one 
                                           
89 Diyanet Magazine, (2009, November), 227th issue. Retrieved from 
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/DIYANET/2009aylik/kasim/aylik/Diyanet.html 
90 Diyanet Magazine. (2009, October). 226th issue. Retrieved from 
 http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/DIYANET/2009aylik/ekim/aylik/Diyanet.html 
91 Diyanet Magazine. (2009, August). 224th issue. Retrieved from 
 http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/DIYANET/2009aylik/agustos/aylik/Diyanet.html  
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who works will get his reward’ (Kara 2003: 74). Kara, argues that the headlines 
and content of the sermons have always been considered highly important and 
deserve special attention. The sermons should share a uniting and reconciling 
discourse and be devoid of personal, political or ideological implications. The 
central control of the sermons, which we discussed in chapter 4, underlines the 
importance of the sermon in the eyes of state officials (Kara 2003: 70). In turn, the 
writings hanging between the minarets of a mosque during festivals (mahyas) 
illuminated by light sometimes contain messages that refer to the morality of the 
state rather than to religious faith, like the instruction ‘save your money’ (Kara 
2003: 75). 
5.1.3.4. Social harmony in Turkey 
One of the most central concerns of Diyanet is social unity and harmony in Turkey. 
As this belongs to the constitutional tasks of Diyanet, it needs no further 
legitimation. Nevertheless, the President of Diyanet closely links this contribution 
to social harmony to the religious services Diyanet provides. If religious service is 
not provided successfully, gaps will be filled by ideas that harm social peace. 
Religion, in his view, should be used to prevent the spread of harmful ideas in 
society.92
However, Diyanet’s contribution to social harmony need not be explicitly 
religious; it can also contain a moral appeal to the public. A good example is a 
statement made by Mr. Bardakoğlu in December 2009, emphasising that everyone 
has the responsibility to prevent the mounting unrest in the streets, which resulted 
from the closure of the Democratic Society Party (DTP)- the Kurdish party in the 
assembly- by the Constitutional Court. He went on to say that people should 
respond positively towards this call for unity and harmony, and refrain from 
encouraging provocations: which he calls “the fire of fitna”.
 
93
                                           
92 ‘Bardakoğlu: Din hizmetleri iyi verilmezse boşluk olur.’ (There will be a vacuum if 
religious service is not provided efficiently), (2010, January 9), Zaman. Retrieved from 
 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=938100&keyfield=646979616E6574 
93 ‘Diyanet İşleri Başkanı Prof. Dr.. Ali Bardakoğlu Rize'de uyardı: Fitne Ateşine Dikkat.’ 
(The President of Diyanet Professor Ali Bardakoğlu warned in Rize: Be cautious of the fire 
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This example shows that Diyanet’s official task of providing and protecting 
national peace and unity is not only interpreted in religious terms, but also (more 
predominantly) in national terms. Our respondent, Mr. Er, confirmed this idea; 
when asked what should be done when national and religious interests clash, he 
replied simply: “We are trying not to make them clash. Preventing a clash between 
the two is very important for our social integration. It is highly beneficial to present 
these two to the public as mutually supporting each other.” The ideology of the 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which became an important state doctrine after 1980, 
still seems to play an important role within Diyanet. 
Reflecting on the relationship between nationalism and religion in Turkey, Mr. 
Subaşı argues that ‘Turkishness’ cannot discard religion. As religion in Turkey has 
been redesigned by the state, Islam has always been a component of Turkishness. 
Although religion was repressed in the early republic, it continued to be a factor in 
propagating national unity. Even the army, that is so often portrayed as the 
watchdog of secularism, has used religion and claimed that patriotism is a religious 
duty.  
5.1.3.5. Signs of autonomous reasoning 
Diyanet has not always acted in line with the ideas of the central administration. 
For instance, in the period following the coup of 28 February 1997, Diyanet 
declared that the headscarf is an order of Allah (Çakır and Bozan 2005: 36). Under 
the circumstances, this claim was very much against the interests of the central 
administration, as the headscarf was seen as the main symbol of Islamist politics – 
a political structure seen as the most serious threat against the secular Turkish 
order. 
The statements of former President Bardakoğlu and former Vice President 
Mehmet Görmez (who is now President) at the Orthodox Seminary in Halki on 
Heybeli Ada (an island in the Sea of Marmara) constitute another example of 
Diyanet’s autonomous position. The Greek government and the Orthodox Church 
                                                                                                           
of provocation), (2009, December 19), Milli Gazete. Retrieved from 
http://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/fitne-atesine-dikkat-146725.htm 
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in Istanbul expect Turkey to allow the reopening of a seminary in the country, 
which would be the only school where the Greek minority would be able to educate 
its clergy. In turn, the AKP government uses this issue in negotiations with the 
Greek government as a means of improving the position of the Turkish minority in 
Greece.94 Görmez, however, suggested that the seminary issue should be evaluated 
within the scope of religious freedom; he stated that every religious group should 
have the right to train its own clergy, which has been interpreted as a form of 
criticism of government policies.95
One of the most mediatised statements from Diyanet in recent years concerned 
television. While Mr. Bardakoğlu delivered a Friday sermon in Diyarbakır, he 
recommended that the audience turn off their televisions for half an hour in the 
evening and spend that time reading or listening to the Quran. The general message 
of his sermon was to convey the importance of the Quran to Muslims. According to 
him, the Quran reveals our past, future and even ourselves and hence meeting with 
the Quran means meeting with ourselves. While reading the Quran, Muslims know 
both God and themselves, and realise the whole universe was created for them and 
become thankful to God. For these reasons, Bardakoğlu recommended devoting 
some time to the Quran in the evenings. 
 
Mr. Bardakoğlu's speech aroused a heated discussion in the media, and some 
journalists argued that such a recommendation should not be given in a secular 
state as there are non-Muslims and even non-believers in Turkey. Their 
interpretation of the statement was that it “forced” people to read the Quran rather 
than encouraged it; they maintained that a person making this public call to read 
the Quran was unfit for the Presidency of Diyanet in a secular republic. Others, 
however, considered Mr. Bardakoğlu’s statement just one of many to be expected 
from the President of Diyanet. A well-known journalist ironically responded to the 
turmoil by asking whether the critics expected the President of Diyanet to 
                                           
94 ‘Erdoğan refers to Turks in Greece in seminary debate’, (2010, January 5), Today’s 
Zaman. Retrieved from http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-197584-erdogan-refers-
to-turks-in-greece-in-seminary-debate.html 
95 Sadık Güleç, ‘Diyanet'ten Ortodoks açılımı.’ (Orthodox opening from Diyanet)", (2010, 
January 3), Taraf. Retrieved from http://taraf.com.tr/haber/46234.html 
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recommend gambling or watching soap series on TV and the dubious sexual 
relations portrayed in these programmes. However, Bardakoğlu’s critics insisted 
that he should not comment on the private lives of citizens, which was “none of his 
business”. He ought to limit himself to regulating religious life. Another 
commentator, although highly critical of the existence of an institution like Diyanet 
in a secular state, said that the statement of Bardakoğlu was very logical: if a state 
institution is allowed to wear the robes of religious authority (that is, with gown 
and turban), one should not be surprised if it calls for the Quran to be studied and 
followed.96
This fierce public debate makes clear how sensitive the issue of religion and how 
contentious the behaviour of Diyanet as a religious authority has become. A moral 
and religious appeal by Diyanet to turn of the television and study the Quran in the 
evenings is all too easily constructed to be a threat to the secular public order of 
Turkey. The more secular circles of Turkish society may have reluctantly accepted 
the fact that taxpayers’ money is spent on an institution like Diyanet as it is an 
institution meant to control and manage Islam. However, many become alarmed 
when Diyanet directly addresses the wider public with religious and moral appeals. 
The issue also illustrates that the President of Diyanet, Ali Bardakoğlu, did indeed 
intend to do more than merely manage the material facilities of religious life and 
limit the influence of anti-modern Islam interpretations; he also wanted his 
institution to play a role in society as a whole and address the nation with an appeal 
to morality and religious conscience. The more Diyanet seems to act as a religious 
authority, the higher the tensions with secular forces in Turkey are likely to be. 
 
                                           
96 For more information on Bardakoğlu’s statement and the media discussion revolving 
around it, see these websites;http://www.guncelhaber.com/haberler/vequottelevizyonu-
kapatip-kuran-okuyunvequot-
459887.htm,http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=951428, 
http://www.haber7.com/haber/20100215/Bardakoglunun-Haberturke-Kuran-yaniti.php, 
http://www.aksam.com.tr/2010/03/09/yazar/16323/sevim_gozay/Diyanet__medya_ve_oku
ma_isleri.html, http://www.medyakulisi.com/haber4755/hasmet-babaogludan-altayliya-
elestiri_1/kulis1.aspx, http://www.kanalahaber.com/kurana-degil-neye-cagiracagim-haberi-
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5.2. In the Netherlands 
As we already indicated, the migration of Turks to Western Europe placed their 
cultural and religious life under quite different legal, social and political conditions 
than in Turkey, and although the emerging Turkish Muslim organisations 
maintained ties with the home country, they had to adapt. On both the institutional 
level (Chapter 3) and in their activities (Chapter 4), Diyanet in the Netherlands 
could not simply copy models from Turkey; it had to take the Dutch environment 
seriously. If we now turn to the issue of religious authority and guidance, it is 
relevant to ask two questions; the first is that of centralisation versus 
decentralisation of religious authority: in other words, to what extent can and do 
representatives of Diyanet in the Netherlands develop their own religious 
interpretations and give independent religious advice? The second is that of 
contextualisation of the religious messages: to what extent does the content of the 
religious information presented to the faithful living in Western Europe consider 
the specific European conditions? 
5.2.1. ISN-officials as religious guides 
The website of the ISN refers readers looking for answers to religious questions to 
the central Diyanet site in Ankara. When clicking the heading, ‘Dini Sorular’ 
(religious questions), the inquirer automatically arrives at the ‘Dini Soruları 
Cevaplandırma Komisyonu Bilgi Sistemi’ (the data bank from the commission 
providing answers to religious questions) section of the Turkish Diyanet website.97 
The same thing happens when clicking in the ISN page on ‘Dini Bilgiler’ (religious 
information).98
                                           
97 
 In an interview with the President of ISN, Dr. Bülent Şenay 
responded to several of our questions on religious matters by handing over written 
statements from the President of Diyanet at the time, Professor Ali Bardakoğlu. 
http://sorusor.diyanet.gov.tr/ 
98 http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/Diyanet-Isleri-Baskanligi-AnaMenu-dini-bilgiler-
95.aspx  
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These examples suggest that the ISN very much functions as an intermediary 
conveying messages from the central office in Ankara.  
Bardakoğlu’s statements also underline the idea that providing religious 
guidance is more a responsibility of the central institution rather than the individual 
Diyanet representatives working at the regional or local levels. In an article about 
the duties of Diyanet, Bardakoğlu argues: 
 
“Sound knowledge means a struggle against superstition, error, ignorance, 
injustice and religious abuse. In the Islamic tradition, it has been 
theologians that have been the ones who have continued [this] struggle 
(…) By basing its actions on sound religious knowledge and information, 
the Presidency of Religious Affairs does not tolerate hard-line tendencies 
that disturb social peace, and proceeds to educate, convince and inform 
people who have such tendencies. (…) Piety, which is based on emotion 
rather than knowledge, usually remains reserved and withdrawn. It 
becomes nearly impossible to enlighten people who have surrendered to a 
certain force, movement or centre of attraction in an emotional atmosphere 
with such sound knowledge. (…) Despite everything, centres of religious 
knowledge and the Presidency of Religious Affairs have managed to attain 
a level of success in this difficult tasks. Complete success is not possible, 
in any case.” (Bardakoğlu 2006: 16-18)   
 
In this quote, Bardakoğlu positions his institution against a variety of deviations 
from ‘correct’ interpretations of Islam, instead of basing the authority of Diyanet 
on “sound knowledge” of the religion. At the same time, the quote locates this 
sound knowledge in “centres of religious knowledge and the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs”. He does not specify where “centres of religious knowledge” 
are, but we understand this as a reference to theological faculties in Turkey. Both 
the stress Diyanet puts on unity and the careful way in which the Ankara centre 
issues fatwa’s about religious questions leave little room for regional or local 
representatives (such as the ISN President in the Netherlands) to act independently.  
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On the other hand, both ISN activities and its magazine, the HDV Bülten (ISN 
bulletin), suggest that the ISN President does show leadership; the President 
himself claims that the ISN is more than an organiser of activities, and actually 
provides guidance. More than his predecessors, the current President tries to make 
himself more visible whilst creating an image of being ‘among’ and ‘above’ the 
people at the same time. In paragraph 4.2.3., we characterised the image of the 
President as a “religious expert, a (religious) leader, leader of the dialogue, and, on 
the other hand as a ‘man of the people’, who is everywhere: from conferences on 
topics related to religion to kick offs of soccer matches.” In this chapter on 
religious guidance, his position and initiatives as a religious expert are important. 
One way of communicating with the people are through monthly addresses in the 
above-mentioned ISN bulletin. 
On the first page of the monthly, the President usually writes the leading article. 
The articles often begin with ‘değerli dostlar’ (dear friends), and the President later 
goes further to discuss a societal or religious topic. In his writings, he displays a 
sound knowledge and understanding of Dutch society. For example, in the April 
2009 issue, he carefully depicts the religious landscape of the Netherlands, noting 
the various Muslim organisations, quoting the Minderhedennota of 1983 (official 
report on minorities, migration and integration), and speaking about the Dutch 
phenomenon of ‘pillarizasyon’ (pillarisation). The subject of this article is ‘equality 
before the law and freedom of religion’. In this context, the ISN is characterised as 
a leading party, a kind of ‘guide’ whose purpose is to meet the demands and needs 
of the Turkish community in the Netherlands, both inside and outside of the 
mosque: 
 
“HDV, dini toplulukların din hizmetleri ihtiyacının karşılanması esasına 
dayalı bir yapı içerisinde 300 bin civarında Hollandalı Türk topluluğa en 
geniş ölçüde, yani cami içi din hizmetleri ve cami dışı din hizmetleri 
kapsamında, Kur’an kursu, din eğitimi, ramazan, hac, kurban, cenaze 
hizmetleri, kadınlara ve gençlere yönelik eğitim ve kültür hizmetleri, spor 
etkinlikleri organizasyonu vs. mahiyetinde din hizmetlerini organize 
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etmekte ve rehber kurum görevini ifa etmektedir.” (In its effort to meet the 
needs for religious services – in a broad sense, both inside and outside the 
mosque - of the Dutch-Turkish community of around 300,000, ISN 
organises religious services like Quran courses, religious education, 
Ramadan, Pilgrimage to Mecca, the ritual sacrifice, educational and 
cultural activities aimed at women and youngsters, sports, etcetera, and has 
the function of an institution of guidance). 
 
The figure of around 300,000 in this above quote is interesting, as the number of 
Dutch people with a Turkish origin hovers around 380,000. Assuming that the 
President knows these statistics, he must have deliberately left out a portion of the 
Dutch-Turkish community. This could be taken to mean that the ISN’s target group 
is the Sunni community, not the Alevis. On the other hand, the number of 300,000 
is high enough to suggest that the target group includes all the Sunni Turkish 
Muslims and not only those actually attending Diyanet mosques. The question of 
how the ISN positions itself in the wider landscape of Muslim organisations in the 
Netherlands will be discussed in the next chapter.  
The various responsibilities and target groups of the ISN is also raised in an 
article series entitled, ‘Islam’da Maruf, Muamelat ve Toplum Ahlaki’ (correct 
behaviour, social regulation, and social ethics in Islam). In this articles, the 
President explains that the Muslim community is comparable to what is now called 
‘civil society’ (“Islam toplumu modern zamanların ifadesiyle ‘sivil toplum’dur”), 
and points to the importance of the fact that the evolution of moral codes and ethics 
within society is a social process (HDV Bülten, May, June, July, August 2009). In 
the September 2009 issue, the President also points out the importance of religious 
and cultural activities organised by the ISN, which are aimed at preventing youth 
from losing their own cultural background: 
 
“Gençlerimiz dini, sosyal ve kültürel ihtiyaçlarlarının karşılanması onların 
her yönü ile hayata hazırlanmasının manevi sorumluluğu her an 
omuzlarımızdadır.” (Meeting the religious, social and cultural needs of our 
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youngsters and the moral responsibility of making them ready for life is 
always on our shoulders.) 
 
In statements like this, the President of the ISN reveals his ambitions to lead and 
guide. However, the services rendered and guidance given are usually presented in 
the general language of moral education; this type of education could be given 
anywhere: locally, nationally and internationally, by imams and other religious 
personal employed by Diyanet. It does not suggest a broader ambition to develop a 
religious authority that operates autonomously from the centre in Ankara. 
5.2.2. Contextualised religious knowledge 
The contextualisation of Islamic knowledge has received growing attention among 
scholars working on Islam in Europe. An important issue has been the emergence 
of what is often called fiqh al-aqalliyat, Islamic law for minorities. The idea behind 
this concept is that Islamic prescriptions, especially the ones regulating social, 
economic, and political life, were formulated for Muslim majority countries and 
therefore cannot be adequately applied to societies where Muslims are a minority. 
A key figure in this respect is the Egyptian Muslim scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the 
chairman of the European Council for Fatwa and Research: an organisation 
specialising in answering religious and moral questions faced by European 
Muslims. 
For some decades, Turkish Muslims living in Europe have used the opportunity 
to pose religious and moral questions to the Higher Council of Religious Affairs of 
Diyanet in Ankara. In 1990, Jac den Exter estimated that 25 percent of the 
questions asked to the Council came from Muslims living outside Turkey, most of 
them in Germany but also some in the Netherlands (Den Exter 1990b: 34; see also 
Den Exter 1990a). Many questions concerned everything from marriage and 
divorce, interest, ritual slaughter, praying under the imam of another school of law, 
and using the false teeth or inlays. The fatwa’s of Den Exter were formulated in 
general and universal terminology and did not address the specific situation of 
European Muslims in the way to that of Qaradawi’s European Council. More 
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research on Diyanet’s fatwa’s and responses to questions raised by European 
Muslims is urgently required to asses how Diyanet contextualises the knowledge of 
Islam. Such a study could also inquire as to how the experience of being part of a 
secular political system has shaped Diyanet’s religious authority and methods of 
interpreting religious morality in a secular culture. 
Some responses to the Dutch context may be seen in the messages of ISN’s 
President, Dr. Bülent Şenay, in the ISN bulletin. In the October and November 
2009 as well as the January and February 2010 issues, the President wrote 
philosophical essays and comments on the meaning of religion in the ‘modern era’. 
In December, he addressed the question of whether Muslims who live in non-
Muslim countries should be allowed to participate in the celebration of Christian 
festivals. This is interesting as similar issues have been publicly raised by Diyanet 
in Turkey as well, regarding the position of Muslims in Turkey (see section 5.1.3 
of this report). The ISN’s answer to this question is evidenced in the 
aforementioned fiqh al-aqalliyat, or jurisprudence of minorities, such as Muslims 
living in the West. In the article, the ISN President mentions the pagan roots of 
holidays and festivals (such as Christmas or New Years) which later were 
‘Christianised’. He concludes that Muslims are allowed to celebrate these festivals 
in the sense of ‘enjoying the public holiday’ and may congratulate their 
neighbours. It is, after all, their culture and the dominant culture in the country. 
However, the participation of Muslims in religious celebrations is officially caiz 
değil (religiously not permissible) unless one is invited, on an institutional level, to 
represent Muslims for a prayer or sermon as part of a (Christian) celebration. In 
using the phrase caiz değil, Mr. Şenay here resorts to the vocabulary of Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh) to address the situation of Muslim minorities. He speaks as a 
religious authority; the content of his recommendation can be analysed as a safe 
‘middle way’ between Muslim isolationism - that would reject participation in 
Christian holidays totally - and an inter-religious encounter between Islam and 
secularism. 
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6. Diyanet in the religious landscape 
We have thus far discussed the tasks, activities and religious profile of Diyanet 
without regard to other religious organisations or groups. However, it is clear that 
the religious landscapes of Turkey and the Netherlands are quite complex; Diyanet 
is only one player in the field of Islamic life. However, Diyanet’s role is unique in 
that it is a privileged actor operating under the support of the Turkish state, which 
allows it resources that other Muslim organisations do not have – even in the Dutch 
context. In this final chapter, we will examine the relation between Diyanet and the 
various other Islamic and different religious communities. 
6.1. In Turkey 
6.1.1. Interreligious dialogue 
As Mr. Yeprem told us, Diyanet has an office whose sole occupation is to engage 
in an inter-religious dialogue; this office is technically part of the Directorate of 
External Relations, one of the core departments of the institution. He compared this 
office to the Vatican’s Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, which is 
interesting as it suggests that Diyanet plays the role for Turkish Islam that the 
Vatican plays for Catholicism; namely, representing one world religion during an 
encounter with other religions.  
In November 2010, Mr. Yeprem mentioned that a meeting was scheduled 
between Muslims and Christians on the subject of revelation. In an effort to 
underline common ground between the two religious faiths, Mr. Yeprem suggested 
that it is better to speak about dialogue “between religious people” than pointing 
out various aspects of the two different identities. Meetings like these are intended 
to develop a culture of “living together.” However, the aim is not to establish a 
mixed, hybrid religious system by combining elements from different religious 
traditions; instead it is to provide each faith with an inside view of different 
religious beliefs and practices.  
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The same concern about blurring the religious boundaries emerged when Pope 
Benedict XVI visited Turkey; in Istanbul’s Sultanahmet Mosque, there was a 
moment of silence in which he visibly prayed. This evoked a critical reaction from 
Diyanet President Ali Bardakoğlu, who stated: “The most meaningful thing would 
be if everyone would protect and support their own beliefs and their own traditions. 
In order for a healthy dialogue to occur, it is not right for an imam to have to put on 
a cross and pray before the Virgin Mary, or priests to pray in mosques. In order to 
build healthy relations between religions, it is enough that we respect the beliefs, 
values and character of others. It is not right to expect that others will pray as the 
Pope did.”99
For one of our respondents, Mr. Erul, this inter-religious teaching framework 
and dialogue should not be limited to Christians, but should also include “atheists 
or Satanists”. It is easy to speculate as to whether representatives of each group 
might feel uncomfortable being brought together in this way, though the intention 
to display open-mindedness is obvious. 
 Diyanet’s view on inter-religious religion can be readily observed in 
the fact that some of Mr. Yeprem’s students now work in the Vatican, teaching 
Christians about Islam; likewise, some Catholics are active within Diyanet in 
teaching Muslims about Christianity. 
Diyanet’s top officials have often attended meetings with dignitaries from 
various non-Muslim religious communities. Diyanet was present at the first 
‘meeting of civilisations’ in Hatay (2005), along with the Chief Rabbi, the 
Armenian Patriarch and the Greek Patriarch. The way ‘Hatay’ was written on the 
poster of the meeting attracted media attention, as three letters of the word were 
represented by the symbols of the three monotheistic religions. However, many 
conservative Muslims did not approve of this method of portraying three major 
world religions as equally important.  
 
The emblem of the ‘Hatay Meeting of Civilisations’ 
                                           
99 http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=Pope_prayerintheSultanahmetMosque  
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Mr. Bardakoğlu’s positive attitude towards inter-religious dialogue complements 
his call for religious tolerance, which in his view is a consequence of Islam’s 
doctrines on unity and solidarity. Responding to a question of a journalist, which 
inquired as to whether he supported the idea that the historical monastery of 
Sumela (near Trabzon) should be made available for religious services to the 
Christian community, he argued that a person who keeps his own values should 
give others the opportunity to practice their beliefs as well. He added that he 
considered it his duty to protect all different religions and denominations. Diyanet, 
he stated, respects and supports freedom of religion for all religious minorities in 
Turkey and does not display intolerance to any one group. Bardakoğlu also took 
this opportunity to extend his call for tolerance to ethnic diversity. Our tradition, he 
stated, is one of respecting each other regardless of the ethnic roots or type of 
belief. Interestingly, the tradition he refers to could be interpreted as meaning the 
Islamic tradition, the Turkish nation and the secular state simultaneously. This is 
clear from his words: “It is important to be the citizens of the same state, being 
bounded to the same Quran and the same prophet, possessing the same memory 
and geography.”100
6.1.2. Diversity in Islam 
 The rhetoric used here is a remarkable mix of diversity and 
unity. It uses, so to speak, different registers at the same time: there is the secular 
register of national unity that transcends ethnic and religious diversity – in this 
register non-Muslims are simply a part of nation. But there is also the register of 
Sunni Islam. In this register the “same Quran” becomes the binding factor, so that 
non-Muslims are not part of the nation, but are outsiders, towards whom the 
Turkish-Muslim nation needs to be tolerant. 
A similar ambiguity of Diyanet’s identity – whether it should speak as an orthodox 
Sunni institution or as a religious institution above the parties – becomes clear in its 
                                           
100 ‘Bardakoğlu: Islam Ötekinin Dinine Saygı Duymaktır.’ (Islam is respecting the other’s 
religion), (2010, April 16). Retrieved from: 
http://www.haber7.com/haber/20100416/Bardakoglu-Islam-otekinin-dinine-saygi-
duymaktir.php  
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attitude towards the internal divisions within the Turkish Islamic population. We 
have already seen how Diyanet strongly attacks some popular religious practices as 
superstitions which have no place in true Islam. In this attack, Diyanet behaves as a 
religious authority defining the correct religious doctrines and practices according 
to Sunni orthodoxy. But at the same time Diyanet officials like to claim that they 
are above the parties and accommodate diversity. Is this simply rhetoric or more? 
How does Diyanet in fact relate to the existing diversity in Turkish Islam, where a 
huge variety of Shia and Sunni communities and associations are active in 
organising religious ceremonies and publishing their religious opinions? To answer 
such questions we discuss three denominations within Turkish Islam: the various 
Sunni ‘cemaats’, or religious communities, the Alevis, and the Twelver Shia. 
6.1.2.1. Diyanet and the ‘cemaat’ 
In many studies about Diyanet the rivalry between a top-down institution of 
‘official Islam’ and the bottom-up associations of ‘parallel Islam’ is mentioned 
(e.g. Landman 1992: 80-84). The so-called parallel Islam includes religious 
movements outside the direct control of Diyanet, and which are often opposing the 
secular culture of the state elite. These movements include the Nurcu movement, 
the Süleymancıs, and most recently the Milli Görüş movement. As loyal servants 
of the Kemalist project, Diyanet top officials tended to see these movements as 
anti-modern, anti-secular, and a threat to the existing order. To curb their influence, 
Diyanet published hostile studies about them and tried to take control over some of 
their activities, for example Quran courses. Diyanet prepared several written 
documents insulting and condemning the Süleymancıs and Nurcus, labelling them 
as ‘tarikat’, (Sufi orders, associations of Islamic mysticism) or as sectarian 
movements. Such documents claimed that these groups were similar threats to 
Turkey much like communism and the Christian missionary were. Some of the 
documents were published and received media attention. The 1970s were 
dominated by Diyanet’s conflict with the Süleymancıs and Hüseyin Hilmi’s Işık 
group, both being branches of the Nakshbandi tarikat. The conflict between these 
groups and Diyanet was a tough one, and the hostile attitude of Diyanet led some 
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of their members to refuse praying behind Diyanet imams in the mosques. 
According to Ismail Kara, the conflicts are not simply about religious 
interpretation, but concerned also the political and economic problems behind them 
(Kara 2003: 112). 
In 1997, the year in which hard-line secularists tried to curb the influence of a 
perceived Islamism, officials of Diyanet often expressed critical views towards the 
tarikats. On 24 January 1997, the Diyanet President at the time warned the public 
about ‘fake sheikhs’ and recommended people to gain knowledge about Islam 
through reading the Quran on their own. 
Though the relations between Diyanet and other Sunni movements have 
sometimes been hostile, scholars also noted that adherents of these movements 
were active within Diyanet itself, as became clear in Western Europe in the 1980s, 
when imams of these movements often turned out to be former imams of Diyanet. 
Caner Taslaman also downplays the former rivalry to some extent. The initial aim 
behind the establishment of Diyanet may have been to promote a single Islam 
controlled by the state, but in reality Diyanet has never had a monopoly in this 
sphere and always had to cooperate with the cemaats. 
Today’s top officials of Diyanet speak in much more positive terms about the 
abovementioned religious communities. According to Mr. Er, Diyanet tended to 
ignore the cemaats in the past. He remarks how “today, however, we regard them 
as a social phenomenon. We meet them. We also believe that we can benefit from 
them”. A significant moment in this changing situation was seemingly a meeting 
held by Diyanet’s Religious Council in 1994 in which representatives of these 
groups were invited (together with Alevi representatives, see below). 
If we are to believe Mr. Yeprem, the rivalry no longer exists. Today, the cemaats 
support Diyanet and those with differing views from Diyanet are few in number. 
Mr. Bardakoğlu has not spoken in hostile terms about the Sunni cemaats like his 
predecessor did in 1997. It is therefore tempting to suppose that this more 
constructive attitude towards the Sunni associations reflects the fact that the ruling 
party, the AKP, has strong relations with some of these cemaats. 
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Mr. Yeprem acknowledges the growing influence of the cemaats, noting how 
many of them now have their own private TV and radio channels, newspapers and 
magazines. He interprets this as proof that secularisation and modernisation 
theories predicting the decreasing role of religion were wrong. Additionally, he 
analyses this growing influence in terms of the rise of civil society in Turkey. 
Taslaman also confirms this and concludes that although the power of Diyanet is 
still considerable, it has also diminished relative to the cemaats. 
With regard to religious diversity, the Sunni cemaats are a relatively easy to 
handle for Diyanet, as both are adherents of the same main faction, the Sunni 
denomination of Islam. Diyanet and the cemaat may have had rivalries, emerging 
from their different attitudes towards the state and different positions within the 
secular state, but they share the same religious orientation and accept the same 
religious sources. 
6.1.2.2. Twelver Shia 
With respect to Caferis or the Twelver Shia, the largest branch within Shiite Islam 
and the state religion in Iran, there is a different point of departure. The group has 
only a limited following in Turkey. Though Diyanet had offered religious services 
from an exclusive Sunni perspective, today the institution has opened its doors for 
the Caferis and accepts the religious diversity of Sunni and Shia in Turkey. Diyanet 
even started to accommodate this diversity within its own institution and is 
prepared to train imams living in the eastern parts of Turkey and in Istanbul as 
members of this community. Diyanet’s statements about the Caferi movement 
signify how Diyanet interprets the belief system and the practice of Caferis as 
legitimate interpretations of Islam.101
                                           
101 Okan Müderrisoğlu, ‘Diyanet'in hedefi Caferileri kazanmak.’ (Diyanet's aim is to gain 
the support of Caferis)’, (2005, December 25), Sabah. Retrieved from 
 The contrasting attitudes towards the 
‘superstitions’ of popular Islam on the one hand and Caferi Islam on the other 
makes clear that Diyanet does not have a neutral position above all religious 
diversity, but tries to a certain extent to allow diversity within Islam. 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/muderrisoglu/2005/12/25/Diyanet_in_hedefi_Caferileri_
kazanmak 
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6.1.2.3. The Alevis 
Perhaps the toughest issue in terms of accommodating religious diversity is its 
relation with the Alevi population of Turkey. This population is very diverse in 
religious attitudes and affiliations. The vast majority, however, share a distrust and 
dislike of Sunni orthodoxy and Diyanet. In the last decades, Alevis have become 
the fiercest critics of Diyanet and have challenged its presence in the secular 
Turkish state, what they see as a stronghold of Sunni orthodoxy. 
A detailed explanation of what Alevism is would require the space of a complete 
book (see e.g. Olsson 1998). Here we can only sketch some features that are 
necessary to understand the challenge they potentially constitute for Diyanet. 
Though hard statistical data is lacking, most academic observers assume that 
between 15 and 25 percent of the Turkish population belongs to the Alevi 
community. This community has a quite distinct religious culture, in which ritual 
dances and music plays a significant role. They share some religious ideas with 
Shia denominations that see Ali, the nephew and son-in-law of the Prophet 
Muhammad, as the perfect human being and even as a manifestation of God on 
earth. In the Ottoman era they were sometimes persecuted by the Sunni sultans and 
hid in remote villages, but the mystical brotherhood of the Bektaşis made its lodges 
or tekkes major centres of Alevi culture and religiosity. In the Republican era much 
of this culture was lost by secularisation and the gradual disappearance of isolated 
life in villages. However, in the 1980s Turkey witnessed a revival of the Alevi 
identity. Many Alevi authors stressed the secular and humanist aspects of their 
tradition rather than religious ones. Despite this there was a revival of distinct 
religious celebrations, often organised by newly created Alevi associations that 
sometimes founded their own houses of worship, called cem houses (meaning a 
place for the Alevi religious ceremony of the cem). Contemporary Alevism is very 
critical about religious orthodoxy and usually defines its own identity by distancing 
itself from Sunni Islam. Most Alevis do not accept the authority of the Quran and 
the Hadith and feel no obligation to practice the five ‘pillars of Islam’. Many of 
them feel attracted to mystical traditions in Islam that look for God in the human 
heart. 
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Since the 1980s in Alevi publications and on websites complaints could be 
found about the unequal treatment they received in Turkey, compared to the Sunnis 
whose religious needs were cared and paid for by Diyanet. Also in Europe, Alevi 
institutions advocate this cause with political parties.  
Increasingly, the Alevis are mentioned as an example of the problematic way in 
which Turkey deals with its religious minorities. 
 
Alevi workshops 
 
This background considered, it is not surprising that the Turkish government has 
instigated a number of initiatives, for example and most particularly the Minister of 
State Çelik, who is responsible for Diyanet, began an initiative to discuss the 
relation between Alevism and Diyanet. This so-called ‘Alevi workshop’ consisted 
of seven different meetings between June 2009 and February 2010. A prominent 
Alevi author, Reha Çamuroğlu, who surprisingly is a Member of Parliament for the 
AKP, underlined the importance of these workshops, as they marked the first time 
the Turkish Republic officially listened to the Alevis and recognised them as a 
distinct group bearing that name. It is interesting to note that it was the AKP that 
made this move, an Islamist movement highly distrusted by many Alevis. The 
Alevi workshops were not only an important step towards a dialogue between 
government agencies and Alevis, but also brought together a wide variety of Alevi 
organisations with rather different perspectives on the origin and future of Alevism. 
Both the diversity within the Alevi community and their distrust of the intentions 
of the AKP government and Diyanet made the chance of a consensus highly 
unlikely. To what extent the final report, prepared by Minister of State Çelik, really 
represents views that are accepted by a majority of the attendants is an open 
question. Nevertheless, the report makes clear that the discussion focused on the 
need to change the current position and structure of Diyanet, because it seems to 
represent only the interests of Sunni Muslims, but is paid from tax money collected 
from all citizens of the Turkish Republic, either Shia or Sunni or non-Muslim. 
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It was observed in the report that most Alevis were in favour of the abolishment 
of Diyanet and very sceptical about the legitimacy of such an institution in a 
secular state; this view is upheld in much Alevi media. More surprising is the claim 
that by the end of the meetings, most Alevis were convinced that such a radical 
step was not realistic; as a result, a new option was put forward, that of turning 
Diyanet into a autonomous civilian institution constitutive of various different 
interpretations of Islam. Rather than abolishing Diyanet altogether, it was agreed 
that creating a fair and indiscriminating system of religious taxation was the way 
forward. 
A final remark in the report was rather alarming for Diyanet, namely the remark 
that participants had agreed upon that fact that Diyanet’s current structure would 
keep Turkey from entering the EU. 
Minister of State Mr. Çelik was expected to present the final report to the 
Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Erdoğan. So far, no official steps have been taken on 
any of the issues discussed in the meetings or mentioned in the report.102
Though Diyanet was involved in these Alevi workshops, it was not an initiator 
of the gatherings; the repercussions from the workshops could, if translated into 
concrete measures, have drastic consequences for the institution as it exists today. 
Vice President İzzet Er strongly underlined the fact that these workshops were not 
initiated by Diyanet but rather by the government and the Ministry of State to 
which the institution is linked. Everything Mr. Er told us suggested that he was not 
pleased with the direction these workshops had taken, and most of his remarks 
about the meetings can be summed up in two words: ‘damage control’. In other 
words, he stated that the workshops had not led to “any solid argument or request 
regarding Diyanet”. Though he did admit that the status of Diyanet was discussed, 
he pointed to the lack of consensus on the issue among Alevis themselves. He did 
not see any convincing reason to really transform Diyanet; however, he offered to 
 
                                           
102 ‘Alevi Çalıştayı Bitti Uzlaşma Sağlandı.’ (Alevi workshop has ended consensus has 
been reached), (2010, January, 30). Retrieved from 
http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/01/31/alevi.calistayi.bitti.uzlasma.saglandi/561722.0
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help “our Alevi brothers” by publishing the results of some projects in which 
classical texts associated with the Alevi tradition would be translated in 
contemporary Turkish. He also pointed out that the Turkish Diyanet Foundation 
has already put such projects into motion. 
 
Diyanet’s own statement on Alevism 
 
If the report on the Alevi workshops of 2009 and 2010 did not reflect the views of 
Diyanet itself, what position does the institution take on the issue of Sunni – Alevi 
diversity? In the past, Diyanet has tended to ignore the presence of such diversity; 
however, since the Alevi revival of the 1980s and their increased public visibility, 
such an attitude is no longer possible. What followed was a series of attempts to 
downplay the distinct religious identity of Alevis and stress a common ground. An 
example was a statement made by Bardakoğlu to the Turkish press in 2008 on 
Ashura, the tenth day of the Islamic month of Muharram: a holy day for Shia 
Muslims (including Alevis). On this day, the Shia commemorate and mourn the 
tragic dead of Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, who was 
massacred together with most of his family members by an army of the Caliph at 
Karbala. Bardakoğlu seized the opportunity to emphasise the love for Hussein and 
all Muslims, Shia and Sunnis alike, even using Shia religious vocabulary (like the 
term Ehl-i Beyt, used for the family members of the prophet). He mentioned that 
the Karbala incident had harmed all Muslims around the world, regardless of their 
region, culture, denomination, or spiritual approach. However, he insisted that all 
Muslims must learn from these kinds of sad incidents and refrain from all 
sentiments and behaviour that might damage the unity and solidarity of the Islamic 
world.103
                                           
103 Muharrem ve Aşure Mesajı (Diyanet’s statement to the press on the Month of 
Muharram and Asura (Noah’s pudding)). (2008, December 12). Retrieved from  
 
 http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/Diyanet-Isleri-Baskanligi-Duyuru-4801.aspx; 
 ‘Biz bir ve beraberiz’ (We are one and together), (2009, December 27), Milli Gazete. 
Retrieved from http://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/biz-bir-ve-beraberiz-147657.htm  
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Although this kind of discourse is completely in line with Diyanet’s attempts to 
promote social unity and harmony, many Alevis consider this an attempt at forced 
assimilation as no recognition of the distinct Alevi identity was made. A press 
statement published in December 2008, in which four important questions about 
this issue were raised and briefly discussed, depicts a clearer picture of how 
Diyanet positions itself against Alevi claims. The first question concerns the 
definition of Alevism. Alevism is defined broadly and includes various groups and 
communities that play an important role in shaping Turkey’s social, cultural and 
historical architecture; as such these various groups constitute an important part of 
Turkish cultural identity. The press statement suggests that Alevism must be 
regarded as an historically “within-Islam formation” and the fruit of Islam. After 
some digressions about the need for sound scientific research to confirm this claim, 
Diyanet responded that “Alevism that accepts the Prophet Muhammad as the last 
prophet and the Quran as the holy book cannot be regarded a separate religion”. 
What this means for those Alevis who do not accept the Quran remains unclear. 
According to Diyanet, however, research on Alevism shows that a vast majority 
Alevis define their religious practices as Islamic and even as constituting ‘the 
essence’ of Islam. The structuring of Alevism around tekkes (lodges) and the 
hierarchy of dedes (the title of Alevi religious leaders) and derwishes proves that 
Alevism must be understood as a form of Islamic mysticism. The press statement 
likewise repeatedly stresses that Alevism is not a separate religion. As in the 
Ashura message of Bardakoğlu, the language is inclusive, which can be construed 
as a gesture of acceptance; however, it denies the distinct identity which Alevis 
claim themselves. 
The second question addresses the official recognition of cem houses, places for 
the Alevi cem ceremonies, as “places of worship” and deserving of financial 
support from the state. The fact that Diyanet supports mosques but not the Alevi 
cem houses has been one of the reasons for Alevis to speak out about 
                                                                                                           
 Açıklama - Alevilik (Diyanet’s statement to the press on Alevilik). (2008, December 12). 
Retrieved from http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/Diyanet-Isleri-Baskanligi-Duyuru-
128.aspx 
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discrimination. However, Diyanet's motivation is as follows: cem houses are a new 
phenomenon as the cem ceremonies were previously held in tekkes or even private 
houses. Moreover, Alevi worship practices do not fall into the category of Muslim 
ritual prayer (one of the five pillars), but rather into the much wider category of 
devotional and cultural practices. Cem houses are therefore not similar to official 
mosques, churches or synagogues. Moreover, Diyanet argues that mosques have 
been accepted as a common place of worship for all Muslims, regardless of their 
denomination, practices, etc. It maintains that official places of religious worship 
should be distinguished from places where mystical, scientific or cultural activities 
associated with that religion are taking place. Finally, if cem houses were 
recognised as places of worship, it would imply that Alevism is a religion distinct 
from Islam. Cem house may fall under legal protection but should not have the 
same status as the mosque. In this line of reasoning, the logic of unity and diversity 
of Diyanet’s ideas becomes very clear; though many manifestations of Alevi 
culture are mentioned, accepted and even praised as a worthwhile contribution to 
Islamic and Turkish culture, Alevism is subordinated to the symbols of orthodox 
Sunni Islam: the Quran, the Prophet and the five pillars of Islam. 
The third question surrounds the issue of whether Diyanet is prepared to create 
an Alevi department within its own institution. Diyanet claims to be “above groups 
and sects” and simply the voice of Islam, as it depends on two major Islamic texts: 
the Quran and the Sunna. The task given to Diyanet by the secular state, namely to 
stay out of political controversies but to create national unity, is often invoked by 
the institution to refuse a separate Alevi department. It might go without saying 
that many Alevis do not accept that Diyanet is above groups and denominations 
(Çakır and Bozan 2005: 114) Also, the aforementioned behaviour of Diyanet 
towards the Twelver Shia is not consistent with the argument against a relative 
autonomy for the Alevis. 
In the last section of the press statement, Diyanet responds to an accusation 
made by Alevis, who charge that mosques were built by the state in Alevi villages. 
Diyanet makes clear that the building and maintenance of mosques is not among 
the duties of the institution. Mosques in Turkey are built by individuals or private 
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organisations; Diyanet’s function is to allow individuals to open mosques for 
worship, whilst regulating mosque activities and appointing and financing 
imams.104
What the issues brought forth in the Alevi-Diyanet discussion make clear is that 
Diyanet makes conscious attempts to use inclusive language towards different 
religious denominations though categorically refuses to make real concessions to 
the Alevis, who they only accept as different within strictly defined parameters: 
those of Islamic orthodoxy. In short, the fact remains that Diyanet does not 
recognise the Alevis as a religious minority and does not award them rights equal 
to other religious denominations. 
 
 
 
                                           
104 Açıklama – Alevilik (Diyanet’s statement to the press on Alevilik), (2008, December 
12). Retrieved from http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/Diyanet-Isleri-Baskanligi-
Duyuru-128.aspx 
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6.2. In the Netherlands 
6.2.1. ISN and the other Turkish-Islamic organisations 
As explained in chapter 3, the juridical position of Diyanet in the Netherlands is 
quite different from that of Turkey; it operates through a foundation (ISN) that has 
no monopolies or exclusive rights compared with other Turkish and non-Turkish 
Muslim organisations. Nevertheless, the ISN occupies a specific position in the 
Islamic landscape in the Netherlands due to its status as the formal representative 
of the Turkish state, and as such, has its financial backing. Among the Turkish 
Islamic organisations, the ISN is the largest in terms of the number of mosques, 
which number around 142. Also, the ISN is by far the largest owner of mosques in 
the country. When we compare the level of organisation among migrant 
communities with an Islamic background, the Turks are essentially the best 
organised migrant community (Van Heelsum, Tillie, Fennema 2004: 1). Migrant 
organisations have always been a sensitive issue in broader debates about 
integration in the Netherlands. Some have argued that a high level of organisation 
among migrants is an indication of trust and emancipation (see also Putnam 1994). 
For example, there is a correlation between the level of organisation among 
migrants in the Netherlands and their participation in local elections (Tillie 2009). 
Those who are critical towards migrant organisations argue that the continuation of 
these types of these groups is an indication of staggering integration. In any case, 
Turkish migrants do have the largest number of organisations; they are also the 
most organised Muslim community in the Netherlands (with 223 mosques in 2009 
against 132 Moroccan and 22 Surinamese). Most mosques in the Netherlands are 
still ethnically organised (Van Heelsum, Tillie, Fennema 2004: 3), though the 
number of non-ethnic mosques is increasing.105
                                           
105 For a list of Islamic organisations and umbrella organisations in the Netherlands, see: 
  
http://mighealth.net/nl/index.php/Lijst_van_Turkse,_Marokkaanse,_Surinaamse_en_Mosli
m_Organisaties_in_Nederland . 
DIYANET IN THE RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
 124 
The ISN is a member of the CMO, the National Muslim Advisory Board to the 
government, which consists of several Islamic umbrella organisations. Since 2004, 
the year of the CMO’s recognition by the Dutch government, it has had regular 
contact with the Dutch government. At the moment, the CMO has ten member 
organisations. In addition, the CMO has a long-standing working relationship with 
eleven different Muslim organisations and platforms. The CMO issues reports and 
advices on a variety of topics related to Islam in the Netherlands.106
The relation between Diyanet organisations and other Turkish Muslim 
organisations has changed over the past decades. The President of the ISN 
describes this relation as “not competitive but also not very cooperative”.
 Since January 
2005, another advisory board has been active: CGI, or the Contact Group Islam. 
The CGI branched off from CMO because they criticised the Sunni-domination of 
the CMO Board. It is remarkable that both the ISN and the TICF are members of 
the CMO, which actually means that the Diyanet cemaat has a double vote in the 
CMO. In general, both the ISN and the TICF have a well organised network in the 
Netherlands. They actively take part in advisory and consulting committees on 
different levels (Van Heelsum, Tillie, Fennema 2004: 9). The TICF also 
participates in ethnically based organisations such as the Advisory Board for Turks 
(IOT, Inspraak Orgaan Turken). 
107
                                           
106 Member organisations:: Unie van Marokkaanse Moskeeën in Nederland, Islamitische 
Stichting Nederland, Milli Görüş Noord-Nederland, Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie, 
Overkoepelende Sjiïetische Vereniging, Stichting Islamitisch Cultureel Centrum 
Nederland, Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie, World Islamic Mission, Vereniging 
Imams Nederland, Limburgse Islamitische Raad. Samenwerkings- en overlegpartners: 
IHSAN, Stichting Islamitisch Begrafeniswezen, Raad van Moskeeën Noord-Nederland, 
Islamitische Vereniging van Bosniaks in Nederland, Landelijke moslimvrouwenorganisatie 
ALNISA, Afghaanse Culturele Vereniging te Utrecht, Somalische vereniging SOMVAO, 
Diyanet Organisaties Rotterdam en Omgeving, SPIOR Stichting Platform Islamitische 
Organisaties Rijnmond e.o., STIPU Stichting Islamitisch Platform Utrecht e.o., Brabantse 
Islamitische Raad . See also: 
 
According to him, the level of dialogue between the different Turkish Muslim 
organisations is improving. He states that the large manifestation (Kutlu Doğum 
http://www.cmoweb.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=30&Itemid=48 . 
107 Interview with Dr. Bülent Şenay, 13th of April, Den Haag. 
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Avrupa) organised in the Amsterdam Arena on the 4th of April 2010 was a joint 
undertaking between various groups. It must be noted, however, that it was a joint 
Sunni undertaking, as Alevis were not involved. In this framework, the President 
called Diyanet a camia, by which he means a community or an umbrella 
comprising different views. He also makes clear that differences between Diyanet 
and other organisations are “not theological, but social differences”.108 By saying 
this, he rather explicitly refers to Milli Görüş, and adds that the relation with the 
Gülen movement is more problematic due to somewhat distinctive religious views. 
A board member of a Muslim platform (and a member of Milli Görüş) stressed the 
theological unity between Diyanet and his own organisation:“There is just one 
Islam and the problems are not related to Islam but to the social vehicle so to 
speak.”109
The inclusive language of Dr. Şenay raises questions about the future relation 
between the ISN and other Turkish-Muslim organisations in the Netherlands. 
Referring to the ISN or Diyanet as umbrella organisations inclusive of diversity 
may sound like an attempt to overcome rivalry, but still positions the ISN above 
the others. This seems to reflect the situation in Turkey, where Diyanet has a 
monopoly on certain religious services, rather than the European context, where 
such a privileged position does not exist for them.  
  
For their part, the other Turkish-Muslim organisations (particularly Milli Görüş) 
may claim that religious controversies with Diyanet no longer exist but they have 
not given up their autonomous position vis-à-vis the ISN. In fact, the Milli Görüş, 
Süleymancıs and ISN have created their separate networks of mosques and 
developed very similar strategies to create communities, on the local, national and 
even European level. This European level is visible on the new website (since the 
end of 2009) of the ISN, where (under ‘linkler’ (links)) we observed that the ISN 
confidently refers to its ‘sister organisations’ in Europe. 
The efforts to create a community around Diyanet mosques raises interesting 
questions about the distinct identity of the Diyanet community, especially 
                                           
108 Ibidem. 
109 Interview in Amstelveen, 10th of December 2009. 
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considering that both the ISN President and Milli Görüş spokespersons downplay 
the religious and ideological differences between them. Questions surrounding 
identity also emerge in an analysis of who is attending ISN and Milli Görüş 
mosques respectively: why do these individuals choose one mosque over another? 
Is it for practical reasons (the location of the mosque)? Does it have to do with the 
influence of friends or family? Or do they make a deliberate choice based on the 
distinct identity of that mosque and the umbrella organisation to which it belongs? 
Based on earlier research (Sunier 1996) we can say that the boundaries between the 
‘communities’ of the various Turkish-Islamic networks are far from clear. 
However, their organisational infrastructures, and the religious services they 
provide, are, both on the local, the national and the international level, clearly 
distinct: a situation which has not changed in recent years.  
With the Alevis, however, the situation is very different. Here it is indeed a 
theological dispute. As in Turkey, the exact number of Alevis in the Netherlands is 
unknown. Estimates vary between 20 and 30 percent of the migrants of Turkish 
background in the Netherlands. According to a spokesman of the Alevi federation 
HAK-DER, it is impossible to speak of Alevis as a unified community. They differ 
in outlook from politically engaged to religiously or culturally orientated. They 
often have a Kurdish or a Turkish background. A spokesperson of HAK-DER 
considers Alevism a philosophy which is close to humanism. It is, in his view, the 
non-activist outlook that imparts a lack of attention or even neglect by the media. 
These kind of Alevi people and Alevi organisations are, due of their moderate, 
reconciling tone, apparently not very interesting for the media.110
                                           
110 Interview in Driebergen, 11th of February 2010. 
 HAK-DER does, 
however, participate in IOT, together with TICF, and in 2009 HAK-DER 
cooperated with the ISN in an (unsuccessful) attempt to obtain a broadcasting 
license. Apart from that, there are other cultural and religious occasions in which 
HAK-DER and the ISN work together, as we can regularly read and observe in the 
monthly ISN bulletin.  
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The close link between the ISN and the Turkish state makes it difficult for the 
two actors to profile themselves in the Dutch media and speak on behalf of the 
cemaat about issues such as the integration of Turks into Dutch society. Until 
recently, the ISN left this task to the TICF, and if asked, could point to the division 
of labour between the two umbrella organisations. However, at this point we have 
noticed a gradual but clear turn. In early 2008 former trade union leader Doekle 
Terpstra and chairman of the foundation ‘Islam and Integration’, Mohammed Sini, 
presented a manifesto in which they warned against the ‘brutalisation’ of the debate 
on Islam and integration.111 The manifesto was signed by sixteen representatives, 
among them the TICF but also Arif Yakışır from the ISN.112 In those days, Yakışır 
was in charge of the ISN Educational Centre in Rotterdam. The current President 
of the ISN appeared in a program of the Islamic Broadcasting Company, NIO in 
April 2009, to discuss the possible imam training institute in the Netherlands. 
Rather than appearing as a servant of the Turkish state, he acted as a theologian. In 
September 2009 he appeared in another program on Dutch television to speak 
about religion and science. He continues to participate in conferences on Islam and 
the political situation in the Netherlands; for example, in October 2009, he 
participated in a conference at the Clingendael Institute in The Haag. He spoke at 
conferences at Dutch and foreign universities about the inter-religious dialogue. In 
general, President Dr. Bülent Şenay presents himself on these occasions as a 
theologian rather than manager. The ISN seems to keep a distance from the 
everyday political squabbling, but the organisation appears to aim to profile itself 
as an important participant in the debate on the place of religion in society. 
According to the President, “the aim is to bring Islamic science, hermeneutics, into 
the public discourse and the public debate.”113
The conclusion to be drawn from these seemingly trivial events and 
developments is that the ISN, headed by the current President, is turning from a 
primarily bureaucratic body to a visibly academic, theological institution that is 
 
                                           
111 http://www.benoemenenbouwen.nl 
112 http://www.trouw.nl/opinie/podium/article1752080.ece 
113 Interview with Dr. Bülent Şenay, Den Haag, 13th of April 2010. 
DIYANET IN THE RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
 128 
simultaneously among and above the cemaat. This ambition provoked a sceptical 
reaction from one of our interviewees, who said that the ISN co-operates with the 
other organisation as long as it is “their show”.114
6.2.2. Case study: two mosques in Rotterdam  
  
From the analysis so far, it becomes clear that ISN, both in its theological and in 
social roles, though also vis-à-vis other religious movements, aims to profile itself 
at once as an equal partner simultaneously and as a religious guide that stands 
above, or embraces, all parties. In the following section, we present a small case 
study of two mosque organisations to get a more detailed picture of these 
developments. In order to better understand the ‘Umwelt’ of local mosques, two 
large mosques have been chosen for further analysis.115 Both of the mosques are 
located in Rotterdam, a city with more than forty mosques (Erkoçu and Buğdacı 
(ed.) 2009: 16), of which seven are ISN mosques.116 The Kocatepe mosque is 
located in the Afrikaanderwijk, a so-called ‘multicultural’ quarter in Rotterdam-
Zuid, also known as a ‘Vogelaarwijk’, or ‘krachtwijk’ (power quarter), i.e. one of 
the forty weak city quarters designated by former Minister of Integration Vogelaar 
as a focus for social action. The mosque is situated in an old monumental building, 
which was built in the 1920s and formerly used as a school. The Mevlana mosque 
is located in Rotterdam-West in a quarter that, like Rotterdam-Zuid, also has a high 
proportion of Muslim inhabitants. The Mevlana mosque was built in 2001 and is 
one of the few ‘newly built’ mosques in the city. In 2006, the Mevlana mosque was 
chosen as the ‘most beautiful building of Rotterdam’117
                                           
114 Interview in Den Haag, 20th of January 2010. 
 by the city's inhabitants, 
beating out, among others, the ‘Erasmus bridge’, the ‘City hall’, the ‘Feyenoord 
stadium’, and Hotel New York. 
115 The information is based on various visits of both mosques, guided tours given by a 
policy maker of SPIOR, Platform Islamic Organisations Rijnmond Foundation, and 
interviews with members of the board, the before-mentioned guide and volunteers working 
in the two mosques.  
116 
http://www.diyanet.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=145&Itemid=97  
117 http://www.top010.nl/html/mooiste_gebouw_rotterdam.htm  
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The organisations running the Kocatepe and Mevlana mosques are daughter 
foundations of the ISN, which is apparent in their names (ISN Kocatepe and ISN 
Mevlana, respectively) and their articles of association. The day-to-day 
management, however, lies in the hands of a local board consisting of volunteers, 
who during interviews emphasised the importance of local decision-making 
processes and the relative autonomy from activities run by the ISN in The Hague. 
They found this important, as they were involved in several kinds of 
neighbourhood activities which required a thorough familiarity with local political 
dynamics.  
Both the Kocatepe mosque and the Mevlana mosque are more than mere houses 
for prayer. In addition to the prayer rooms, they have board rooms, a conference 
room, rooms for the elderly, youth, women and girls, internet facilities, class 
rooms, a small library and study facility, a kitchen and canteen, and even a 
hairdresser. Kocatepe mosque recently opened a youth club, a non-alcohol hang 
out place for Saturday nights, and watching – Dutch or Turkish - football matches 
on a super-size screen, events supervised by an volunteer appointed by the mosque, 
who is familiar with the neighbourhood and knows how to handle youth 
(particularly male youngsters) living there. 
Kocatepe and Mevlana are both open seven days a week, during prayer times, 
but also for courses and social activities. The general activities organised are as 
follows: praying five times a day, Friday sermons, Quran classes, festivities on 
religious holidays, meetings organised around various topics like health or social 
problems, visitation of the sick, co-organizing (with ISN) the yearly Pilgrimage. 
The women’s department has several separate activities, such as language courses, 
Quran classes, but also sewing-classes and ‘women-only’ swimming lessons. On a 
regular basis, guests are invited and social gatherings organised. The Kocatepe 
women’s department even organises “Kermes”, an event similar to a street-fair, but 
held within the borders of the mosque complex. Special activities are also 
organised for youth. According to a Board member of Kocatepe: “The aim is 
keeping youngsters away from ‘the street’ and avoiding their ‘derailment’.” The 
youth have their own rooms and an active board; among other activities, they 
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undertake visiting the cinema, playing movies, organising theatre plays, watching 
football matches, bowling, karting, camping, table tennis, and ‘tailor-made’ classes 
about Islam for youth. There are also some activities aimed at younger children, 
like watching children’s movies. And last but not least, Kocatepe has its own 
football team, R.V.V. Kocatepe, which has 25 teams. They regularly join the 
national K.N.V.B. competition. Both visitors of the mosque and private sponsors 
finance most of the above-mentioned activities. These activities are therefore 
largely locally based. Board members of both mosques say that between 250 and 
500 persons participate in courses and other activities on a weekly basis. 
The wide variety of activities in the Mevlana and Kocatepe mosques to some 
extent meet the ideal of Shervin Nekuee, a well-known author and opinion leader 
of Iranian background in the Netherlands, who wrote, in a visionary book about 
mosques in the Netherlands:  
 
“To create a welcoming feeling in mosques for non-Muslims seems to be 
impossible as long as we take the concept ‘prayer house’ literally and as 
long as the mosque is experienced and presented as a one-dimensional 
entity. It surprises me that in cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam, with 
high European pretentions, still nothing like a ‘La Grande Mosquée de 
Paris’ exists. That mosque, in the same complex, houses a prayer room, a 
hammam and a restaurant. In the inner garden are a patisserie and a tea 
house. It is a favourite place for Muslims and non-Muslims, for locals and 
for touristic visitors of Paris. But mosques can even offer more than that; 
rooms for yoga, longer retreats and Zen meditations. Why should you not 
want to offer room to the masses searching for spirituality and host them, 
and accordingly, be rewarded by society the best way to be rewarded by 
society: the appraisal of a courteous host?” (Erkoçu and Buğdacı 2009: 
59). 
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For the Kocatepe and Mevlana mosques, while allowing Zen meditations and yoga 
may be excessive, opening the mosque for activities to non-Muslims is, under 
certain conditions, accepted and encouraged.  
The activities organised in the mosques can roughly be divided into religious 
and non-religious categories, though this distinction may be somewhat artificial. A 
board member of the Kocatepe mosque argued that social activities are constituent 
in making and maintaining the local cemaat. He argued that there are two separate 
spaces in Diyanet mosques in the Netherlands: the ‘ISN space’ and the ‘TICF 
space’, or the religious and the social space, respectively. However, at the same 
time, the board members and other volunteers working in the mosque admitted that 
“the division is not 100 percent clear”. There is indeed a distinction between social 
activities organised on a local level by mosques and those initiated by the ISN in 
Den Haag. In the latter case, the mosque more or less acts as a host; often, 
photographs of the activities appear in the monthly ISN bulletin. As mentioned 
previously, the ISN appears to be shifting its activities, focusing more on the social 
dimension. Though despite these changes, and regardless of the structural 
differences between a local mosque and a national institute, it should be 
emphasised that the social and religious distinction occurs within an organisational 
setting that is first and foremost religious. The attempts made by the Dutch 
government in the 1980s to mobilise mosque organisations for activities oriented 
towards integration of migrants, for example, was in fact an attempt to reinforce 
the migrant status of these mosque organisations.  
Both the Mevlana and Kocatepe mosques have imams appointed and paid by 
Diyanet. Their work falls under the supervision of the müşavir, religious counsellor 
at the Turkish Embassy in Den Haag and religious attaché of the Turkish Consulate 
in Rotterdam. They are permitted to stay and work in the Netherlands only 
temporarily (currently five years) and are expected to attend a tailor-made 
‘inburgeringscursus’, an integration course to learn more about the country, 
culture, major national debates, and language.  
Their appointment by Diyanet gives them, and all the other ‘Diyanet imams’, a 
strong position within the local mosque community. Moreover, the local mosque 
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board cannot dismiss them. Board members can only file complaints to the imams’ 
supervisors at the Consulate or Embassy. This power relation is quite different 
from the situation in Moroccan mosques, where imams can, and frequently are, 
fired by local mosque boards.  
In the two mosques visited by the research team, the imams have more 
responsibilities than just leading prayers and delivering sermons; they also act as 
spiritual leaders of the local cemaat, and one could even say they are ‘religious 
social workers’. The board members of both the Kocatepe Mevlana mosques stated 
that one of the important tasks of an imam is “to have conversations with people, 
especially youngsters, who seem to be derailing”. In both mosques, interviewees 
told us that the imam is also in charge of social control. In the case of 
‘unfavourable behaviour’ or problems with visitors, the imam can be called in. 
What is meant by ‘unfavourable behaviour’ ranges from theft, drug abuse or school 
absence, but also includes religious radicalism. The imam may also be expected to 
address sensitive or problematic issues, such as the national turmoil surrounding 
the movie Fitna by Geert Wilders, or local issues such as suicide attempts by a 
member of the mosque organisation. Apart from the imam, such intermediary work 
can also been done by local board members. Whereas on a national level the ISN 
provides religious information, the local imams act as shepherds, coaches and 
counsellors who know the people personally. In fact, the distinction between their 
religious and social function has become blurred, just as the distinction between 
social and religious activities in the mosques is somewhat unclear. Creating 
opportunities for assisting with homework or organising sports are all considered 
part of the ‘core business’ of the imams’ religious leadership. 
Here we touch on another delicate issue with respect to the role of religious 
leaders in the Netherlands; several studies indicate that traditional Islamic 
leadership in the form of the local imam suffers from a poor reputation not being 
able to reach younger generations. Many young Muslims are searching for new 
forms of spiritual guidance (De Koning 2008, Boender 2007, Peter 2006). Though 
the imams in the Kocatepe and Mevlana mosques are far from fluent in Dutch, our 
DIYANET IN THE RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
 133 
respondents were quite positive about their ability to carry out the social tasks 
expected from them.  
The huge variety of activities outside the strictly religious sphere also creates 
bridges to the neighbourhood and social environments of the Mevlana and 
Kocatape mosques. One of the most concrete and visible elements of this is the 
various media (brochures) displayed at the entrance of the mosques. Some of the 
titles include: Anlamak ve anlaşılmak Hollandaca dilini bilmekle başlar 
(Understanding and being understood starts by speaking the Dutch language), a 
pamphlet about a Dutch language course; Kendi dilinde ilgi (Attention in your own 
language), a course on discussing personal and sensitive matters in one's mother 
tongue; and Size ev bakım var / yardım mı?, which contains information about 
home (health) care. There is also a brochure containing an invitation to a 
conference on the Islamic mystic and poet Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi in one of the 
mosques, as well as an invitation to the introduction days of Ibn Ghaldoun, an 
Islamic secondary school in Rotterdam. In turn, the commercial ‘Umwelt’ is visible 
with Sigorta & Ipotek (insurance and mortgage) pamphlets, Komfort Makelaardij 
& Verzekeringen – ‘Size bir telefon kadar yakınız’, a promotional leaflet of an 
insurance and housing company, and Garage Middelland – ‘Aktie grote beurt APK 
Gratis en nog veel meer aktie’, the promotion material of a car repair garage. All 
these announcements indicate that the role of the mosque in the local community 
exceeds that of religious issues. 
As mentioned before, the two local mosques have conference rooms with 
facilities. These rooms are sometimes rented out to other organisations; depending 
on the renting party and the topic of the meeting, a fee is asked by the mosque. If a 
Muslim women’s society meets there to discuss issues such as child abuse, no fee 
is asked, though if a non-Muslim school requests a guided tour and information 
about Islam for its students, the mosque asks for a fee. The admission of external 
parties is, however, guarded carefully. The mosque boards generally do not accept 
activities that would offend the local cemaat, though here we also see a gradual 
change. Twenty years ago it would be inconceivable for many Muslims to allow 
non-Muslims in during important moments such as the iftar, celebrating the 
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breaking of fast with a meal. Today, any serious mosque Board has its own iftar 
party for the neighbourhood. 
Officially, politics are not allowed inside the mosque; however, in the tea or 
television room no one can forbid visitors from having conversations about politics 
or candidates. In the case of the Mevlana mosque, in the ‘TICF part’ of the mosque 
pictures of candidates for the local elections were put on the walls. 
The board members of the Kocatepe mosque have put together a kind of mission 
statement about the position of the Kocatepe mosque within its local, social 
environment. Kocatepe has relationships with the police – including the 
‘wijkagent’ (area policeman) – as well as schools, the BOA (Bewoners Organisatie 
Afrikaanderwijk, a local organisation of people living in the quarter), churches, and 
health care organisations. Relationships with other Islamic organisations also exist, 
though to a lesser extent. The best relationships, albeit not formalised, are those 
with the Milli Görüş and Süleymancı organisations. The ISN and the TICF do not 
participate in the SPIOR, the Rotterdam Platform of Muslim Organisations, though 
this is the result of a personal conflict (which began some twenty years ago) about 
leadership and the dominance of the ISN and the TICF in issues related to Islam in 
the Netherlands. Today, informal relations between the platform and the local 
TICF and ISN organisations are not bad. However, there are currently – according 
to some informants – no intentions to become a member of SPIOR in the near 
future.  
This above case study of two local mosque organisations and their local 
functions shows that the Mevlana and Kocatepe mosques in Rotterdam are 
multifunctional, religious, social and educational centres. If Diyanet in Turkey 
today launches pilot projects to broaden the range of mosque activities, the Dutch 
ISN mosques may serve as a model. In this way, the Diyanet network in Europe is 
not merely a transplantation of Turkish models; it has developed its own modus 
operandi that could even be brought back to Turkey. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
The central question of this research was: 
 
To what extent and how do recent changes in the religious and political power 
relations in Turkey affect the position and politico-religious agenda of Diyanet, 
and how do they influence Diyanet’s relation with other actors in the religious 
arena? 
 
The relevance of this question arises from two central observations regarding the 
role Diyanet plays in the way Turkish Islam takes shape, both in Turkey and in 
Europe more generally. First, an adequate assessment of Diyane’s institutional 
position (and possible changes in this regard) could prove relevant for European 
policy makers in terms of both foreign policy and laws related to immigration and 
integration. Diyanet’s activities in European host countries and close connection 
with the Turkish state are not new but have existed over the past 25 years. 
However, the present political climate in Europe has made the extent to which the 
Turkish government exerts influence on Turkish citizens abroad a sensitive issue. 
Second, a close examination Diyanet touches on the present debate about the future 
membership of Turkey in the European Union, and the conditions Turkey should 
fulfil to occupy such a position. 
This research also contributes to important scientific and academic debates 
concerning the development of Islam in an increasingly secular age. The report 
elaborates on the important issue of the separation of church and state and how 
secularism takes shape in different political and social contexts. The results of this 
research can contribute to a deeper understanding of how relations between 
religion and the state evolve under constantly changing circumstances. 
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The research consisted of two parts, the first examining Diyanet’s role in 
shaping Islam in Turkey, and the second analysing the situation in the Netherlands. 
For the Turkish case, we considered the institutional and legal framework in which 
Diyanet operates and possible changes in this framework. We also examined the 
politico-religious influences both on and emerging within Diyanet, and the extent 
to which the AKP adopts these influences. Finally, in addition to analysing the 
various activities carried out by Diyanet, we also investigated characteristics of 
Diyanet’s religious leadership position in and out of Turkey, and possible changes 
in this respect.  
With respect to the Dutch portion of this research, in general we addressed the 
same issues. Since the socio-political context in which Diyanet operates in the 
Netherlands differs fundamentally from Turkey, we have concentrated in particular 
on how this difference operates in specific situations. Of particular concern was the 
question how Diyanet positions itself vis-à-vis other Turkish religious movements 
operating in the Netherlands. 
 
Conclusions 
We broke down our analysis of Diyanet into four dimensions, focusing on the 
institutional role, the actual activities of Diyanet, the role of Diyanet as a ‘religious 
guide’, and how Diyanet positions itself vis-à-vis other Islamic groups and 
religious denominations.  
With respect to the first dimension, we looked primarily at Diyanet’s relation 
with the state, its internal organisation, the financial position of the institution, and 
the composition of the staff. Diyanet was set up in 1924 by the Turkish state, then 
under control of a Minister of State who was responsible for the Directorate; the 
primary aim at the time was to control Islam and organise the material aspects of 
the religious life of Muslims. The central office in Ankara and regional 
departments across the country together have the mutual task of fulfilling these 
aims. Since the 1970s, Diyanet extended its organisation abroad, notably in Europe 
but also in other parts of the world. From the 1980s onwards, the importance of 
Diyanet to the Turkish state increased substantially. The 1982 constitution expects 
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Diyanet to contribute to national solidarity and unity and gives the institution a 
place in the General Ministry (i.e. the Ministry led by the Prime Minister). Within 
this ministry, the responsibility for Diyanet lies, as was in 1924, with a Minister of 
State who is a member of the Turkish cabinet.  
Though our respondents from Diyanet underlined the relative autonomy of 
Diyanet in formulating its own judgments on religious and moral matters, and 
although media reports from recent years suggest that not all statements of Diyanet 
were appreciated by the government, it is obvious that, for decades, the Turkish 
government has seen Diyanet as an instrument through which policies on Islam are 
put into practice. As such, the Turkish government has traditionally expected 
Diyanet to operate as an ally to government policies. The present government is no 
exception to this political tendency. While a recent modification of the law 
regulating the internal organisation of Diyanet gave the institution more 
possibilities to manage their own affairs – e.g. in the nomination of candidates for 
top functions – it did not fundamentally alter the power relation between Diyanet 
and the Turkish government. 
Turning from the influence of government to that of society, it is common 
knowledge that factions exist within the ranks of Diyanet (political, regional and 
theological) that reflect to some extent different segments of Turkish society. These 
fractions are able to exert their own influence on decision-making processes. 
Sometimes this has been presented as infiltration of conservative and Islamist 
forces attempting to Islamise Turkish society through Diyanet. The problem with 
such statements is that they often come from biased sources and cannot easily by 
verified or falsified. Such an endeavour was not the aim of our research. However, 
that a large and growing organisation like Diyanet has sympathisers encompassing 
a variety of cultural and religious subgroups seems obvious.  
Diyanet is also a large bureaucratic organisation with thousands of employees 
and a large budget. As a state organisation, it should not be depicted as a religious 
movement with a specific religious identity. We contend that Diyanet should 
indeed be seen as a state bureaucracy in the first place; many of the changes and 
continuities that we have described in this report should also be understood in this 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 138 
perspective. One consequence of Diyanet’s position in the state is that fundamental 
changes in its political role are very unlikely in the short run, both due to its 
constitutional base as well as the financial and economic repercussions any change 
in Diyanet’s position might impart. 
With respect to institutional characteristics, we observed sometimes 
contradicting tendencies, such as on the one hand more centralisation and on the 
other the transferring of responsibilities to regional offices. Until recently, the 
Friday sermon (hutbe) was issued by the central Diyanet authorities on a weekly 
basis. This was one of the measures in which successive secularist governments 
tried to control local imams and religious practices. Decentralising the Friday 
sermon could thus also be interpreted as a move by the AKP to promote religious 
freedom: one of the political priorities of the AKP. 
In terms of Diyanet’s budget, the number of personnel has increased steadily 
over the last fifteen years, though at pace consistent with the general growth of the 
Turkish population. There were no remarkable changes in the budget and related 
activities of Diyanet since 2003. 
However, in recent years, there have been changes worth mentioning. We 
observed a stronger focus on the professionalisation of religious personnel. There is 
a slightly larger proportion of board members within Diyanet with theological 
training as opposed to civil servants lacking theological training compared to ten 
years ago. We also observed a clearer distinction between religious tasks and those 
of a more administrative nature. In general, decentralisation and professionalisation 
point at a shift away from the controlling function of Diyanet – a function which 
has a high priority for secularists – towards the theological tasks of the 
organisation. 
With respect to institutional developments in the Netherlands, we did not 
observe major changes in the last decade. In the Netherlands (as in other European 
countries) Diyanet established a daughter organisation in the early 1980s, the ISN, 
in order to exert control over Islamic practices of Turkish citizens abroad. The 
board of the ISN in The Hague is formally presided by the head of Diyanet in 
Ankara. This means that Diyanet has a direct influence on the policies of the ISN. 
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The daily management of the ISN is in the hands of a senior official of Diyanet, 
who is appointed as din müşaviri (counsellor on religion) at the Turkish Embassy 
in Den Haag. He holds a diplomatic passport and stands above the two religious 
attachés residing in the Dutch consulates in Rotterdam and Deventer. While the 
latter are more engaged with the imams working in the Netherlands (their 
appointment and functioning), the muşavir advises the Ambassador on religious 
issues, which is his main task. 
One important way for Diyanet to exert influence on local Muslim communities 
is through the appointment of imams. The selection of these imams takes place in 
Turkey, as they are officially employees of the Turkish state. In addition to this, 
mosques that resort under the ISN are officially owned by a foundation that is also 
associated with Diyanet. In short, one could conclude that Diyanet in Turkey has a 
powerful influence on Turkish Muslim communities in the Netherlands through the 
organisational structure of the ISN and the appointment of imams. 
Such a top-down analysis, however, does not take into account the fact that 
mosques in the Netherlands operate in a fundamentally different context than in 
Turkey. Our research findings are consistent with previous research which found 
that the development of Muslim communities in Europe has its own dynamics. For 
a long time, the strong emotional and familial attachments of many Turkish 
migrants in Europe provided a solid basis for organisational links between Diyanet 
and the Turkish Muslim communities in Europe. In the course of the past twenty 
years, we have seen that these ties have lost much of their saliency. It is very likely 
that this will influence the position of organisations such as Diyanet among 
Muslims in Europe. In addition, Diyanet in Europe operates in a fundamentally 
different legal-political framework than that in Turkey; this too is relevant for the 
position of Diyanet. 
With respect to the activities of Diyanet (the second dimension of our analysis), 
not surprisingly, current emphasis is on religious services in the mosque and 
Islamic education. This can be considered the core business of Diyanet throughout 
history; most of Diyanet’s budget is geared towards the salaries of religious 
personnel, the printing and distribution of religious material, and the organisation 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 140 
of religious activities. In the past decades (well before the coming to power of the 
AKP), Diyanet has, in addition to these core activities, been increasingly 
concentrated on its public role. This has become clear in two ways. On the one 
hand, Diyanet has increased the use of modern mass media to reach out to those 
segments of society that cannot be reached through conventional means. On the 
other hand, Diyanet has invested in activities that have no obvious religious 
undertone, such as sports, social activities for special target groups, and art. The 
experiment with mosques as social centres that are more than places of worship is a 
good example of the process we have called ‘the social turn’. Diyanet is more 
explicitly active in those fields that are located on the boundaries between religious 
and non-religious. 
The same could be observed in the Netherlands, where the ISN is changing its 
function from a bureaucratic administrative institute into an organisation that 
reaches out to the local religious community. Although most Turkish mosques in 
the Netherlands are still places where there is no sharp distinction between religion 
and Turkish culture, and where ‘love for the fatherland’ is a self-evident element of 
the daily religious practice, we could observe an increasing emphasis on a process 
of ‘rooting’. Dutch is becoming more important as the common language in a 
variety of activities. We consider these gradual changes as a crucial aspect of this 
‘social turn’. 
Diyanet’s duties include articulating and illuminating Islam to the general 
public; one of the activities of its highest body, the Higher Council of Religious 
Affairs, is answering questions about the correct interpretation of Islamic practices 
and beliefs. We identified the religious guidance of Diyanet as one of its more 
sensitive activities, as in this field two loyalties come together, and possibly 
collide: the secular state and the religious arena. The picture that emerges from our 
analysis of the religious information and guidance of Diyanet is one of an 
institution extensively engaged in the vocabulary, classical sources and 
methodologies available to Sunni religious authorities all over the world. Fatwa’s 
issued by Diyanet gain their legitimacy in the same way as other fatwa institutions, 
by interpreting the Quran, quoting authentic prophetic traditions and using 
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analogous reasoning to address new moral questions. In this sense, Diyanet works 
like an institution for Sunni orthodoxy.  
However, it is striking how much Diyanet’s religious and moral advice conforms 
to values promoted by the modern Turkish republic, which are widely accepted by 
the Turkish public. Diyanet’s stance on contemporary issues, such as birth control, 
in vitro fertilisation, organ transplantation, and sexuality, as well as how these 
subjects should be taught in schools, broadly reflects the views and opinions of a 
majority of the population. Diyanet accepts and promotes Turkish nationalism, one 
of the pillars of the Turkish republic, and provides it with a religious legitimacy. A 
field where the ideas of Sunni orthodoxy and Kemalism go remarkably hand in 
hand is popular Islam and the veneration of saints; this is condemned as 
superstitious and in violation of the Islamic principle that veneration is for God 
only.  
As a religious guide, Diyanet has managed, so far, to avoid clashes with the 
secular principles of the Turkish republic. In some sensitive cases, this was done by 
refraining from religious judgments utilizing a specific Islamic vocabulary (like 
halal or haram, allowed or forbidden) and using more general language instead 
(like wise, unwise, usual practice in Islamic cultures, etc). Also, Diyanet officials 
have refused to pass religious judgments on politically controversial topics, like the 
headscarf ban for civil servants, simply commenting that such matters were for the 
government to decide.  
The last dimension we addressed concerned the place of Diyanet in the broader 
religious landscape of Europe. Questions asked in this regard related to whether the 
organisation recognises religious diversity both within Islam and in the rest of 
society. We were particularly interested in the relation between Diyanet and the 
Alevi people, comprising an estimated 20 percent of the Turkish population. Two 
issues are at stake here; Diyanet is a service institute for religious matters, and 
when the Law gives Diyanet the task of coordinating religious services, there is no 
explicit reference to Sunni Islam. In Turkey, with a Sunni population of about 74 
percent, however, it has always been assumed that religious services provided by 
Diyanet were implicitly based on Sunni Islam. The resurgence of Alevi Islam in the 
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1980s challenged this situation and created a dilemma for the Turkish government 
and Diyanet: were Alevis entitled to benefit from Diyanet services, and if so, under 
what conditions? This controversy still rings true today; making substantial 
concessions to Alevi claims would drastically change the role and identity Diyanet 
has cultivated for decades. Refusing such concessions could easily be seen as 
favouring a religious community (the Sunnis), and discriminating against another 
(the Alevis). Moreover, this tension is very likely to influence the debate on 
Turkey’s integration into the EU. So far, the AKP government has taken cautious 
steps towards a dialogue with the Alevis, but the Diyanet leadership itself has been 
very reluctant to accept the Alevis as a distinct religious group.  
Diyanet could also emphasise its function as a service institute for all religious 
denominations and adopt a more neutral position. However, in practice, we did not 
observe such a strategy. In general, Diyanet refrains from making statements about 
the position of religious denominations in Turkish society. 
In the Netherlands, the position of Diyanet within the national religious 
landscape is fundamentally different from that in Turkey. From their foundation in 
the early 1980s onwards, formally speaking, ISN mosques had no privileged 
position in comparison to other Islamic organisations, apart from the arrangements 
for imams. They are, on paper, just one of the many organisations operating in the 
religious field. We observed some relaxation in the way Diyanet addresses other 
movements. On some occasions, Diyanet openly collaborated with other 
movements, though it is too early to draw strong conclusions on this subject about 
a possible policy change. A sceptic might argue, for the Dutch case, that this 
reconsideration of their position is a strategic move to encapsulate other 
organisations and to dominate them, but we could also conclude that this is simple 
‘Realpolitik’. 
 
Reflections 
Our findings lead us to conclude that policy changes in recent years, both within 
the institutional structure of and towards Diyanet, do not reflect any remarkable 
breaks with the periods prior to the coming to power of the AKP. In other words,, 
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the AKP has not used its political power to enforce major changes in the position 
of Diyanet any more than other governments in the past. Yet we contend that a 
thorough assessment of the policies of Diyanet should neither be confined to the 
last decade, nor to the policies of the present government alone, but rather take into 
account the transformations of Turkish society over a much longer period. Only 
then are we able to interpret both changes and continuities in our observations. It 
was for this reason that we included older documents, secondary literature and 
other relevant sources in our analysis, thereby ensuring an historical perspective. 
The conclusions described above should thus be interpreted against the background 
of these societal transformations.  
Since the 1980s, Turkey has been undergoing vast social and political changes. 
New political parties have emerged that began to address their constituencies 
through new media outlets; the country opened up economically and a new urban 
middle class was born. Even more fundamental, and related to these developments, 
was the growth of a civil society in Turkey, which facilitated the gradual rooting of 
a democracy – not simply from a legal standpoint but also in everyday social life. 
The political effects of these changes continue to gradually unfold. For one thing, it 
is clear that Islam has become a crucial factor in the making of modern politics in 
Turkey. Admittedly, Islam has for long played a marginalised political role in the 
past and is more visible today. This has often mistakenly been referred to as the 
‘return of Islam’; however, this is not a very adequate understanding of recent 
developments. The present saliency of Islam as a social and political force is not a 
‘return’ to an earlier phase in history, but rather reflects the recent social and 
economic changes discussed above. Another important development is the 
intensified negotiations between Turkey and the European Union about the 
country’s membership. The fact that a vast majority of the Turkish population is 
Muslim imbues the membership issue with a deeply cultural and religious 
connotation. 
Thus, the continuities and changes in the policies and practices of Diyanet 
should not simply be attributed to the AKP’s coming of power; rather, both the 
changes and the victory of AKP must be considered manifestations of broader 
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societal changes sketched above. Islam in Turkey has long been associated with 
rural backwardness, provincialism and conservatism, and not least, a strong inward 
looking attitude. Until the end of the 1990s, Turkey’s main Islamic political 
movement was strongly against relations with the European Union. However, the 
societal basis of the AKP is a strong urban Islamic middle class with an 
international outlook. 
How can we relate these developments to the position of Diyanet? From our 
research findings it becomes clear that Diyanet, as it exists today, engages in 
essentially three functions which determine its public face. The first function 
involves the role of Diyanet as state bureaucracy that controls, monitors and 
‘domesticates’ Islam. The second is Diyanet’s role as a service institute, which 
facilitates the material conditions of religious life – a service that, in principle, 
could be provided by a religiously neutral institution for different religious groups 
in society. The third function of Diyanet is as a modern version of a Sunni religious 
authority (which also was one of the functions of the Şeyhülislam in the Ottoman 
era). In this function, Diyanet’s activities are only oriented towards the estimated 
74 percent of Sunni Muslims in Turkey and those abroad. 
The first function of Diyanet has existed for most of the republican years. As a 
controlling institute, Diyanet is meant to promote a republican version of Islam. 
Services such as imam training and religious guidance are in that respect means to 
a Kemalist end. However, since the 1980s, this controlling function came under 
pressure. The second function, as a facilitating institution, is often stressed by 
Diyanet to external observers who express their bewilderment of a secular state 
tolerating a religious institution like Diyanet. Indeed, this second function is 
probably what many European observers would find the most acceptable function 
of an institution like Diyanet. As we saw in practice, Diyanet operates mainly as a 
modern Sunni ‘church’ institution. The quote of former President Bardakoğlu, with 
which we began this report, strongly suggests this. 
The role of Diyanet is complex and these three functions seem contradictory as 
they reflect the different political forces that act upon Diyanet and ‘appropriate’ its 
legitimacy in society. Different political actors prefer and underline these different 
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functions. In addition, the different functions or combinations of them can be 
emphasised in different circumstances and contexts, and this is precisely why 
successive governments have never seriously considered the abolition of Diyanet. 
The AKP is no exception to that political tradition. 
However, the different contradicting functions within the institutional 
framework of Diyanet also make its position in society principally complex. The 
continuity we observed in the way Diyanet is organised, in its formal structure and 
in its legal place in society has two main implications. On the one hand, it means 
that the seven years of AKP rule have apparently not resulted in fundamental 
changes to the make-up of Diyanet – something that some more secular observers 
feared. On the other hand, it implies that no new initiatives should be expected 
which coincide with what secular or western observers might like to see. Diyanet’s 
position vis-à-vis non-Sunni Islamic movements has not changed fundamentally 
either. In other words, the implicit demand by some Western governments towards 
Diyanet to ‘open up’ and function as a neutral service institute (that facilitates 
religious denomination equally) will probably not be complied with in the near 
future, at least not on paper. Also, the apparent contradiction between Diyanet’s 
three roles (guardian of the secular order, service institute above the parties, and 
Sunni religious guide) is not likely to be resolved in the near future. Major changes 
would undermine the relative balance between the three functions of Diyanet.  
However, with respect to the actual practices of Diyanet, our findings reveal that 
there are clear changes both in Turkey and in the Netherlands. There has been an 
unmistakable relaxation in the controlling role of Diyanet. In several sections of 
our report, we mention ‘parallel Islam’ in Turkey, denoting non-official, semi-legal 
Islamic movements that play a significant role in the Turkish landscape. Until 
recently, Diyanet was strict in curbing all kinds of activities initiated by ‘parallel 
Islam’, though various social and economic transformations (noted above) have 
relegated some of these movements to the margins of society; conversely, other 
groups, notably those in support of the AKP, have acquired a more prominent 
position. It is thus clear that the division between ‘parallel’ and ‘official’ Islam 
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needs a thorough revision, not at least because it has also influenced the Islamic 
landscape in Europe.  
The most important changes both in Turkey and in the Netherlands are related to 
what we have called the ‘social turn’ (vermaatschappelijking) in the characteristics 
of activities and initiatives taken by Diyanet. In both Turkey and in the 
Netherlands, there are clear indications that Diyanet is orienting itself more 
explicitly to the cemaat, the religious community, at least to the Sunni community. 
Whereas previously the ISN in the Netherlands organised primarily religious 
activities, it has now extended its program with activities designed to work on the 
social texture of the religious community. Also in Turkey, there are clear signs that 
Diyanet is progressively engaging in activities that resemble those of a typical 
NGO. How can this be interpreted? In our view, there are two ways to assess these 
developments. One is to consider these actual practices as strategic choices to 
extend Diyanet’s influence over the Muslim population with new instruments. A 
more logical (and less conspiratorial) explanation would be that a ‘turn to society 
and away from the state’ is part of the long-term changes that have taken place in 
Turkish society. To put it differently, for a long time the secular state was the sole 
political force that (through Diyanet) directed the course of Islam in Turkish 
society. From the 1980s onwards, though actually since the post-war 
democratisation of Turkish society, the influence of civil society on the place of 
Islam has increased considerably. This shift is currently being reflected in the 
attitudes and activities of Diyanet.  
We have argued that assuming a direct correlation between the coming to power 
of the AKP and a possible policy change in Diyanet neglects the various shifts in 
Turkish society over the past three decades, in which the emergence of Islam as a 
significant social force is just one of many elements. It could also be argued that 
some aspects of the ongoing Islamisation of Turkish society is an obvious and self-
evident result of these societal developments. The recent referendum, in which a 
majority of the population voted for further restrictions in the political power of the 
army, will no doubt increase tensions between secularists and the more religious 
portion of Turkish population. What is clear is that Diyanet’s constitutional duty to 
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support national harmony and unity whilst illuminating religious matters to the 
public has not become any easier. 
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Organisation chart ISN119
 
 
 
 
Member of the General Board120
Professor Dr. Ali Bardakoğlu (T.C. Diyanet Işleri Başkanı) 
 
Doç. Dr. Ali Dere (DİB Dış İlişkileri Dairesi Başkanı) 
Doç. Dr. Bülent Şenay (Din Hizemetleri Müşaviri) 
Dr. Tayyar Altıkulaç 
                                           
119 
http://www.diyanet.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=103&Itemid=193 
120 HDV Bülten 2009: 11 
• HDV: ISN;  
• Genel Kurul: General Board 
• Denetleme Kurulu: Board of 
Supervision 
• Yönetim Kurulu: Management 
Team 
• Eğitim Merkezi: Education Centre 
• Araştırma Merkezi: Research 
Centre 
• Şube Camileri: local mosques 
(142) 
• Çalışma Birimleri:work units 
• Idari Koordinatör: administrative 
coordinator  
• Muhasebe: treasurer  
• Sekreterya: secretary;  
• Cenaze Fonu: funeral trust 
• Cenaze Firması: funeral 
company 
• Gençlik Koordinatörü: youth 
coördinator 
• Hizmet Birimi: service unit 
• Iletişim ve Medya: 
communication and media 
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Professor Dr. Mustafa said Yazicioğlu 
Sami Uslu 
Arif Soytürk 
Rıza Selimbaşoğlu 
Niyazi Baloğlu 
Ahmet Uzunoğlu 
Mustafa Yılmaz 
Mehmet Kervancı 
Hayrettin Şallı 
Mahmut Sezgin 
Remzi Yavuz 
Erdinç Türkçan 
Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz 
 
The current Management Team was appointed on 19 October, 2008, and has the 
following composition: 
 
Dr. Bülent Şenay, chairman 
Veysel Kükrek, treasurer (imam of the Ahi Evren Mosque, The Hague) 
Rahim Usan, accountant (chairman of the Mimar Sinan Mosque in 
Heerhogowaard) 
Nevruz Özcan (chairman of the Fatih mosque in Roermond 
Recep Erkoç (chairman of the Supervision Board of the Nebi Mosque in Kampen 
Zekeriya Açkalmaz (coordinator of the ISN-Education Centre in Rotterdam  
Abdurrahman Aydeğer (chairman of the Mevlana Mosque in Rotterdam) 
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9.2. List of respondents 
 
Mr. Subaşı, advisor of Faruk Çelik, the Minister of State responsible for Diyanet. 
Also a member of the Higher Council of Religious Affairs. 
Mr. Çağrıcı, mufti of Istanbul. 
Mr. İzzet Er, Vice President of Diyanet. 
Mr. Caner Taslaman, theologian and philosopher. 
Mr. Saim Yeprem, director of Science, Culture, Arts and Publication Board of the 
Turkish Diyanet Foundation and former member of the Higher Council of 
Religious Affairs. 
Mr. Bunyamin Erul, member of the Higher Commission of Religious Affairs and 
the person leading the Hadith Project. 
Mrs. İştar Gözaydın, Professor of Law and Politics, Istanbul Technical University. 
Mr. Bülent Şenay, President of ISN the Netherlands. 
 
In the Dutch case, on request of the interviewees, besides the President of the 
President of ISN, due to privacy reasons, we decided not to publish names. 
Summarising, we conducted about twenty interviews; representatives of various 
Muslim organisations on national and local levels, board members of mosques, 
board members and policy makers of Muslim platforms, individuals close to ISN, 
scholars and journalists.  
APPENDICES 
 163 
9.3. List of abbreviations 
 
AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or Justice and Development Party. 
CMO: Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid or national Association 
between Muslims and the Government. 
CvdM: Commissariaat voor de Media or Directorate for the Media. 
HAK-DER: Dutch Federation of Alevi and Bektashi Associations. 
HCRA: Higher Council of Religious Affairs. 
HDV: Holland Diyanet Vakfı; Turkish name of ISN. 
IOT: Inspraak Orgaan Turken or Turkish Advisory Board. 
ISN: Islamitische Stichting Nederland or Dutch Islamic Foundation.  
NIF:  Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie or Dutch Islamic 
Federation. 
SIC: Stichting Islamitisch Centrum or Islamic Centre Foundation. 
SICN: Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland or Dutch Islamic 
Centre Foundation. 
TICF: Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie or Turkish Islamic 
Cultural Foundation 
SPIOR: Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties Rijnmond or 
Rotterdam Platform of Muslim Organisations 
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Postscriptum: Resignation of Professor Ali Bardakoğlu 
 
On Thursday the 11th of November 2010, the head of Diyanet, Professor Ali Bardakoğlu announced 
that he had resigned from his post, which he held since 2003. News reports and speculations in and 
outside Turkey suggested that he was removed from office due to his recent remarks, that were 
criticised by the AKP, on Kurban Bayramı (Festival of Sacrifice) and the Muslim headscarf. 
Bardakoğlu had said that Diyanet would recommend not to slaughter animals during the festival that 
year, if this would eventually endanger the livestock population in Turkey. On the headscarf, he had 
said that although it is considered a religious requirement, women who do not wear headscarves could 
still be Muslims. Besides, on several occasions before, he had stated that solving the headscarf issue 
should be left to the politicians, refusing to mingle with politics on this topic: “We were never party to 
the headscarf debates, because the debates are mainly concerned with the political or legal nature of 
the issue. We make statements about the religious nature of the issue only.” (Bardakoğlu 2006: 137). 
Professor Bardakoğlu himself, however, told the media that he had already planned his resignation 
almost a year ago and that it had been a deliberate choice. Bardakoğlu was succeeded by Professor 
Mehmet Görmez, the deputy head of Diyanet since 2003.  
The resignation of Professor Bardakoğlu took place after the period of our research. We leave this 
change of presidency to future researchers to analyse. Nevertheless, we believe that the sometimes 
wild speculations in the press about these event tell us more about the polarised climate in Turkey that 
about what actually happened. We have no reason to assume that the early retirement of Bardakoğlu 
makes a revision of the outcomes of this report necessary.  
 
